Capítulo 24. Chapter XXIV.—What Is The So-Called Art Of Living?
[3.24.188] Again, the Stoics declare that goods of the soul are certain arts, namely the virtues. And an art, they say, is ‟a system composed of co-exercised apprehensions,”[486] and the perceptions arise in the ruling principle. But how there takes place in the ruling principle, which according to them is breath,[487] a deposit of perceptions, and such an aggregation of them as to produce art, it is impossible to conceive, when each succeeding impression obliterates the previous one, seeing that breath is fluid and it is said to move as a whole at each impression.
[3.24.189] For it is perfect nonsense to say that Plato’s imaginary construction of the soul—I mean the mixture of the indivisible and the divisible essence and of the nature of the Other and of the Same,[488] or the Numbers—is capable of being receptive of the Good. Hence the good cannot belong to the soul either.
[3.24.190] But if the good is not choice itself, and what is choiceworthy in itself neither exists externally nor belongs to either body or soul—as I have argued, —then there does not exist at all any natural good.
For the foregoing reasons also there exists no natural evil. For things which seem to some to be evil are pursued as goods by others—for instance, incontinence, injustice, avarice, intemperance, and the like. Hence, if it is the nature of things naturally existent to move all men alike, whereas the things said to be evil do not move all alike, nothing is naturally evil.
[3.24.191] Similarly there is nothing naturally indifferent, because of the divergence of opinion about things indifferent. The Stoics, for example, assert that of the indifferents some are preferred, some rejected, and others neither preferred nor rejected,[489]—the preferred being such as have sufficient value, like health and wealth; the rejected such as have not sufficient value, like poverty and sickness; while extending the finger or bending it in are cases of the neither preferred nor rejected.
[3.24.192] Some, however, maintain that none of the indifferents is by nature preferred or rejected; for, owing to the differences in the circumstances, each of the indifferents appears at one time preferred, at another rejected. For certainly, they argue, if the rich were being threatened with attack by a tyrant while the poor were being left in peace, everyone would prefer to be poor rather than rich, so that wealth would be a thing rejected.
[3.24.193] Consequently,since of each of the so-called indifferents some say that it is good, others bad, whereas all alike would have counted it indifferent had it been naturally indifferent, there is nothing that is naturally indifferent.
So also, should anyone declare that courage is naturally choiceworthy because lions seem to be naturally bold and courageous, bulls too, it may be, and some men and cocks, we reply that, as for that, cowardice also is one of the things naturally choiceworthy, since deer and hares and many other animals are naturally impelled thereto. The majority of men, too, show themselves to be cowardly; for it is rare for a man to give himself up to death for the sake of his country,[490] or to seem inspired to do any other daring deed, the great majority of mankind being averse to all such actions.
[3.24.194] Hence, also, the Epicureans suppose themselves to have proved that pleasure is naturally choiceworthy; for the animals, they say, as soon as they are born, when still unperverted, seek after pleasure and avoid pains.
[3.24.195] But to these we may reply that what is productive of evil cannot be naturally good; but pleasure is productive of evils; for to every pleasure there is linked a pain, and pain, according to them, is a natural evil. Thus, for example, the drunkard feels pleasure when filling himself with wine, and the glutton with food, and the lecher in immoderate sexual intercourse, yet these things are productive of both poverty and sickness, which, as they say, are painful and evil. Pleasure, therefore, is not a natural good.
[3.24.196] Similarly, too, what is productive of good is not naturally evil, and pains bring about pleasures; it is, in fact, by toil that we acquire knowledge, and it is thus also that a man becomes possessed both of wealth and of his lady-love, and pains preserve health. Toil, then, is not naturally evil. Indeed if pleasure were naturally good, and toil bad, all men, as we said, would have been similarly disposed towards them, whereas we see many of the philosophers choosing toil and hardship and despising pleasure.
[3.24.197] And so, too, those who assert that the virtuous life is naturally good might be refuted by the fact that some of the sages choose the life which includes pleasure,[491] so that the claim that a thing is by nature of this sort or that is contradicted by the divergence of opinion amongst the Dogmatists themselves.
[3.24.198] And perhaps it may not be amiss, in addition to what has been said, to dwell more in detail, though briefly, on the notions concerning things shameful and not shameful, unholy and not so, laws and customs, piety towards the gods, reverence for the departed, and the like. For thus we shall discover a great variety of belief concerning what ought or ought not to be done.
