[1]: See Introd. pp. xxxii ff.
[2]: ‟Doctrine.” ‟School,” ‟system” or ‟way” are other possible renderings of ἀγωγή. ‟Procedure,” ‟way of thought,” ‟trend,” or ‟line of argument,” ‟leading” (ἄγων) up to a definite goal, is rather what it connotes.
[3]: Cf. Introd. p. xxxvii; §§ 36 f. infra.
[4]: Bks. II and III belong to the ‟special” part of the exposition.
[5]: See Introd. pp. xxx f.
[6]: i.e. ‟opposites” includes, for the Sceptics, ‟contraries” (e.g. ‟All are wise”)(‟None are wise”), as well as ‟contradictories” (e.g. ‟Some are wise”)(‟None are wise”), whereas the Stoics used it of the latter only.
[7]: Cf. §§187 ff. As there explained, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον is eliptical for οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε.
[8]: Lit. ‟underlying things.” i.e. the essences or reals which lie behind, and give rise to, sensations or ‟appearances;” Cf. note a in §§48p. 30 note a.
[9]: Lit. ‟more smoothly” or ‟simply;” hence ‟in a less restricted, more extensive, way.”
[10]: i.e. ‟impressions” or ‟presentations” which cause ‟affections” or ‟feelings” (πάθη), as described in §13 supra.
[11]: Cf. §213.
[12]: i.e. the ‟reason,” or logic, which serves to discredit phenomena may be used a fortiori to discredit ultra-sensible objects. Instead of ‟abolishing appearances” it really (as the Sceptics contend) abolishes itself.
[13]: Cf. ii. 14 ff.
[14]: Cf. §§226, 237-238.
[15]: Cf. De fin. i. 12. 42 ‟vel summum bonum vel ultimum vel extremum, quod Graeciτέλος nominant, quod ipsum nullam ad aliam rem, ad id autem res referuntur omnes.” Aristot. Eth. Nic. i. 1. 1. καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντ᾽ἐφείται; ibid. 5 τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δἰ αὑτὸ βουλόμεθα, τἆλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο.
[16]: Court painter to Alexander the Great (circa 350-300 B.C.)
[17]: Viz. Timon and Aenesidemus; cf. Diog. Laert. ix 107.
[18]: Cf. § 118
[19]: See Introd. p. xi; cf. ii. 244.
[20]: Cf. §84.
[21]: τὰ ὑποκείμενα (Lat. sub-stantia) is a favorite term with Sextus for the objective realities which ‟underlie,” or lie behind, the subjective impressions of sense (phenomena): they are called ἐκτός as ‟outside” of and not dependent on the percipient. I render the term indifferently by ‟objects,” ‟real objects” or ‟realities,” and ‟underlying objects.”
[22]: See ii. 134 ff. where it is argued that logical demonstration or ‟proof” is ‟non-existent.” The argument here is that, even if we grant the existence of ‟proof” in the abstract we cannot prove anything in the particular case before us—the question as to the superiority of our impressions to those of animals. For all proof must be either ‟apparent” to us, or ‟non-apparent:” the latter kind we reject as incomprehensible; the former ‟apparent” proof is indecisive, its ‟apparency” being relative to us, who are a species of animal, and thus involved in the dispute. Further, as relative to us the ‟apparent proof” is not aboslute, and therefore not necessarily ‟true.”
[23]: This would be the fallacy of petitio principii, or ‟arguing in a circle;” cf. §§ 117, 164.
[24]: i.e. as a further, superfluous or jocular, kind of argument, which serves to ‟cap” the serious treatment of questions: cf. §§ 63, 78.
[25]: Esp. the Stoics.
[26]: The Stoic theory of logos thus distinguished between its two senses— internal reason, or conception, and the enunciation of thought in the uttered word.
[27]: Cf. [Plato], Deff. 411e.
[28]: i.e. the Stoics.
[29]: See Odyss. xvii. 300.
[30]: i.e. the Stoic logic, cf. ii. 94.
[31]: The Stoics had five syllogisms which they termed anapodeictic, or ‟indemonstrable,” since they required no proof themselves but served to prove others. The ‟complex” syllogism was of the forms: ‟Either A or B or C exists; but neither A nor B exists; therefore C exists.”
[32]: The famous physician, of Cos (circa 460-400 B.C.).
[33]: A sarcastic allusion to the Cynics; cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 13, Introd. p. xvi.
[34]: For the Pythagorean rule of silence (ἐχεμυθία) cf. Diog. Laert. viii. 10.
[35]: Our word ‟idiosyncrasy” comes from ἰδιοσυγκρασία, a later form of ἰδιοσυγκρισία. σύγκρισις (or σύμμιξις) is Anaxagoras's term for the process of ‟composition” by which the world comes into being; cf. Intro. p. xi.
[36]: See § 52.
[37]: A tribe of N. Africa, cf. Hdt. iv. 173.
[38]: Tentrya was a town in Upper Egypt; cf. Juvenal xv.
[39]: In S. Egypt. The ‟Astapous” is the Blue Nile.
[40]: See Aristot. Meterol. iii. 4.
[41]: Fragm. 242 (Boeckh), Sandys' Pindar, in Loeb Library, p.610, copied by Horace, Odes, i. 1. 3 ff.
[42]: See Homer, Odyss, xiv. 228. Cf. Virgil, Ecl. ii. 65 ‟tahit sua quemque voluntas;” and ‟quot homines, tot sententiae.”
[43]: The ideal ‟Wise Man” of the Stoics; See Introd. p. xxviii.
[44]: For exceptions see § 101.
[45]: A species of plants with acrid, milky juice.
[46]: See § 53
[47]: i.e. the mental or physical state of the subject at the moment of perception.
[48]: This is aimed against the Stoic view that only the healthy, or normal, is ‟natural.”
[49]: ἀνύπαρκτα (from ὑπάρχω, ‟subsist”) is an Epicurean term for ‟non-existent.”
[50]: For age as affecting character cf. Aristot. Rhet. ii. 12 ff.
[51]: Cf. Lucret. iv. 388.
[52]: Fragm. 518 (Kock). It is supposed that these lines were spoken by a maiden of her lover who had fallen into evil ways.
[53]: Cf. Horace, Sat. i. 3. 38.
[54]: i.e. the tepidarium, of moderate temperature.
[55]: Cf. § 90.
[56]: Cf. §§ 60, 122; ii. 34, 121, etc.
[57]: Cf. Lucret. iv. 428 ff.
[58]: ‟Lyngurion,” so called from the belief that the stone was made of the urine of the lynx frozen or crystallized.
[59]: Cf. ii. 128.
[60]: i.e. the real (‟external”) object of perception (cf. p. 30 note a) plus the physical conditions which accompany the act of perception; these latter may be either external (e.g. atmospheric) or internal (e.g. peculiarities in the sense-organs of the percipient).
[61]: Cf. §§ 44, 101 supra.
[62]: For the Stoic ἡγεμονικόν see Introd. p. xxv; for the dispute as to its location cf. Adv. Log. i. 313.
[63]: Taenarum was the most southerly promontory of Laconia; its marble was yellowish green in colour (like serpentine).
[64]: The main point urged here is that no object can be apprehended in its purity. As perceived it is always conditioned by (1) the physcial or mental state of the percipient (‟the thing which judges”), and (2) by the ‟concomitant percepts” which accompany its emergence into the world of space and time. As thus conditioned, the object is no longer ‟absolute” but ‟relative.”
[65]: Cf. § 39 supra.
[66]: Or ‟have a distinct existence of their own,” as opposed to a merely relative existence. This is a technical term for the class of objects which are ‟self-existent,” ‟absolute,” or ‟independent.”
[67]: Including the Peripatetics, as well as the Stoics. A summum genus (e.g. ‟Being”) may be divided into genera (e.g. ‟Animals” ‟Minerals”), and these sub-divided into species (e.g. ‟Men,” ‟Dogs,” etc.), down to the infimae species (e.g. ‟Golden Retriever”) which cannot be further subdivided. The intermediate species (e.g. ‟Men”) are both genera (in relation to their sub-species) and species (in relation to higher genera).
[68]: i.e. superlatively, or wholly, manifest. Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 141.
[69]: Cf. Plato, Euthyd. 304b.
[70]: The Cynic philosopher.
[71]: Democritus and Epicurus took the first view, Anaxagoras the second, Diodorus Cornos the third; cf. iii. 32.
[72]: i.e. inhabitants of the Crimea; cf. Hdt. iv. 103, and Eurip. Iphigenia in Tauris.
[73]: Homer, Il. xiv. 201.
[74]: Flourished about 360 B.C., famed as astronomer, geometer, legislator and physician.
