Capítulo 9. Chapter IX.—Does Anything True Really Exist?
[2.9.85] Seeing, then, that there is a controversy amongst the Dogmatists regarding ‟the true,” since some assert that something true exists, others that nothing true exists, it is impossible to decide the controversy, because the man who says that something true exists will not be believed without proof, on account of the controversy; and if he wishes to offer proof, he will be disbelieved if he acknowledges that his proof is false, whereas if he declares that his proof is true he becomes involved in circular reasoning and will be required to show proof of the real truth of his proof, and another proof of that proof, and so on ad infinitum. But it is impossible to prove an infinite series; and so it is impossible also to get to know that something true exists.
[2.9.86] Moreover, the ‟something,” which is, they declare, the highest genus of all,[205] is either true or false or neither false nor true or both false and true. If, then, they shall assert that it is false they will be confessing that all things are false. For just as it follows because ‟animal” is animate that all particular animals also are animate, so too if the highest genus of all (‟something”) is false all the particulars also will be false and nothing true. And this involves also the conclusion that nothing is false; for the very statements ‟all things are false,” and ‟something false exists,” being themselves included in the ‟all,” will be false.
[2.9.87] And if the ‟something” is true, all things will be true; and from this again it follows that nothing is true, since this statement itself (I mean that ‟nothing is true”) being ‟something” is true. And if the ‟something” is both false and true, each of its particulars will be both false and true. From which we conclude that nothing is really true; for that which has its real nature such that it is true will certainly not be false. And if the ‟something” is neither false nor true, it is acknowledged that all the particulars also, being declared to be neither false nor true, will not be true. So for these reasons it will be non-evident to us whether the true exists.
[2.9.88] Furthermore, the true things are either apparent only, or non-evident only, or in part non-evident and in part apparent;[206] but none of these alternatives is true, as we shall show; therefore nothing is true. If, however, the true things are apparent only, they will assert either that all or that some of the apparent are true. And if they say ‟all,” the argument is overthrown; for it is apparent to some that nothing is true. If, again, they say ‟some,” no one can assert without testing that these phenomena are true, those false, while if he employs a test or criterion he will say either that this criterion is apparent or that it is non-evident. But it is certainly not non-evident; for it is now being assumed[207] that the apparent objects only are true.
[2.9.89] And if it is apparent, since the matter in question is what apparent things are true and what false, that apparent thing which is adopted for the purpose of judging the apparent objects will itself in turn require an apparent criterion, and this again another, and so on ad infinitum. But it is impossible to judge an infinite series; and hence it is impossible to apprehend whether the true things are apparent only.
[2.9.90] Similarly also he who declares that the non-evident only are true will not imply that they are all true (for he will not say that it is true that the stars[208] are even in number and that they are also odd); while if some are true, whereby shall we decide that these non-evident things are true and those false? Certainly not by an apparent criterion; and if by a non-evident one, then since our problem is which of the non- evident things are true and which false, this non- evident criterion will itself also need another to judge it, and this again a third, and so on ad infinitum. Neither, then, are the true things non-evident only.
[2.9.91] The remaining alternative is to say that of the true some are apparent, some non-evident; but this too is absurd. For either all the apparent and all the non-evident are true, or some of the apparent and some of the non-evident. If, then, we say ‟all,” the argument will again be overthrown, since the truth is granted of the statement ‟nothing is true,” and the truth will be asserted of both the statements ‟the stars are even in number” and ‟they are odd.”
[2.9.92] But if some of the apparent are true and some of the non-evident, how shall we judge that of the apparent these are true but those false? For if we do so by means of an apparent thing, the argument is thrown back ad infinitum; and if by means of a thing non-evident, then, since the non-evidents also require to be judged, by what means is this non-evident thing to be judged? If by an apparent thing, we fall into circular reasoning; and if by a thing non-evident, into the regress ad infinitum.
[2.9.93] And about the non-evident we must make a similar statement; for he who attempts to judge them by something non- evident is thrown back ad infinitum, while he who judges by a thing apparent or with the constant assistance of a thing apparent falls back ad infinitum, or, if he passes over to the apparent, is guilty of circular reasoning. It is false, therefore, to say that of the true some are apparent, some non-evident.
[2.9.94] If, then, neither the apparent nor the non-evident alone are true, nor yet some apparent and some non- evident things, nothing is true. But if nothing is true, and the criterion seems to require the true for the purpose of judging, the criterion is useless and vain, even if we grant, by way of concession, that it possesses some substantial reality. And if we have to suspend judgement as to whether anything true exists, it follows that those who declare that ‟dialectic is the science of things true and false and neither”[209] speak rashly.
[2.9.95] And since the criterion of truth has appeared to be unattainable, it is no longer possible to make positive assertions either about those things which (if we may depend on the statements of the Dogmatists) seem to be evident or about those which are non-evident; for since the Dogmatists suppose they apprehend the latter from the things evident, if we are forced to suspend judgement about the evident, how shall we dare to make pronouncements about the non- evident?
[2.9.96] Yet, by way of super-addition,[210] we shall also raise separate objections against the non-evident class of objects. And since they seem to be apprehended and confirmed by means of sign and proof, we shall show briefly that it is proper to suspend judgement also about sign and proof. We will begin with sign; for indeed proof seems to be a kind of sign.