[3.24.199] For example,[492] amongst us sodomy is regarded as shameful or rather illegal, but by the Germani,[493] they say, it is not looked on as shameful but as a customary thing. It is said, too, that in Thebes long ago this practice was not held to be shameful, and they say that Meriones the Cretan was so called by way of indicating the Cretans’ custom,[494] and some refer to this the burning love of Achilles for Patroclus.[495]
[3.24.200] And what wonder, when both the adherents of the Cynic philosophy and the followers of Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, declare that this practice is indifferent?[496] Having intercourse with a woman, too, in public, although deemed by us to be shameful, is not thought to be shameful by some of the Indians; at any rate they couple publicly with indifference, like the philosopher Crates, as the story goes.
[3.24.201] Moreover, prostitution is with us a shameful and disgraceful thing, but with many of the Egyptians it is highly esteemed; at least, they say that those women who have the greatest number of lovers wear an ornamental ankle-ring as a token of their proud position.[497] And with some of them the girls marry after collecting a dowry before marriage by means of prostitution. We see the Stoics also declaring that it is not amiss to keep company with a prostitute or to live on the profits of prostitution.
[3.24.202] Moreover, with us tattooing is held to be shameful and degrading, but many of the Egyptians and Sarmatians tattoo their offspring.
[3.24.203] Also, it is a shameful thing with us for men to wear earrings, but amongst some of the barbarians, like the Syrians, it is a token of nobility. And some, by way of marking their nobility still further, pierce the nostrils also of their children and suspend from them rings of silver or gold—a thing which nobody with us would do,
[3.24.204] just as no man here would dress himself in a flowered robe reaching to the feet, although this dress, which with us is thought shameful, is held to be highly respectable by the Persians. And when, at the Court of Dionysius the tyrant of Sicily, a dress of this description was offered to the philosophers Plato and Aristippus,[498] Plato sent it away with the words—
but Aristippus accepted it, saying—
Thus, even in the case of these sages, while the one of them deemed this practice shameful, the other did not.
[3.24.205] And with us it is sinful to marry one’s mother or one’s own sister; but the Persians, and especially those of them who are reputed to practise wisdom— namely, the Magi,—marry their mothers; and the Egyptians[499] take their sisters in marriage, even as the poet says[500]—
Moreover, Zeno of Citium says that it is not amiss for a man to rub his mother’s private part with his own private part, just as no one would say it was bad for him to rub any other part of her body with his hand. Chrysippus,[501] too, in his book The State approves of a father getting children by his daughter, a mother by her son, and a brother by his sister. And Plato,[502] in more general terms, has declared that wives ought to be held in common.
[3.24.206] Masturbation, too, which we count loathsome, is not disapproved by Zeno; and we are informed that others, too, practise this evil as though it were a good thing.
[3.24.207] Moreover, the eating of human flesh is sinful with us, but indifferent amongst whole tribes of barbarians.[503] Yet why should one speak of ‟barbarians” when even Tydeus[504] is said to have devoured the brains of his enemy, and the Stoic School declare that it is not wrong for a man to eat either other men’s flesh or his own?
[3.24.208] And with most of us it is sinful to defile an altar of a god with human blood, but the Laconians lash themselves fiercely over the altar of Artemis Orthosia[505] in order that a great stream of blood may flow over the altar of the goddess. Moreover, some sacrifice a human victim to Cronos, just as the Scythians[506] sacrifice strangers to Artemis; whereas we deem that holy places are defiled by the slaying of a man.
[3.24.209] Adulterers are, of course, punished by law with us, but amongst some peoples[507] intercourse with other men’s wives is a thing indifferent; and some philosophers,[508] too, declare that intercourse with the wife of another is indifferent.
[3.24.210] With us, also, the law enjoins that the fathers should receive due care from their children; but the Scythians cut their throats when they get to be over sixty years old. And what wonder, seeing that Cronos cut off his father’s genitals with a sickle, and Zeus plunged Cronos down to Tartarus, and Athena with the help of Hera and Poseidon attempted to bind her father with fetters?[509]
[3.24.211] Moreover, Cronos decided to destroy his own children, and Solon gave the Athenians the law ‟concerning things immune,” by which he allowed each man to slay his own child; but with us the laws forbid the slaying of children. The Roman lawgivers also ordain that the children are subjects and slaves of their fathers, and that power over the children’s property belongs to the fathers and not the children, until the children have obtained their freedom like bought slaves; but this custom is rejected by others as being despotic.
[3.24.212] It is the law, too, that homicides should be punished; but gladiators when they kill often receive actual commendation. Moreover, the laws prevent the striking of free men; yet when athletes strike free men, and often even kill them, they are deemed worthy of rewards and crowns.
[3.24.213] With us, too, the law bids each man to have one wife, but amongst the Thracians and Gaetulians (a Libyan tribe)[510] each man has many wives.