[75]: A Cynic philosopher, circa 320 B.C.; cf. iii. 24.
[76]: Cf. iii. 219.
[77]: Cf. iii. 204.
[78]: Homer, Odyss. X. 423.
[79]: See Introd. pp. xxvii-xxviii; cf. iii. 205.
[80]: Homer, Il. xvi. 459.
[81]: Cf. our use of ‟chimera” (Lion+goat+dragon) for what is fantatic.
[82]: i.e. those posterior to Aenesidemus; but the reference here is specially to Agrippa (See Introd. p. xl); cf. Diog. Laert. ix. 88.
[83]: See §§ 135 ff.
[84]: Of these views the first was maintained, e.g. by Protagoras and Epicurus, the second by Plato and Democritus, the third by the Peripatetics and Stoics.
[85]: Lit. ‟the through-one-another mode” (of reasoning). This is the fallacy known as circulus in probando, by which each of two propositions is used in turn to prove the truth of the other.
[86]: Lit. ‟without exit (or way of escape);” i.e. it hopelessly entangles the opponent.
[87]: i.e. the super-ordinate, or more universal, proposition.
[88]: For this final reduction of the ‟Tropes” to two—arguing against the possibility of either (1) immediate or (2) mediate certitude—see Introd. p. xli.
[89]: ‟Physics,” as a branch of philosophy, was treated of by all the Schools alluded to in § 170 supra, which are specifically here in mind.
[90]: See ii. 96 ff.
[91]: See §§ 164 ff. supra.
[92]: Cf. §§ 14, 15 supra.
[93]: i.e. (perhaps) a two-storied house (taking ἐστία as meaning οἰκία). Fabric, proposed ἐσθής, διπλῆ then being=διπλοΐς,‟a double cloak.” πλατεῖα, ‟square.” lit. ‟broad, open, place.”
[94]: The τί, here substituted for οὐ, is capable of meaning either ‟what” (or ‟in what respect”) or ‟why,” ‟for what cause or reason” (=διὰ τί). Thus τί gives an interrogative form (πύσμα) to the formula, as distinct from the affirmative form (ἀξίωμα) with οὐ.
[95]: Eurip. Herc. Fur. 1.
[96]: Fragm. 900 (Kock).
[97]: This is the typical Sceptic's attitude of complete mental neutrality, or ‟state of even balance” (ἀρρεψία, Diog. Laert. ix. 74).
[98]: Cf. §§ 13, 191 supra.
[99]: Cf. §§ 7, 10 supra.
[100]: For ‟opposed” ‟conflicting” see § 10 above.
[101]: i.e. the personal pronoun ‟I” is potentially, or implicitly, expressed in the ending of the Greek verb (first person singular).
[102]: Cf. § 1.
[103]: i.e. by the use of syllogisms.
[104]: As with Protagoras, who seems to have originated it.
[105]: The infinite is here used in a jussive sense.
[106]: Cf. §§ 10, 25 ff.
[107]: Cf.§ 29.
[108]: Cf. § 195 supra.
[109]: Suggesting that such attacks must involve the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi.
[110]: For Heracleitus see Introd. p. viii; cf. ii. 59, 63. For Aenesidemus see Introd. pp. xxxvii ff.
[111]: The Sceptic view that the same thing apparently possesses opposite attributes or qualities is regarded as a step on the road to the Hercleitean view that it really possesses such qualities. But as Sextus proceeds to argue, the ascription of apparently contradictory attributes to a thing is not peculiar to the Sceptics but common to all men, so that all other might equally well be regarded as Heracleiteans in the making. For the opposition of ‟appearances” cf. §§ 32, 91 ff., 101 ff.
[112]: Cf. § 101 supra.
[113]: i.e. general human experience and observation, dervied from sense-impressions.
[114]: i.e. ‟world-conflagration,” by which all things are resolved into the Primal Fire.
[115]: See Introd. pp. xi ff.
[116]: See Introd. p. xvii; cf. Adv. Log. i. 191 ff.
[117]: §§ 25 ff. supra.
[118]: See Introd. p. xiv. In his physical theory Protagoras follows Heracleitus.
[119]: i.e. in brief, all ‟appearances” (sensations, opinions, etc.) are due to inter-action between the matter of the percipient subject and the matter of the objective world, both of which are in constant flux. Thus ‟matter” is potentially the ‟phenomenon.”
[120]: See Introd. pp. xxxii f.
[121]: i.e. those which aim at training the mind—subdivided (in Diog. Laert. iii. 49 ff.) into ‟maeeutic” (‟akin to the midwife's art” or ‟mental obstetrics”) and ‟peirastic” (or ‟tentative,” e.g. Lysis, Laches, Euthyphro, Meno).
[122]: i.e. the five books Against the Dogmatists; see Introd. p. xli.
[123]: See Introd. p. xl.
[124]: See Introd. p. xxxi; and for Xenophanes, ibid. p. viii.
[125]: e.g. Homer, Il. ii. 114 where Agamemnon says of Zeus νῦν δὲ κακὴν ἀπάτην βουλεύσατ᾽. Cf. Plato, Rep. 380d ff.
[126]: Carneades was the chief exponent of this ‟probabilism;” see Introd. pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.
[127]: Cf. §§ 15, 23f.; ii. 13.
[128]: Cf. § 117.
[129]: διεξωδευμένας and περιωδευμένας mean literally ‟gone all through” (or ‟all over”), hence ‟thoroughly inspected,” ‟scrutinized:” ἀπερισπάστους, ‟not able to be drawn round” (or ‟stripped off”), hence ‟indubitable.”
[130]: This is a curious example of an ‟irreversible” impression. If the text is right, it looks as if Sextus was nodding.
[131]: Cf. §§ 22, 27 ff. supra.
[132]: See §§ 25 supra.
[133]: Cf. § 226.
[134]: Cf. §§ 23, 24.
[135]: Cf. § 220 supra.
[136]: Ariston of Chios, a pupil of Zeno the Stoic.
[137]: The verse is a parody of Homer, Il. vi. 181 (cf. Hesiod, Theog. 323), who thus described the Chimaera: πρόσθε λέων, ὄπιθεν δὲ δράκων, μέσση δὲ χίμαιρα (‟Lion the head of her, Dragon the taol of her, trunk of a She-goat”). Diodorus Cronos was a Megaric philosopher (circa 300 B.C.).
[138]: See Introd. pp. xxxvi f.
[139]: The later schools of medicine were three: (1) the Dogmatic or Logical, which theorized about the ‟non-evident” causes of health and disease; (2) the Empiric, which regarded such causes as indiscoverable and confined itself to observation of evident facts; (3) the Methodic, which adopted an intermediate position, refusing either to affirm or deny ‟non-evident” causes; cf. Introd. p. xl.
[140]: §23.
[141]: Or ‟generic character.” All diseases being referred to one or other of the two ‟general” morbid states, over-contraction or over-dilation of the pores or passages of the body, each of these ‟general” states was said to ‟pervade” all the cases which exhibited the symptoms of that state. The ‟genus” ‟pervades” (its characteristics run through) its ‟species” and ‟particulars.”
[142]: i.e. the ‟special” section of this Sceptical treatise, as distinguished from the ‟general” exposition contained in Bk. I.; cf. i. 5, 6, 21.
[143]: i.e. Stoics and Epicureans.
[144]: This argument is not elsewhere mentioned; possibly it refers to some form of the ‟Sorites”; cf. § 253. But T has ‟qui non novit . . . quid est omnis triangulus habet tres angulos equales duobus rectis.”
[145]: The hypothetical syllogism ‟by two hypotheses” has its major premiss in double form; e.g. ‟If A is, B is, and if A is not, B is; but A either is or is not; therefore B is.” Cf. §§ 131, 186 infra.
[146]: For this term in the Stoic epistemology see Introd. p. xxv. The argument is, in brief, that the Stoic cannot consistently criticize the Epicurean unless he allows that his ‟apprehensive impression” of their dogmas is an impression of things which have no basis in reality, and this contradicts the Stoic definition of ‟apprehensive impression.”
[147]: It is uncertain to what ‟division” this refers—whether that of God from the world (Fabricius), of Body from Void (Zimmermann), of the ‟numberless worlds” from one another (Pappenheim), or (as seems simplest) of Body into numberless atomic fractions. For the dicta about ‟God” and ‟Pleasure” cf. iii. 219.
[148]: For this distinction cf. i. 178 ff.
[149]: Cf. i. 61.
[150]: Cf. i. 63, ii. 84.
[151]: Cf. Adv. Log. i. ad init.
[152]: The others mentioned in Adv. Log. i. 16 are Plato, Xenocrates, and the Peripatetics; so too the Epicureans.
