Capítulo 23. Chapter XXIII.—Is Anything By Nature Good, Bad, Or Indifferent?
[3.23.179] Fire which heats by nature appears to all as heating, and snow which chills by nature appears to all as chilling, and all things which move by nature move equally all those who are, as they say, in a natural condition. But none of the so-called ‟goods,” as we shall show, moves all men as being good; therefore no natural good exists. And that none of the so-called goods moves all men alike is, they assert, an evident fact.
[3.23.180] For, not to mention ordinary folk—of whom some regard right bodily condition as good, others chambering, others gluttony, others drunkenness, others gambling, others greed, and others still worse things,—some of the philosophers themselves (such as the Peripatetics) say that there are three kinds of goods;[479] of these some concern the soul, like the virtues, others the body, like health and similar things, while others are external, such as friends, wealth and the like.
[3.23.181] The Stoics themselves, too, assert that there is a trinity[480] of goods; of these some have to do with the soul, like the virtues, others are external, like the good man and the friend, while others are neither of the soul nor external, as for instance the good man in relation to himself; but they deny that the bodily states, which the Peripatetics declare to be goods, are goods. And some have accepted pleasure as a good, whereas some affirm that it is a downright evil, so that one professor of philosophy[481] actually exclaimed, ‟I would sooner be mad than merry.”
[3.23.182] If, then, things which move by nature move all men alike, while we are not all moved alike by the so-called goods, there is nothing good by nature. In fact it is impossible to believe either all the views now set forth, because of their conflicting character, or any one of them. For he who asserts that one must believe this view, but not that, becomes a party to the controversy, since he has opposed to him the arguments of those who take the rival view, and therefore he himself, along with the rest, will need an adjudicator instead of pronouncing judgement on others. And as there does not exist any agreed criterion or proof[482] owing to the unsettled controversy about these matters, he will be reduced to suspending judgement, and consequently he will be unable to affirm positively what the good by nature is.
[3.23.183] Further, it is asserted by some that Good is either the Choice[483] itself or that which we choose. Now Choice is not good according to its proper meaning; else we would not have been hurrying to obtain that which we choose, for fear of losing the power of continuing to choose it; for example, if the seeking to get drink were good, we would not have hurried to obtain drink; for when we have enjoyed it we are quit of seeking to get it. So, too, with hunger and love and the rest. Choice, then, is not choiceworthy in itself, even if it is not actually disagreeable; for in fact the hungry man hurries to partake of food in order to get quit of the discomfort due to his hunger; and so likewise the man in love and the thirsty man.
[3.23.184] But neither is the good the choiceworthy. For this is either external to us or in connexion with us. But if it is external to us either it produces in us a soothing motion and a welcome condition and a delightful feeling, or it does not affect us at all. And if it is not a delight to us it will not be good,[484] nor will it attract us to the choosing of it, nor will it be choiceworthy at all. And if there arises within us, from the external object, a congenial condition and an agreeable feeling, it is not for its own sake that the external object will be choiceworthy but for the sake of the internal condition which follows upon it;
[3.23.185] so that what is choiceworthy in itself cannot be external. Nor can it be personal to us. For it is said to belong either to the body alone or to the soul alone or to both. But if it belongs to the body alone, it will elude our perception; for our perceptions are said to be properties of the soul, and they assert that the body, viewed by itself, is irrational. And if it should be said to extend to the soul also, it would seem to be choiceworthy owing to its affecting the soul and to the agreeable feeling therein; for, according to them, what is judged to be choiceworthy is judged by the intellect and not by the irrational body.
[3.23.186] There remains the alternative that the good is in the soul only. But this, too, is impossible if we go by the statements of the Dogmatists. For the soul is, perhaps, actually non-existent;[485] and even if it exists, judging by what they say it is not apprehended, as I have argued in my chapter ‟On the Criterion.” How then could one venture to affirm that something takes place in a thing which he does not apprehend?
[3.23.187] But, to pass over these objections, in what manner does the good, according to them, come about in the soul? For certainly, if Epicurus makes the End consist in pleasure and asserts that the soul, like all else, is composed of atoms, it is impossible to explain how in a heap of atoms there can come about pleasure and assent or judgement that this object is choiceworthy and good, that object to be avoided and evil.