[3.24.214] Piracy, too, is with us illegal and criminal, but with many of the barbarians it is not disapproved. Indeed they say that the Cilicians used to regard it as a noble pursuit, so that they held those who died in the course of piracy to be worthy of honour. So too Nestor—in the poet’s account[511]—after welcoming Telemachus and his comrades, addresses them thus—
Yet, if piracy had been an improper thing, he would not have welcomed them in this friendly way, because of his suspicion that they might be people of that kind.
[3.24.215] Moreover, thieving is with us illegal and criminal; yet those who declare that Hermes is a most thievish god cause this practice to be accounted not criminal— for how could a god be bad? And some say that the Laconians also punished those who thieved, not because they had thieved, but because they had been found out.
[3.24.216] Moreover, the coward and the man who throws away his shield are in many places punished by law; and this is why the Laconian mother, when giving a shield to her son as he set out for the war, said, ‟Either with this, my child, or upon it.” Yet Archilochus,[512] as though vaunting to us of his flight after flinging away his shield, speaks thus of himself in his poems—
[3.24.217] And the Amazons[513] used to maim the males amongst their offspring so as to make them incapable of any manly action, while they themselves attended to warfare; though with us the opposite practice is regarded as right. The Mother of the gods,[514] also, approves of effeminates, and the goddess would not have decided thus if unmanliness were naturally a bad thing.
[3.24.218] So it is that, in regard to justice and injustice and the excellence of manliness, there is a great variety of opinion.
Around all matters of religion and_ theology also, there rages violent controversy.[515] For while the majority declare that gods exist, some deny their existence, like Diagoras of Melos, and Theodorus, and Critias the Athenian.[516] And of those who maintain the existence of gods, some believe in the ancestral gods, others in such as are constructed in the Dogmatic systems—as Aristotle asserted that God is incorporeal and ‟the limit of heaven,”[517] the Stoics that he is a breath which permeates even through things foul, Epicurus that he is anthropomorphic,[518] Xenophanes that he is an impassive sphere.
[3.24.219] Some, too, hold that he cares for human affairs, others that he does not so care; for Epicurus declares that ‟what is blessed and incorruptible neither feels trouble itself nor causes it to others.” Hence ordinary people differ also, some saying that there is one god, others that there are many gods and of various shapes; in fact, they even come to share the notions of the Egyptians[519] who believe in gods that are dog-faced, or hawk-shaped, or cows or crocodiles or anything else.
[3.24.220] Hence, too, sacrificial usages, and the ritual of worship in general, exhibit great diversity. For things which are in some cults accounted holy are in others accounted unholy. But this would not have been so if the holy and the unholy existed by nature. Thus, for example, no one would sacrifice a pig to Sarapis, but they sacrifice it to Heracles and Asclepius. To sacrifice a sheep to Isis is forbidden, but it is offered up in honour of the so-called Mother of the gods and of other deities.
[3.24.221] To Cronos[520] a human victim is sacrificed ⟨at Carthage⟩, although this is regarded by most as an impious act. In Alexandria they offer a cat to Horus and a beetle to Thetis—a thing which no one here would do. To Poseidon they sacrifice a horse; but to Apollo (especially the Didymaean[521] Apollo) that animal is an abomination. It is an act of piety to offer goats to Artemis, but not to Asclepius.
[3.24.222] And I might add a host of similar instances, but I forbear since my aim is to be brief. Yet surely, if a sacrifice had been holy by nature or unholy, it would have been deemed so by all men alike.
Examples similar to these may also be found in the religious observances with regard to human diet.
[3.24.223] For a Jew or an Egyptian priest[522] would sooner die than eat swine’s flesh; by a Libyan it is regarded as a most impious thing to taste the meat of a sheep, by some of the Syrians to eat a dove, and by others to eat sacrificial victims. And in certain cults it is lawful, but in others impious, to eat fish. And amongst the Egyptians some of those who are reputed to be sages believe it is sinful to eat an animal’s head,[523] others the shoulder, others the foot, others some other part.
[3.24.224] And no one would bring an onion[524] as an offering to Zeus Casius of Pelusium,[525] just as no priest of the Libyan Aphrodite would taste garlic. And in some cults they abstain from mint, in others from catmint, in others from parsley. And some declare that they would sooner eat their fathers’ heads than beans.[526]
[3.24.225] Yet, amongst others, these things are indifferent. Eating dog’s flesh, too, is thought by us to be sinful, but some of the Thracians are reported to be dog-eaters. Possibly this practice was customary also amongst the Greeks; and on this account Diocles, too, starting from the practices of the Asclepiadae,[527] prescribes that hounds’ flesh should be given to certain patients. And some, as I have said,[528] even eat human flesh indifferently, a thing which with us is accounted sinful.