[153]: So Chrysippus. Sextus treats of Logic in this Bk. ii., Physics in iii. 1-167, Ethics in iii. 167-278.
[154]: See i. chap. xi.
[155]: i.e. standards of weight and measure (e. g. pound, pint, yard).
[156]: Cf. Adv. Log. i. 261.
[157]: Examples of these three criteria are—the carpenter, his rule, the ‟applying” of his rule; cf. Adv. Log. i. 35 f.
[158]: Earlier than Democritus: cf. Adv. Log. i. 53, 388.
[159]: Cf. i. 224; Adv. Log. i. 48, 110.
[160]: Cf. i. 164 ff., 115 ff.
[161]: Cf. Plato, Phaedr. 229e f., Theaet. 174b.
[162]: Cf. i. 213 ff.; Adv. Log. i. 265.
[163]: Cf. Adv. Log. i. 267. Epicurus taught that truth is given by sense-perception: the percept is the real ‟thing in itself”; hence we have no general concepts which can be logically ‟denned” but only particular phenomena which are ‟indicated” or pointed out as ‟such and such, look you” (τοιουτοί) cf. Introd. p. xxiii.
[164]: Cf. i. 100.
[165]: Stoics and Peripatetics, cf. § 211 infra.
[166]: See i. 40 ff.
[167]: The familiar Aristotelian distinction between ‟actuality” and ‟potentiality” is here used by Sextus to confute the Peripatetics, cf. Introd. p. xx.
[168]: Cf. Adv. Log. i. 281; Diog. Laert. vi. 40; [Plato], Deff. 415 a.
[169]: Cf. Theaet. 152 d, Tim. 27 d.
[170]: ‟Perchance,” one of the Sceptic formulae, cf. i. 194.
[171]: i.e. a ‟substance” in the Aristotelian sense, as distinguished from its ‟attributes,” ‟properties,” or ‟accidents;” cf. Adv. Log. i. 283 ff.
[172]: Lit. ‟this” (τοῦτο: Mutsch. suggests ταῦτα). The argument would be clearer if we inserted the words ‟But we do not apprehend depth” after ‟body”; the text as it stands is too obscure to be sound.
[173]: A pupil of Aristotle, cf. Adv. Log. i. 349; Cicero, Tusc. i. 10. 22.
[174]: Cf. i. 115, 164 ff. Note that, in the context, the words ‟test,” ‟judge,” ‟decide,” are various renderings of κρίνω (whence κριτήριον).
[175]: The fallacy of petitio principii, cf. §§ 57, 60, 67 infra.
[176]: From the inscription on the tomb of Midas quoted in Plato, Phaedr. 264 d; cf. Tibullus i. 4. 60.
[177]: Cf. Adv. Log. i. 327 ff.
[178]: Cf. i. 100; Adv. Log. i. 333.
[179]: Cf. i. 100 ff. for the fourth trope; but the reference ought rather to be to the second, in i. 89.
[180]: ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου, lit. ‟as extra-measure” or ‟overplus”; ‟into the bargain.”
[181]: Cf. Adv. Log. i. 343.
[182]: e.g. Heracleitus, Parmenides, Democritus; cf. Adv. Log. i. 126 ff.
[183]: Epicurus and Protagoras; cf. Adv. Log. i. 204, 369.
[184]: Peripatetics, Stoics, and Academics; cf. Adv. Log. i. 369, 388.
[185]: Cf. i. 100 ff.
[186]: Cf. i. 118.
[187]: Cf. i. 110.
[188]: See i. 36 ff.
[189]: Cf. Adv. Log. i. 89 ff.
[190]: See Introd. p. xv; cf. Adv. Log. i. 65.
[191]: i.e. whether in the head or breast or elsewhere; cf. Adv. Log. i. 313, 348.
[192]: Cf. Adv. Log. i. 354 ff.
[193]: i.e. the Stoics, cf. § 16; Adv. Log. i. 35, 370. For the Stoic doctrine of ‟presentation” and the ‟Criterion” see Introd. p. xxv.
[194]: Or ‟ruling principle,” cf. i. 128, Adv. Log. i. 380; Introd. p. xxv.
[195]: Cf. § 81 infra, iii. 188: Introd. p. xxv.
[196]: The first of these views is ascribed to Cleanthes, the second to Chrysippus, cf. Adv. Log. i. 228, 372: Introd. p. xxv.
[197]: See §§ 57 ff. supra.
[198]: i.e. sensations or feelings.
[199]: See i. 100 ff.
[200]: Cf. § 18 supra.
[201]: Cf. § 103 infra, Adv. Log. i. 443.
[202]: Cf. Adv. Log. i. 38 ff. S. argues that, to go by the Stoics’ own statement, neither ‟truth” (which is ‟corporeal”) nor ‟the true” (particular ‟judgement,” which is ‟incorporeal”) has any real existence: he terms the former ‟unreal,” or ‟non-existent” (ἀνύπαρκτος), the latter ‟non-substantial” (ἀνυπόστατον).
[203]: Literally ‟the utterable” (lekton), or thought in its relation to speech; i.e. the meaning or significance of a word or name (the idea or mental picture evoked by it) as distinguished from (1) the name itself, as uttered (φωνή), and (2) the real object, existing outside the mind (ἐκτός) denoted by the name: these two last were said (by the Stoics) to be ‟corporeal.”
[204]: Cf. Adv. Log. i. 41 ff.
[205]: Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 32 ff.; Introd. p. xxvi.
[206]: Cf, Adv. Log. ii. 17 ff. By ‟true things” are meant judgements or propositions which conform to fact.
[207]: This is incorrect; on the hypothesis, non-evidents may also be true.
[208]: A favourite example of the ‟non-evident,” cf. § 97 infra, Adv. Log. ii. 147, etc.
[209]: For this Stoic definition cf. §§ 229, 247; Adv. Eth. 187; it is ascribed to Poseidonius by Diog. Laert. vii. 62.
[210]: Cf. i. 62–63.
[211]: i.e. the Stoics. ‟Pre-evident” = evident of themselves, self-manifesting; cf. i. 138.
[212]: Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 141, 144, 316.
[213]: Cf. § 90 supra
[214]: i.e. distance in space. From this we infer that Sextus was not then residing at Athens.
[215]: Cf. §§ 146, 318. For the ‟pores” (or excretory ‟ducts,” or ‟passages”) as ‟intelligible” (νοητοί), or objects of thought as opposed to sense, cf. § 140, Adv. Log. ii. 306.
[216]: The Stoic doctrine. Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 151 ff., 156.
[217]: Cf. § 104 infra. As smoke ‟indicates” fire, so in the hypothetical syllogism—‟If there is smoke, there is fire; but in fact there is smoke; therefore there is fire”—the ‟antecedent” (or ‟if”-clause) ‟reveals” (or is a ‟sign” of) the ‟consequent” judgement ‟there is fire.”
[218]: An ‟expression,” lekton (see p. 203 note b), may be either ‟deficient” (e.g. ‟writes”) or ‟complete” (e.g. ‟he writes”); cf. § 81, Adv. Log. ii. 71.
[219]: i.e. with a true antecedent, or ‟if” clause. Cf. generally Adv. Log. ii. 112, 245 ff., 449.
[220]: For this stock example cf. Aristot. Anal. pr. ii. 27, Rhet. i. 2. 18; Plato, Menex. 237 e.
[221]: Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 80 ff.
[222]: A Megaric philosopher (circa 300 b.c.), not the Academic mentioned in i. 235, and Introd. pp. xxxvi f.; cf. Adv. Log. ii. 113 ff.
[223]: Cf. i. 234, Adv. Log. ii. 115.
[224]: The opposite is ‟diartesis,” incoherence or incompatibility, §§ 146, 152, 238 infra, Adv. Log. ii. 430.
[225]: ‟Implication” (emphasis) is power of signifying more than is explicitly expressed. An example of this ‟potential inclusion” is ‟If a man exists, a beast exists.”
[226]: The words bracketed give an unintelligible form of syllogism, and the Greek text is evidently corrupt. Possibly we should read—‟It is day; and if it is day it is light; therefore it is light”—thus merely transposing the premisses of the preceding syllogism (cf. § 137).
[227]: Cf. §§ 105 f. supra.
[228]: Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 163 ff.
[229]: Cf. §§ 99: the ‟others” include some of the Academics and medical Empirics (cf. i. 236).
[230]: Cf. § 96; Adv. Log. ii. 178 ff.
[231]: A curious expression, only used here by Sextus; it seems to mean ‟an affirmation which treats the thing as though it were apprehended.”
[232]: Cf. § 88; Adv. Log. ii. 171 ff.
[233]: Cf. §§ 119, 169.
[234]: Cf. § 124 supra.
[235]: Cf. §§ 185, 187.
[236]: Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 279. The meaning of these sections, 130–133, is briefly this: The Dogmatists argue (§§ 130–131) (1) that the Sceptics’ objections to ‟sign” must signify either something or nothing; if nothing, they have no force against it, while if they signify something they are signs themselves and so prove sign’s existence; (2) the arguments (λόγοι) against ‟sign” prove either something or nothing; if nothing, they fail to prove the non-existence of ‟sign,” while if they prove something, they are ‟proofs,” i.e. a species of ‟sign,” and thus prove sign’s existence. Hence, whichever view we take—the Dogmatists’ that ‟sign exists,” or the Sceptics’ that ‟sign exists not”—we arrive at the same conclusion that ‟sign exists.” In § 132 we have the counter-argument of the Sceptics, ‟reversing” that of the Dogmatists.
[237]: In this § 133 the Sceptics are replying to the first argument of the Dogmatists (in § 130); the conclusion that ‟the existence of sign” proves its ‟non-existence” is based on the arguments in § 132, which ‟reverses” that of the Dogmatists.
[238]: For this Sceptic formula cf. i. 188.
[239]: Cf. §§ 96, 122, 131 supra; and for the next ten sections cf. Adv. Log. ii. 299 ff.
[240]: τὸ συνημμένον, lit. ‟the combination”; cf. p. 246 note a.
[241]: ‟Valid” refers only to logical form; ‟true” to content; cf. § 139; Adv. Log. ii. 413.
[242]: For this and the following sections cf. Adv. Log. ii. 305 ff.
[243]: Cf. § 98 supra.
[244]: See the definition of ‟proof” in §§ 135–136. It is with ‟hypothetical syllogisms” that Sextus is here concerned. The ‟component elements” of the syllogism (or ‟argument”) are the ‟judgements” (or propositions) which go to form its ‟premisses.”
[245]: i.e. the Stoics, cf. §§ 166, 235.
[246]: i.e.(in Stoic terminology) definitely valid and conclusive; cf. § 163 infra. Note that the term συνημμένον (‟combination”) mostly means the ‟hypothetical, or major, premiss of a hypothetical syllogism,” but sometimes the whole syllogism.
[247]: Cf. iii. 177 ff.
[248]: Over 300 volumes, dealing with grammar and logic (‟dialectic”), are ascribed to Chrysippus.
[249]: With §§ 152–156 cf. Adv. Log. ii. 435 ff.
[250]: i.e. the syllogism as a whole, which is a ‟combination”
[251]: i.e. those which need no proof as being self-evident; cf. Aristotle’s ‟perfect syllogisms,” and i. 69; Adv. Log. ii. 223 ff.
[252]: Literally, the ‟combination,” which here (as in § 104) means the hypothetical major premiss, of which the ‟if,” clause is the ‟antecedent,” the other clause the ‟consequent.”
[253]: i.e. a premiss consisting of two clauses ‟coupled” by ‟and” (or ‟both . . . and”); a ‟conjunctive” premiss (as opposed to a ‟disjunctive,” coupled by ‟either . . . or”).
[254]: Cf. i. 69.
[255]: An example of the syllogismus decurtatus, which has but one premiss; cf. § 167.
[256]: Aristotle dealt only with this form of proof; later Peripatetics with the hypothetical and disjunctive forms as well.
[257]: Cf. Plato, Alcib. I. 116.
[258]: i.e. of the First Figure: the previous examples are cases of Barbara and Darii, so ‟the others” would belong to Celarent and Ferio. But Heintz’s suggestion, τρόπων τῶν (for πρώτων), ‟the other figures,” may well be right.
[259]: i.e. Stoics and Peripatetics, cf. § 146 supra.
[260]: A. of Tarsus was head of the Stoic School circa 150-30 b.c.; cf. Adv. Log. ii. 443 for Chrysippus on the ‟curtailed syllogism.”
[261]: Cf. § 143.
[262]: See §§ 85-94 supra, and § 138.
[263]: Cf. § 116.
[264]: Cf. §§ 117 ff., 125.
[265]: Cf. §§ 135, 143 ff.
[266]: Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 382 ff.
[267]: Cf. τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους, § 87 supra; ‟things of a partial character” as opposed to ‟wholes” or genera.
[268]: Cf. § 135 supra.
[269]: i.e. is real, as opposed to phenomenal; so Xenophanes, Xeniades, Gorgias, cf. § 18.
[270]: For this Sceptic formula cf. i. 188.
[271]: The Epicurean proof of Void ran thus: ‟If motion exists, Void exists; but motion does exist; therefore Void exists.” Cf. § 245, Adv. Log. ii. 329 ff.
[272]: Cf. §§ 104 ff., 121.
[273]: Cf. §§ 48 ff. supra.
[274]: Cf. §§ 144 supra.
[275]: i.e. if ‟proof” is non-apprehensible it must also be unreal or non-existent, because non-apprehensible ‟proof” is incapable of ‟proving” anything, and ‟proof” apart from ‟proving” is inconceivable—the ‟conception” of the one necessarily implying the other.
[276]: Lit. ‟reversal” of the argument; cf. § 128, Adv. Log. ii. 463.
[277]: Cf. § 131 for this hypothetical syllogism with double major premiss. Here, as there, the Dogmatists argue that the Sceptics’ proof that ‟proof exists not” refutes itself, the very proof they employ being itself an ‟existent” proof.
[278]: Cf. i. 206, Adv. Log. ii. 480.
[279]: See §§ 145 ff.
[280]: Cf. §§ 159–162 against the Stoics, and 163–166 against the Peripatetics.
[281]: For the phrase ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου, ‟into the bargain,” cf. § 47 supra.
[282]: Or ‟non-demonstrable,” including here categorical syllogisms as well as those mentioned in § 157 supra.
[283]: Cf. Aristot. Anal. pr. ii. 23 on logical ‟induction.”
[284]: Cf. Hdt. ii. 68; Aristot. Hist. An. iii. 7.
[285]: For the ‟conjunctive” or ‟coupled” premiss see § 158, note.
[286]: For the ‟five non-demonstrable (or axiomatic) syllogisms” see §§ 157-158 supra.
[287]: Cf. § 4 supra.
[288]: Cf. §§ 26, 28 for this definition of Man.
[289]: The Aristotelian definition of ‟Definition,” the previous definition being probably Stoic.
[290]: The definition of ‟Dialectic,” and also the four kinds of ‟Division,” here mentioned are given by Alcinous, a second-century (a.d.) Eclectic. As used by Plato and Aristotle, ‟Division” includes only the 3rd and 4th kinds (i.e. ‟logical” as distinguished from grammatical (§ 214) and arithmetical (§§ 215–218) division). Logical ‟division” is the process of defining a class-name by splitting it up into its component parts—the ‟genus” into ‟species,” the ‟species” into particulars. By it we enumerate the classes of objects denoted by the name or term which is ‟divided.”
[291]: That ‟names” exist ‟by nature” was held by Heracleitus, Cratylus, Stoics and Epicureans; Aristotle and the Sceptics took the other view. θέσει, ‟by convention” (or human ordinance), like the more usual νόμῳ, is opposed to φύσει, ‟by nature,” much as we contrast the ‟artificial” with the ‟natural.”
[292]: Cf. iii. 82 ff.; Adv. Phys. i. 297 ff., 330 ff., ii. 304.
[293]: The subject of geometry, as numbers are of arithmetic.
[294]: No such discussion is to be found in the extant works of Sextus.
[295]: i.e. the Stoics; cf. §§ 29 ff., 70 ff., Adv. Log. i. 370 ff. for the Sceptic criticisms.
[296]: This view is Plato’s, the former Aristotle’s. The following objections are like those brought against the Platonic theory of ‟participation” by Aristotle and in the Parmenides of Plato.
[297]: i.e. a part of the Genus is taken as meaning a part of its definition; cf. § 224 for this definition of the genus ‟animal.”
[298]: The stock name for a specimen of ‟Man,” cf. i. 189, and §§ 227 ff.
[299]: e.g. the Platonic Ideas, cf. iii. 189.
[300]: The argument here is that it is impossible to conceive a number of opposite qualities, such as are possessed by the multitude of species and particulars included in the ‟genus,” co-existing in the unity of the genus; while if they do not all co-exist in it, the ‟genus” ceases to be inclusive of all its proper species and particulars; and if it includes none of the opposites, it is wholly unrelated to its particulars, and has no claim to be termed a ‟genus.”
[301]: The Stoic view, cf. §§ 86 f. supra.