[3.24.226] Yet, if the rules of ritual and of unlawful foods had existed by nature, they would have been observed by all men alike.
A similar account may be given of reverence towards the departed.[529] Some wrap the dead up completely and then cover them with earth, thinking that it is impious to expose them to the sun; but the Egyptians take out their entrails and embalm them and keep them above ground with themselves.
[3.24.227] The fish-eating tribes of the Ethiopians cast them into the lakes, there to be devoured by the fish; the Hyrcanians[530] expose them as a prey to dogs, and some of the Indians to vultures. And they say that some of the Troglodytes[531] take the corpse to a hill, and then after tying its head to its feet cast stones upon it amidst laughter, and when they have made a heap of stones over it they leave it there.
[3.24.228] And some of the barbarians[532] slay and eat those who are over sixty years old, but bury in the earth those who die young. Some burn the dead; and of these some recover and preserve their bones,[533] while others show no care but leave them scattered about. And they say that the Persians[534] impale their dead and embalm them with nitre, after which they wrap them round in bandages. How much grief others endure for the dead we see ourselves.
[3.24.229] Some, too, believe death itself to be dreadful and horrible, others do not. Thus Euripides says:[535]
And Epicurus declares:[536] ‟Death is nothing to us; for what is dissolved is senseless, and what is senseless is nothing to us.” They also declare that, inasmuch as we are compounded of soul and body, and death is a dissolution of soul and body, when we exist death does not exist (for we are not being dissolved), and when death exists we do not exist, for through the cessation of the compound of soul and body we too cease to exist.
[3.24.230] And Heracleitus[537] states that both life and death exist both in our state of life and in our state of death; for when we live our souls are dead and buried within us, and when we die our souls revive and live. And some even suppose that dying is better for us than living. Thus Euripides says;[538]
[3.24.231] These lines, too, spring from the same sentiment:[539]
We know, too, the facts about Cleobis and Biton which Herodotus[540] relates in his story of the Argive priestess.
[3.24.232] It is reported, also, that some of the Thracians sit round the new-born babe and chant dirges.[541] So, then, death should not be considered a thing naturally dreadful, just as life should not be considered a thing naturally good. Thus none of the things mentioned above is naturally of this character or of that, but all are matters of convention and relative.
[3.24.233] The same method of treatment may be applied also to each of the other customs, which we have not now described owing to the summary character of our exposition. And even if, in regard to some of them, we are unable to declare their discrepancy offhand, we ought to observe that disagreement concerning them may possibly exist amongst certain nations that are unknown to us.[542]
[3.24.234] For just as, if we had been ignorant, say, of the custom amongst the Egyptians of marrying sisters,[543] we should have asserted wrongly that it was universally agreed that men ought not to marry sisters,—even so, in regard to those practices wherein we notice no discrepancy, it is not proper for us to affirm that there is no disagreement about them, since, as I said, disagreement about them may possibly exist amongst some of the nations which are unknown to us.
[3.24.235] Accordingly, the Sceptic, seeing so great a diversity of usages, suspends judgement as to the natural existence of anything good or bad or (in general) fit or unfit to be done, therein abstaining from the rashness of dogmatism;[544] and he follows undogmatically the ordinary rules of life, and because of this he remains impassive in respect of matters of opinion, while in conditions that are necessitated his emotions are moderate;
[3.24.236] for though, as a human being, he suffers emotion through his senses, yet because he does not also opine that what he suffers is evil by nature, the emotion he suffers is moderate. For the added opinion that a thing is of such a kind is worse than the actual suffering itself, just as sometimes the patients themselves bear a surgical operation, while the bystanders swoon away because of their opinion that it is a horrible experience.
[3.24.237] But, in fact, he who assumes that there exists by nature something good or bad or, generally, fit or unfit to be done, is disquieted in various ways. For when he experiences what he regards as natural evils he deems himself to be pursued by Furies, and when he becomes possessed of what seems to him good things he falls into no ordinary state of disquiet both through arrogance and through fear of losing them, and through trying to guard against finding himself again amongst what he regards as natural evils;
[3.24.238] for those who assert that goods are incapable of being lost[545] we shall put to silence by means of the doubts raised by their dissension. Hence we conclude that if what is productive of evil is evil and to be shunned, and the persuasion that these things are good, those evil, by nature produces disquiet, then the assumption and persuasion that anything is, in its real nature, either bad or good is evil and to be shunned.
For the present, then, this account of things good, evil, and indifferent is sufficient.