[302]: Aristotle regarded the relation of Genus to Species as that of Potentiality to Actuality, i.e. of unrealized possibility to what is real and determinate, or of the germinal to the fully evolved. As the ‟actuality” of the oak is implicit in the ‟potency” of the acorn, so the plurality of ‟actual” particulars are implicit in the ‟potency” of the unitary ‟genus.”
[303]: Two names of the son of Priam who carried off Helen to Troy.
[304]: ‟Term,” i.e. (in Stoic usage) ‟common noun or appellative” (Diog. Laert. vii. 58).
[305]: The Stoics; cf. § 94 supra for the definition of Dialectic.
[306]: i.e. the views and conduct of ordinary people, cf. i. 23, 165.
[307]: Or ‟meaningless.” The Stoics held that every ‟judgement” or ‟proposition” (ἀξίωμα) was significant; so the proposition” this is not possible” is not ἄτοπον, in this sense of the word.
[308]: i.e. ungrammatical, involving the use of an adjective for a noun, the accusative for the nominative case (as here τόπον for τόπος), and the like. Cf. Aristot. Soph. El. cc. 14, 32.
[309]: i.e. meaningless—a Stoic dictum.
[310]: i.e. the third Sophism, in § 231.
[311]: i.e. judgements which change from truth to falsehood; cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 76.
[312]: Cf. §§ 80 ff. supra.
[313]: Cf. §§ 144 ff., 156 ff.
[314]: The ‟Methodic” School of medicine held that the progress of a disease was marked by three-day periods of increasing (up to the crisis) or decreasing severity; for the former they prescribed a light diet.
[315]: Cf. Hippocrates, De. flat. 2; for morbid ‟contraction” counteracted by ‟dilatation” or ‟relaxation” cf. i. 238. By ‟corresponding” is meant the appropriate ‟counteracting” remedy. The ‟persistent” or ‟deep-seated” (προσεχῆ) morbid states are distinguished from the superficial ‟symptoms” which the Methodic School disregarded as accidentals.
[316]: The ceratinē or ‟Horn-fallacy” (invented by the Megarics, cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 111, vi. 39) is generally put in a simpler form—‟If you have not lost anything, you have it; you have not lost horns, therefore you have horns” (a joke aimed at cuckolds, thinks Fabricius). Sextus’s complex syllogism seems much more clumsy (if the text is right).
[317]: Cf. § 245, iii. 7, and Adv. Gramm. 311, where this argument is ascribed to Diodorus the Megaric.
[318]: In Adv. Log. i. 71 this argument is ascribed to Gorgias.
[319]: Anaxagoras held this notion about snow, cf. i. 33.
[320]: Diogenes the Cynic (Diog. Laert. vi. 39); see iii. 66. Cf. Boswell’s story of how Dr. Johnson refuted Berkeley.
[321]: A famous anatomist of Cos, circa 300 b.c. For Diodorus Cronos cf. i. 234.
[322]: This refers back to the end of § 244, § 245 being parenthetic.
[323]: The traditional Sceptic attitude, cf. i. 15, 23 ff., etc.
[324]: Cf. §§ 137 ff.
[325]: Cf. Aristot. Anal. pr. ii. 2; Diog. Laert. vii. 81.
[326]: Cf. § 139.
[327]: The fallacy of the ‟Heap” (acervalis), so-called because commonly framed thus: ‟This is a heap of grain: take away one grain—two grains—three grains, and so on—is it still a heap?” Or ‟Does one grain make a heap? Or, if not, 2,3, . . . x grains?” The essence of the fallacy is that ‟aliquid minutatim et gradatim additur aut demitur” (Cicero, Lucull. 16). In modern Logic ‟Sorites” denotes a chain of syllogisms in which all the conclusions save the last are suppressed.
[328]: Cf. § 214.
[329]: Cf. § 237.
[330]: i.e. his special attitude, as a Dogmatist, towards ambiguities.
[331]: No such discussion is to be found in the extant works of Sextus.
[332]: For the Stoic division of ‟Philosophy” into three parts—logic, physics and ethics—see ii. 13.
[333]: Cf. ii. 84.
[334]: ‟Principles,” or ‟origins” (ἀρχαί) which are assumed to explain existence: fundamental realities: here used practically as a synonym for ‟Causes” (αἴτια).
[335]: Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 13 ff. It is argued here (1) that God is not ‟conceived,” §§ 2–5; nor (2) ‟apprehended,” §§ 6–11. Cf. § 218 infra.
[336]: Literally ‟life”; cf. i. 23 f.
[337]: ‟Substances” in the logical sense, as opposed to ‟properties.”
[338]: The Stoics held God to be ‟corporeal,” not ‟of human form,” ‟inside the world”; the Epicureans, ‟corporeal,” ‟of human form,” ‟outside the world”; Aristotle, ‟incorporeal” and ‟not in space.” Cf. § 218 infra.
[339]: i.e. the Stoics and Epicurus, cf. § 219 infra.
[340]: The Epicurean Deity as contrasted with the Platonic and Stoic. Cf. Lucretius ii. 646 ff.: omnis enim per se divom natura necessest inmortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe.
[341]: i.e. plainly manifest, self-evident, cf. i. 178.
[342]: Cf. ii. 179, 128.
[343]: i.e. by charging us with atheism.
[344]: e.g. Plato’s ‟Ideas” and the Pythagorean ‟Numbers”; cf. § 32, Adv. Phys. i. 364.
[345]: Cf. Plato, Cratyl. 413 a, Phileb. 26 e; Adv. Phys. i. 228.
[346]: Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 1, 243.
[347]: Cf. § 25 infra.
[348]: To mark the distinction between αἴτιον and αἰτία, I render the former by ‟Cause,” the latter by ‟cause.” The latter seems used mostly of the particular instance, the former of the general notion; or (as in §§ 19, 23, 24) the former of the cause of existence, the latter of the cause of cognition.
[349]: Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 201. ‟These things,” being ‟appearances” (or phenomena), may not really exist in the form in which they ‟appear” to us: the ‟real” may differ from the ‟phenomenal,” but even so a ‟Cause” of that difference must be assumed.
[350]: Cf., for the following arguments, i. 164.
[351]: Cf. §§ 17 ff.
[352]: Cf. ii. 18, 104, 134 ff.
[353]: With the following sections cf. Adv. Phys. i. 360 ff., ii. 310 ff.; and for the arguments employed, i. 164.
[354]: Pherecydes, circa 650 b.c., was a semi-scientific cosmogonist; Oenopides was an astronomer and mathematician of the fifth century b.c.; Onomacritus was an Athenian religious poet, said to be the author of some of the Orphic hymns. For the other names see Introd.
[355]: For this ‟formless” or ‟unqualified” primary matter of the Stoics cf. Adv. Phys. i. 11, ii. 312.
[356]: i.e. the quinta essentia, aether (αἰθήρ fr. ἀεὶ θεῖν, ‟ever-speeding,” Plato, Cratyl. 410 b, Aristot. De Caelo i. 3).
[357]: i.e. ‟things with like parts,” or ‟homogeneous substances,” is Aristotle’s name for Anaxagoras’s ‟seeds of things,” or material ‟elements”; cf. Introd. p. xi.
[358]: Asclepiades (first century b.c.), a physician at Rome, held a theory of non-sensible, frangible ‟molecules” (ὄγκοι) of matter always in motion; by collision with one another these ‟molecules” break in pieces, and when re-united become objects of sense.
[359]: For this form of argument cf. ii. 183.
[360]: A favourite classification of the Stoics, cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 218.
[361]: This definition is ascribed to Pythagoras in Adv. Phys. i. 366.
[362]: Cf. ii. 30, Adv. Phys. i. 367, ii. 12.
[363]: In geometry ‟Limits” (or ‟boundaries”) was used to denote the lines or surfaces by which any magnitude is ‟bounded.”
[364]: For arguments based on ‟touch,” or contact, cf. Adv. Phys. i. 258 ff., Adv. Geom. 34 ff.
[365]: Or ‟resistance,” § 39; for this quality, as treated by Epicurus, cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 222.
[366]: Cf.§ 38
[367]: This means that each sense is specialized, so that it is capable of receiving only one kind of impression (e.g. the sight is affected by colour, but not by sound or solidity); cf. § 108.
[368]: i.e. in the view of the Stoics, but not of the Sceptics, for the inapprehensibility of the ‟Incorporeal” is proved in § 50 ad fin.
[369]: Cf. i. 36 ff.
[370]: Cf. ii. 10.
[371]: The first of these theories of vision is that of Chrysippus (a cone of light connecting eye with object), the second that of Democritus and Epicurus, the third that of Empedocles, Pythagoreans, Plato (Tim. 45 b) and Aristotle.
[372]: Cf. Plato, Tim. 67 b; Diog. Laert. vii. 158; ‟acoustic breath” is Stoic for the air within the ear. cf. ii. 70.
[373]: For the Stoic theory of ‟expression” (λεκτόν) cf. ii. 81,104. Logos (‟reason” or ‟word”) is from the same stem as Lekton (‟what can be put into words” or ‟meaning”), which—as contrasted with ‟uttered words”—was termed by the Stoics ‟incorporeal.”
[374]: The Heracleitean doctrine, cf. i. 217 ff.; §§ 82, 115 infra.
[375]: Cf. ii. 28.
[376]: For the four (or five) ‟elements” cf. §§ 30, 31; for ‟the things behind” them (from the point of view of cognition), i.e. primary bodies or stuff, cf. § 32.
[377]: i.e. the primary bodies out of which, as ‟elements,” the (four) so-called ‟elements” (earth, air, fire, water) were said by the Stoics to be compounded.
[378]: For ‟touch” cf. i. 50, 96, iii. 45–46. ‟Mixture” (of solids as well as fluids) is a wider term than ‟blending.”
[379]: Especially Aristotle (De gen. et corr. i. 10) and the Stoics. The following argument is against the latter. As Aristotle says. ‟mixture” effects some change, but not a total change, in the things mixed, which must be such as are capable of mutually affecting one another, and capable also of being easily decomposed into their constituent particles: he defines ‟mixture” as ‟the union of mixables which have undergone alteration.”
[380]: Here ‟blend” is used merely as a synonym for ‟mix.”
[381]: Chrysippus held that ‟mixture” is not effected by superficial ‟juxtaposition” but by the mutual ‟permeation” or ‟interpenetration” of the constituents of the mixture: ‟qualities” as well as substances he regarded as corporeal and thus capable of being ‟penetrated.”
[382]: Cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 37 ff.; Aristot. Phys. vii. 2, Categ. 15 a 13; Plato, Laws, x. 894.
[383]: Lit. ‟by life,” cf. i. 165, ii. 244.
[384]: Such as Zeno and Diodorus Cronos, cf. ii. 242.
[385]: Cf. i. 26 for ‟equipollence” as leading to Sceptic ‟suspension.”
[386]: i.e. what is plainly obvious, cf. § 266.
[387]: Cf. ii. 244.
[388]: An Aristotelian phrase: freedom of choice was denied by fatalists, such as Democritus and the Stoics.
[389]: Cf. ii. 18 ff.
[390]: Cf. ii. 245.
[391]: Cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 93, 103.
[392]: Cf. §§ 119, 131. ‟Place” in the ‟exact” or narrow sense means the precise portion of space occupied by an object, as distinguished from ‟place” in the ‟broad” or ‟extended” sense in which it includes surrounding portions of space. The latter sense of ‟place” was adopted in order to make ‟motion in place” feasible; but Sextus argues that it fails to do so.
[393]: The following sections, 76–80, criticize two kinds of motion, (1) successive motion, by which the moving body occupies the first part of the intervening space first with its own first part, next with its second part, and so on till all its parts have passed through all the parts of the ‟interval.” (Here it is assumed that both the moving body and the spatial distance, or ‟interval,” are divisible; but, argues Sextus, whether they are infinitely divisible or divisible only into a limited number of indivisible parts, in either case motion is found to be impossible.) (2) Momentaneous motion (§§ 78–79), by which the moving body passes into the whole of the interval in a single moment of time.
[394]: Cf, the Eleatic puzzle of ‟Achilles” (and the tortoise); cf. Aristot. Phys. vi. 9.
[395]: Cf. § 77. This is further explained in Adv. Phys. i. 154: ‟If all is indivisible (time, bodies, and space), all moving bodies will be of equal velocity (e.g. the sun and the tortoise), since an indivisible interval is completed by all alike in an indivisible moment of time.” In this § 79 the difficulties as regards the quantity of space passed through by the moving body on the momentaneous theory are exposed: it must be conceived either as (1) unlimited or (2) precisely limited, or (3) small, but not precisely limited; but all these views lead to absurdities.
[396]: Cf. ii. 253.
[397]: Cf. § 66.
[398]: i.e. material substance, which Heracleitus and Plato said was ‟in flux,” cf. i. 217 ff., ii. 28.
[399]: Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 277 ff.
[400]: Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 297 ff.
[401]: The addition of the numbers 1 . . . 5 gives 15; of 1 . . . 4, 10; of 1 . . . 3, 6; of 1 and 2, 3; so we get the total 35 = 15+10+6+3+1; cf. Adu. Phys. i. 304 ff. But perhaps we should read 105 for 35 (ἑκατόν for τριάκοντα), as 1 . . . 14 = 105.
[402]: In what follows it is argued (§§ 90, 91) that 1 cannot be subtracted from a ‟whole 10,” 10 being ten ones, so that the subtracted 1 must be subtracted from each of those ones, including itself, and thus 10–1 = 0. Further, as the number 1 (the ‟monad”) is indivisible, it does not admit of subtraction: and the 1 to be subtracted must fall into 10 parts, and thus be itself a 10, if it is subtracted 10 separate times from the units of the 10.
[403]: i.e. the Dogmatists, who assumed the indivisibility of the ‟one.” In the next sections (92–93) it is shown that ‟a part cannot be subtracted from a part,” i.e., in the case of the ‟Decad,” you cannot subtract 1 from 9: for 10–1 still leaves an ‟entire” 9; and if 9 = 9 x 1, and 1 is subtracted from each of the 9 ones, the subtracted 1 will be 1 x 9; and the same applies to subtraction of 1 from other ‟parts” of the ‟Decad” (8, 7, 6, etc.), of which the last is 1, which, as indivisible, does not admit of subtraction.
[404]: i.e. the Sceptics.
[405]: Cf. § 59.
[406]: Lit. ‟is cancelled,” cf. i. 13.
[407]: Cf. ii. 215 ff., Adv. Phys. i. 330 ff.
[408]: The view of Epicurus; the Stoics said that the whole is neither the same as its parts nor different.
[409]: Cf. ii. 214, 227.
[410]: Cf Adv. Phys. i. 344 f., ii. 27.
[411]: Cf. §§ 86 ff. supra. The notion of ‟part” involves that of a ‟whole” which ‟includes” it, and of which it is ‟part.”
[412]: ‟Part” and ‟whole” are ‟co-relative” notions, each implying the other, and relative things are ‟apprehended together,” the presence, or absence, of the one involving that of the other, cf. ii. 125, 175.
[413]: With this section cf. §§ 38 ff., 49 and 64 where ‟physical change” is distinguished from ‟local transition” and other kinds of ‟motion.”
[414]: Cf. §§ 17 ff.
[415]: With §§ 104–105 cf. 109 ff.
[416]: Cf. §§ 144 ff.; Aristot. Phys. vi. 6.
[417]: This is shown later, in §§ 144–145.
[418]: Lit. ‟simply passive,” i.e. each sense perceives only one class of objects, cf. § 47 supra.
[419]: A peculiar Stoic expression, cf. Adv. Phys. i. 353 ff., ii. 64.
[420]: Cf. ii. 57 ff., i. 170.
[421]: Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 269, ii. 346 ff.
[422]: Cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 326 ff.; Aristot. Phys. i. 8.
[423]: i.e. it is (‟other” or) different after it has ‟become” from what it was before it ‟became”: ‟becoming” involves a change of nature or character in the thing which undergoes the process.
[424]: Cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 344 f.
[425]: Cf. § 64.
[426]: i.e. ‟rest” as the opposite of motion in general, not of locomotion only (as in the Stoic use of the term); cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 245 ff.
[427]: Cf. §§ 51, 54 supra.
[428]: i.e. ‟matter” (in the ordinary sense) of ‟our” physical universe, as distinct from any logical or metaphysical use of the term.
[429]: Cf. §§ 13 ff., 103 supra.
[430]: Cf. § 75 supra for this distinction between the ‟broad” and narrow or ‟strict” senses of ‟place.” In §§ 121–120 we have the popular arguments for space based on (1) observed facts as to ‟the parts of space,” and the movement of bodies in space; and (2) traditional language, which assumes the existence of space; (3) if body exists, space must also exist.
[431]: e.g. the Stoics and Peripatetics, cf. §§ 124, 131.
[432]: Cf. Aristot. Phys. iv. 1.
[433]: Herodotus of Tarsus, cf. Introd. pp. xl f.
[434]: Hesiod, Theog. 118.
[435]: ‟Chaos” is here absurdly derived from χώρα, ‟room” (the Stoics connected it with χεῖν, ‟to pour”). It means, in fact, a ‟cavity” or abyss (from χάσκειν, ‟to yawn”).
[436]: ‟By which” is the ‟efficient,” ‟from which” the ‟material” cause: the Stoics regarded both these as ‟bodies,” and so involving the existence of space.
[437]: For the Stoic use of ‟first” and ‟second” in hypothetical syllogisms cf. ii. 104, 142. In the next sections (122–123) the arguments of the previous sections (120–121) are rebutted: (1) the ‟parts of space” are identical with space and in asserting their existence we are merely ‟begging the question”: (2) the reality of ‟body,” or solid matter, as well as of the ‟efficient” and ‟material” causes, is likewise pure assumption. In §§ 124–130 the special views of the Stoics are expounded and refuted; in §§ 13 1ff. those of Aristotle and his School.
[438]: Cf. §§ 38 ff. supra.
[439]: The argument is: ‟Interval” cannot mean one ‟dimension” only (such as ‟length”) since (by definition) ‟Place” must be ‟equated” to the ‟body” which is in it and must therefore have all three dimensions; and further, the ‟in- cluding” place of one ‟dimension” would be less than the body of three dimensions which it ‟includes.” Nor can it be all three dimensions, since the body which is ‟in” it is all these three dimensions and therefore identical with its ‟place”—the thing contained with the thing which contains it. Thus ‟interval” and ‟place” are not explicable in terms of ‟dimensions.”
[440]: Cf. § 39 supra.
[441]: This argument raises the question—since ‟body” and ‟place” coincide (spatially), to which of the two do the ‟dimensions” belong, as we cannot assume two sets of dimensions in the same place? To ascribe them to the ‟body” annuls ‟place” and vice versa.
[442]: Cf. §§ 45 f.; the ‟components” of ‟body” are the three ‟dimensions.”
[443]: Cf. §§ 49 ff.; and for the ‟affections,” §§ 38, 52, 117.
[444]: Cf. § 124.
[445]: Cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 30 ff.; Aristot. Phys. iv. 4, De cael. iv. 3.
[446]: The first objection is based on §§ 38–56, the second also on §§ 38 ff., the third on §§ 109 ff.
[447]: Cf. §§ 66, 81. The Sceptics are here said to be ‟put to shame,” or ‟confusion” (i.e. caused to hesitate in their judgement as to the nature of space) owing to the ‟equipollence” of the arguments against space and those for it based on the obvious facts of experience.
[448]: The Stoics, cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 141. This definition is derived from the fact that Time is measured by the motions of the planets and stars which compose the Universe.
[449]: Aristot. Phys. iv. 10 mentions this (Platonic) definition, cf. Plato, Tim. 47 d ff. Aristotle says that our notion of time is derived from a sense of difference and of succession in our thoughts and perceptions, which brings with it a distinction between ‟before” and ‟after”—between ‟past,” ‟present,” and ‟future.” Thus ‟time” is a thing ‟numbered” or ‟measured” by the conscious mind, and Aristotle defines it as ‟a numeration of motion in respect of priority and posteriority” (Phys. iv. 11).
[450]: An Epicurean, cf. Adv. Log. ii. 348.
[451]: i.e. the Stoics.
[452]: Cf. i. 8.
[453]: Cf. ii. cc. 3–7, 12, 13.
[454]: Cf. Aristot. Met. xii. 6.
[455]: e.g. that there was once a time when no time was.
[456]: Cf. Aristot. Phys. vi. 6.
[457]: Time ‟came into existence” (γέγονεν), said Plato (Tim. 38 b): ‟No,” said Aristotle (Met. xii. 6). In §§ 147–148 I render γενητός (‟capable of coming into existence”) by ‟generable,” and γίνεται by ‟is generated”; but in § 149, and elsewhere, I usually render γίνεται by ‟becomes,” γινόμενα by ‟becoming,” etc.
[458]: e.g. Aristotle, Epicurus, Poseidonius; cf. Lucr. i. 151.
[459]: Cf. § 133 supra.
[460]: With this chapter cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 248–309. In §§ 152–156 the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers as the primary constituents, or ‟elements,” of the Universe is expounded; in §§ 156–157 the Pythagorean proof that numbers are distinct from things numbered (‟numerables”) is set forth; in §§ 158 ff. the Sceptical arguments against the Pythagorean doctrine of the real existence of numbers (as distinct from ‟numerables”) are developed.
[461]: Cf. i. 15.
[462]: i.e. ‟the limits of bodies” of § 32 supra, cf. § 153.
[463]: The existence of the ‟elemental” numbers is said to be due to ‟participation” in either the principle of ‟Unity” (‟the Monad”) or the principle of Duality (‟the indefinite Dyad”)—odd numbers in the first, even in the second. These principles are the ‟genera” of which odd and even numbers are ‟particulars.”
[464]: i.e. it is an indivisible unit, and begins the line as the One begins the number-series; cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 278.
[465]: The terms here used are those of the Pythagorean musical (‟octave”) system, and denote the ratios 4: 3, 3:2,2: 1. Cf. Plato, Tim. 36 a; Adv. Arithm. 6–9, Adv. Mus. 46.
[466]: Or ‟in its own essence,” apart from relation to anything else.
[467]: The argument here is that ‟participation” of things in the Monad involves either (1) the division of the Monad into an infinite number of parts (§§ 158–159), or (2) the multiplication of the Monad into an infinite number of whole Monads (§§ 160–162), both which results violate the conception of the Monad as unique principle of Unity.
[468]: i.e. ‟Unity” as a summum genus, cf. i. 38.
[469]: Cf. § 160 supra.
[470]: Cf. § 153 supra.
[471]: Lit. ‟fair” (honestum): the Stoics used καλόν as a synonym for ἀγαθόν ‟good” (bonum), and in this section the terms are used as synonymous.
[472]: Or ‟regent part,” i.e. the mind, cf. i. 128, ii. 81; Introd. p. xxv. The doctrine that ‟the good man” is ‟not other” than goodness (virtue or ‟utility”) strikes one as curious. The Stoics, we must remember, regarded attributes or qualities as corporeal and parts of the ‟substance” (οὐσία) to which they belong—here the mind (‟regent part”) of ‟the good man.” For the equation of ‟virtue” (or ‟goodness”) with ‟utility” (or ‟benefit”) as ‟the source (or agency) from which benefit results” see Diog. Laert. vii. 94. For Stoic Ethics cf. Introd. pp. xxvi ff.
[473]: i.e. ‟primary, fundamental, good”—the source of other goods. Good in the first sense is the central good, which expands into the second and third senses as into concentric circles—the third including the second, the second the first.
[474]: Cf. Aristot. Rhet. i. 6; the other definition is Stoic.
[475]: Deriving ἀγαθόν from ἀγαστόν, cf. Plato, Cratyl. 412 c, 422 a and § 184 infra.
[476]: The Stoics said ‟virtue,” Cyrenaics and Epicureans ‟pleasure,” some Peripatetics ‟painlessness” (cf. Aristot. Rhet. i. 7).
[477]: ‟Damage” or ‟harm” being the opposite of ‟utility” or ‟benefit”—the Stoic definition of ‟good.”
[478]: Cf. i. 27.
[479]: Cf. Plato, Laws iii. 697; Aristot. Eth. Nic. i. 8.
[480]: Apparently a unique sense of the rare word τριγένεια (from τριγενής, ‟thrice-born”).
[481]: Antisthenes, the Cynic.
[482]: Cf. ii. 18 ff., 134 ff.
[483]: Literally, ‟the (act of) choosing” or ‟trying to get for oneself.” ‟Choice” (as the context shows) involves ‟desire” and the striving for satisfaction.
[484]: For the connexion of ‟good” (ἀγαθόν) with ‟delightful” (ἀγαστόν) cf. § 175.
[485]: Cf. ii. 31 ff., which also deals with ‟the Criterion.”
[486]: Cf. Cic. Acad. iv. 7. 22 ‟ars . . . ex multis animi perceptionibus constat.” The virtues, said the Stoics, are ‟arts” because they are forms of knowledge and consist in the use or ‟exercise” of a large number of perceptions or ‟apprehensions” related to one another in a systematic way. These ‟apprehensions” are ‟deposited” in the mind which is conceived as an elastic fluid pneuma of which the whole moves when any part of it is moved. Cf. §§ 241, 251 infra.
[487]: Cf. i. 128, ii. 70.
[488]: Cf. Plato, Tim. 35 ff. But ‟the Numbers” may refer to the Pythagorean theory.
[489]: Cf. Introd. p. xxvii, Cic. De fin. iii. 15 f., iv. 9, 16.
[490]: The word bracketed in the Greek text (βλακευσάμενος) means ‟being lazy, or spiritless,” and is obviously out of place here, though it would fit well enough in the next clause (as Apelt suggests).
[491]: e.g. the Cyrenaics.
[492]: Cf. the examples in i. 145 ff. ‟Amongst us” here, and throughout this chapter (as in i. 145 ff.), means ‟amongst the Greeks” and refers in special to the laws or customs of Athens.
[493]: Prob. not ‟Germans,” but a Persian tribe, cf. i. 152.
[494]: i.e. Μηριόνης is derived from μηρός (‟thigh”); cf. § 245 infra.
[495]: Cf. Plato, Symp. 180 a.
[496]: Cf. §§ 205, 245; and i. 148, 153, 160 for what follows. The repellent features of Stoic ethical theory mentioned in this chapter are passed over in most expositions of Stoicism, though confirmed by Plutarch (De Stoic. repugn.). We may ascribe them to the ‟Back to Nature” movement, which the early Stoics shared with the Cynics. The dictum ‟Live according to Nature” might be taken to mean ‟Disregard conventional morals,” ‟Cease to repress your natural instincts.” But, as Sextus says in § 249, they did not (like some of the Cynics) carry out in practice these shocking theories.
[497]: Cf. Hdt. iv. 176.
[498]: Cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 78, and i. 155 supra. The verses are from Eurip. Bacchae 836 and 317.
[499]: Cf. i. 152.
[500]: Homer, Il. xviii. 356.
[501]: Cf. § 246, i. 160.
[502]: Cf. Rep. v. 457.
[503]: Cf. § 225 infra.
[504]: Tydeus, father of Diomede; his ‟enemy” was Melanippus (Il. xiv. 114 ff.).
[505]: Boys were scourged at the altar of Artemis Orthia in Laconia.
[506]: Cf. i. 149.
[507]: Cf. Hdt. iv. 180; Aristot. Pol. ii. 3.
[508]: e.g. Diogenes the Cynic, cf. Diog. Laert vi. 72.
[509]: Cf. Hom. Il. xiv. 204, i. 399.
[510]: Cf. Sallust, Bell. Iug. 21, 82.
[511]: Homer, Od. iii. 73. For early Greek piracy cf. Thucyd. i.5.
[512]: A. of Paros, famous for his iambic poems, circa 680 b.c. Alcaeus, a later poet, also flung away his shield in battle; and Hor. Od. ii. 7 is based on one or other of these incidents.
[513]: Cf. Hdt. iv. 114.
[514]: Cybele, whose priests were eunuchs, cf. Catullus 63.
[515]: Cf. for this subject Adv. Phys. i. 13 ff., 50 ff.
[516]: Diagoras, atomist and poet, circa 420 b.c.; Theodorus, a Cyrenaic, circa 310 b.c.; Critias, orator and poet, one of the ‟Thirty Tyrants” (404 b.c.) of Athens.
[517]: This definition of God is not in our Aristotle, but cf. De caelo, i. 9, 278 b 14: ‟We are wont to give the name of ‘Heaven’ especially to the outermost and highest (part of the Universe), in which all the Divinity, we say, is situated.” It is this outermost circumference—the abode of Fire, the finest and most divine of elements—which is here termed ‟the limit” (πέρας).
[518]: Cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 138 f. (Stoics), x. 139 (Epicureans). For Xenophanes cf. i. 225.
[519]: Cf. Hdt. ii. 41, Juvenal xv. 2 ff.
[520]: Cf. § 208 supra.
[521]: i.e. of Didymus, near Miletus.
[522]: Cf. Hdt. ii. 47.
[523]: Cf. Hdt. ii. 39.
[524]: Cf. Juv. xv. 9.
[525]: East of the Nile Delta.
[526]: Cf. Emped. Frag. 141; probably a Pythagorean (or Orphic) ‟taboo”; cf. Hdt. ii. 37.
[527]: The earliest Greek medical guild; Diocles was a famous physician of the fourth century b.c.
[528]: § 207 supra.
[529]: For this subject cf. Diog. Laert. ix. 84; Cic. Tusc. i. 45; Sir T. Browne, Hydriotaphia, chap. i.
[530]: South of the Caspian Sea.
[531]: i.e. ‟cave-dwellers” of west coast of the Red Sea.
[532]: Cf. § 210 supra.
[533]: Cf. Tibull. iii. 2. 17 for the practice of ossilegium.
[534]: Cf. Hdt. i. 140.
[535]: Eurip. Frag. 638 (Nauck).
[536]: Eric. p. 61. 6; 71. 6 (Usener); cf. Lucret. iii. 830.
[537]: Cf. Heracl. Frag. 67, 78 (b 88 Diels). Part of the ‟Upward and Downward Way” of H. (see Introd, p. viii) is the cycle of generation by which every creature is simultaneously both living and dying. The soul, which consists of ‟fire,” is continually passing into the other elements, and the other elements into it. But the second clause (‟for when we live” etc.) looks rather like a contamination of Heracleitus’s doctrine with the σῶμα—σῆμα (‟body a tomb”) theory of Pythagoreanism.
[538]: Frag. 449; cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 48, Lucr. v. 222 ff.
[539]: Theognis 425 ff.; cf. Soph. Oed. Col. 1227.
[540]: Cf. Hdt. i. 31; Cic. Tusc. i. 47. Their mother Cydippe (the ‟Argive priestess” of Hera) prayed the goddess to grant her sons, C. and B., the best of boons for mortals: the same night both died in their sleep.
[541]: Cf. Hdt. v. 4.
[542]: Cf. ii. 40.
[543]: Cf. § 205 supra.
[544]: Cf. i. 13, 25 ff.
[545]: So said the Cynics, and some Stoics; other Stoics gave up the doctrine; cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 105, vii. 127.
[546]: Cf. Adv. Eth. 167 ff.; Cic. De fin. i. 13, v. 6 ff.
[547]: Cf. §§ 180, 238 supra.
[548]: For the sage as ‟indiscoverable” cf. Adv. Phys. i. 133, Introd. p. xxix. ‟Prudence” (φρόνησις), or ‟practical wisdom, is distinguished from ‟wisdom” (σοφία). Note that in this argument ‟the art of living” is identified with ‟prudence.”
[549]: Cf. §§ 188 ff.; ii. 53 ff.
[550]: Cf. ii. 4, 53 ff., Introd. p. xxv.
[551]: Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 88.
[552]: i.e. always consistently good, impeccable.
[553]: Cf. § 205.
[554]: Cf. § 199.
[555]: Cf. § 207.
[556]: For C. and L., as savages of ancient Sicily, cf. Hom. Od. i. 69, x. 81; Thuc. vi. 21.
[557]: For ‟prudence,” or practical ‟wisdom,” cf. § 240.
[558]: Cf. §§ 188, 241, 261.
[559]: Cf. ii. 85 ff.
[560]: ‟Dubious lessons”: if the text is right, we must supply λόγους (sayings, ‟lessons”) with τοὺς ἀπόρους. It was laid down (cf. Adv. Math. i. 29) that ‟the dubious (ἄπορον) cannot be taught”: it is intermediate between truth and falsehood.
[561]: For the Stoic doctrine of ‟the true” and ‟truth” cf. ii. 80 ff. What ‟the true” is ‟opposed to” is presumably ‟the false.”
[562]: Cf. Aristot. Anal. Post. i. 1.
[563]: For this saying cf. Matt. xv. 14; Hor. Epist. i. 17.
[564]: The argument here is that the non-expert cannot become an expert either (1) by a single lesson, §§ 261–262, or (2) by a course of lessons, which must follow each other singly, § 263. ‟Apprehension” here means the grasp of a truth or principle of the art or craft which is being imparted, the ‟art” itself being defined as a ‟system” of such pieces of knowledge.
[565]: Cf. § 251 supra.
[566]: Cf. § 79 supra.
[567]: These comparisons are ascribed to Anacharsis, the Scythian sage of Solon’s time (circa 590 b.c.); cf. Adv. Log. i. 55.
[568]: Cf. i. 138, 178.
[569]: Cf. ii. 214.
[570]: Cf. § 214.
[571]: Cf. §§ 240 ff.
[572]: Cf. § 168.
[573]: For the Stoic definition of this virtue cf. Adv. Phys. i. 153. It denotes ‟self-mastery” by which the rational self (or ‟Logos”) overcomes the irrational appetites and passions.
[574]: Cf. § 177 for the Stoic use of ‟inclination” and ‟aversion” as ethical terms. The Stoic ideal being complete absence of passion and emotion (‟apathy”), the less ‟temperance” a man exercised the better he was. ‟The Sage,” being a purely rational self, needs no ‟self-mastery.” Cf. Introd. p. xxviii.
[575]: The ‟not-wise” of the Stoics, cf. § 251.
[576]: Cf. §§ 236 f. supra, i. 27.
[577]: Cf. i. 20, 177; ii. 256, 258.