Capítulo 11. Chapter XI.—Does an Indicative Sign Exist?
[2.11.104] Now the sign, judging by the statements of the Dogmatists about it, is inconceivable. Thus, for instance, the Stoics, who seem to have defined it exactly, in attempting to establish the conception of the sign, state that ‟A sign is an antecedent judgement in a valid hypothetical syllogism, which serves to reveal the consequent;” and ‟judgement” they define as ‟A self-complete expression[218] which is of itself declaratory;” and ‟valid hypothetical syllogism” as one ‟which does not begin with truth[219] and end with a false consequent.”
[2.11.105] For either the syllogism begins with the true and ends with the true (e.g. ‟If there is day, there is light”), or it begins with what is false and ends in falsehood (like ‟If the earth flies, the earth is winged”), or it begins with truth and ends in falsehood (like ‟If the earth exists, the earth flies”), or it begins with falsehood and ends in truth (like ‟If the earth flies, the earth exists”). And they say that of these only that which begins with truth and ends in falsehood is invalid, and the rest valid.
[2.11.106] ‟Antecedent,” they say, is ‟the precedent clause in a hypothetical syllogism which begins in truth and ends in truth.” And it ‟serves to reveal the consequent,” since in the syllogism ‟If this woman has milk, she has conceived,” the clause ‟If this woman has milk” seems to be evidential of the clause ‟she has conceived.”[220]
[2.11.107] Such is the Stoic doctrine. But we assert, firstly, that it is non-evident whether any ‟expression” exists. For since some of the Dogmatists, the Epicureans, declare that expression does not exist, others, the Stoics, that it does exist, when the Stoics assert its existence they are employing either mere assertion or demonstration as well. If assertion, then the Epicureans will confute them with the assertion which states that no expression exists. But if they shall adduce demonstration, then since demonstration is composed of expressed judgements, and because it is composed of expressions will be unable to be adduced to confirm the existence of expression (for how will he who refuses to allow the existence of expression grant the reality of a system compounded of expressions?),
[2.11.108] —it follows that the man who attempts to establish the existence of expression from the reality of the system of expressions is proposing to confirm the problematic by the problematic. If, then, it is impossible to establish either simply or by means of demonstration that any expression exists, it is non-evident that any expression exists.
So, too, with the question whether judgement exists; for the judgement is a form of expression.
[2.11.109] And very possibly, even should it be granted by way of assumption that expression exists, judgement will be found to be non-existent, it being compounded of expressions not mutually co-existent.[221] Thus, for example, in the case of ‟If day exists, light exists,” when I say ‟day exists” the clause ‟light exists” is not yet in existence, and when I say ‟light exists” the clause ‟day exists” is no longer in existence. If then it is impossible for things compounded of certain parts to be really existent if those parts do not mutually co-exist, and if the parts whereof the judgement is composed do not mutually co-exist, then the judgement will have no real existence.
[2.11.110] But passing over this objection, it will be found that the valid hypothetical syllogism is non-apprehensible. For Philo[222] says that a valid hypothetical syllogism is ‟that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood,” as for instance the syllogism ‟If it is day, I converse,” when in fact it is day and I am conversing; but Diodorus[223] defines it as ‟that which neither was nor is capable of beginning with a truth and ending with a falsehood;” so that according to him the syllogism now mentioned seems to be false, since if it is in fact day but I have remained silent it will begin with a truth but end with a falsehood, whereas the syllogism
[2.11.111] ‟If atomic elements of things do not exist, atomic elements exist,” seems true, since it begins with the false clause ‟atomic elements do not exist” and will end, according to him, with the true clause ‟atomic elements exist.” And those who introduce ‟connexion,” or ‟coherence,”[224] assert that it is a valid hypothetical syllogism whenever the opposite of its consequent contradicts its antecedent clause; so that, according to them, the above-mentioned syllogisms are invalid, whereas the syllogism ‟If day exists, day exists” is true.
[2.11.112] And those who judge by ‟implication”[225] declare that a hypothetical syllogism is true when its consequent is potentially included in its antecedent; and according to them the syllogism ‟If day exists, day exists,” and every such duplicated syllogism, will probably be false; for it is not feasible that any object should itself be included in itself.
[2.11.113] Probably, then, it will not seem feasible to get this controversy resolved. For whether we prefer any one of the above-mentioned rival views without proof or by the aid of proof, in neither case shall we gain credence. For proof itself is held to be valid whenever its conclusion follows the combination of its premisses as the consequent follows the antecedent; thus, for example—‟If it is day it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light:” [‟If it is day it is light,” ‟it is day and also it is light.”][226]
[2.11.114] But when we inquire how we are to judge the logical sequence of the consequent in its relation to the antecedent, we are met with the argument in a circle. For in order to prove the judgement upon the hypothetical syllogism, the conclusion of the proof must follow logically from its premisses, as we said above; and, in turn, in order to establish this, the hypothetical syllogism and its logical sequence must be tested; and this is absurd.
[2.11.115] So then the valid hypothetical syllogism is non-apprehensible.
But the ‟antecedent” also is unintelligible. For the antecedent, as they assert, is ‟the leading clause in a hypothetical syllogism of the kind which begins with a truth and ends in a truth.”[227]
[2.11.116] But if the sign serves to reveal the consequent, the consequent is either pre-evident or non-evident. If, then, it is pre-evident, it will not so much as need the thing which is to reveal it but will be apprehended along with it and will not be the object signified thereby, and hence also the thing mentioned will not be a ‟sion” of the object. But if the consequent is non- evident, seeing that there exists an unsettled controversy about things non-evident, as to which of them are true, which false, and in general whether any of them is true, it will be non-evident whether the hypothetical syllogism ends in a true consequent. And this involves the further fact that it is non- evident whether the leading clause in the syllogism is the logical antecedent.
[2.11.117] But to pass over this objection also, the sign cannot serve to reveal the consequent, if the thing signified is relative to the sign and is, therefore, apprehended along with it. For relatives are apprehended along with each other; and just as ‟right” cannot be apprehended as ‟right of left” before ‟left,” nor vice versa—and the same holds good of all other relative terms,—so neither will it be possible for the sign, as ‟sign of signified,” to be apprehended before the thing signified.[228]
[2.11.118] And if the sign is not apprehended before the thing signified, neither can it really serve to reveal the actual thing which is apprehended along with itself and not after itself.
Thus also, so far as we may judge by the usual statements of the dissenting philosophers (the Stoics), the sign is inconceivable. For they assert that it is both relative and serving to reveal the thing signified, in relation to which they say it was.
[2.11.119] Accordingly, if it is relative and in relation to the thing signified it certainly ought to be apprehended along with the thing signified, as is ‟left” with ‟right,” ‟up” with ‟down,” and the rest of the relative terms. Whereas, if it serves to reveal the thing signified, it certainly ought to be apprehended before it, in order that by being foreknown it may lead us to a conception of the object which comes to be known by means of it.
[2.11.120] But it is impossible to form a conception of an object which cannot be known before the thing before which it must necessarily be apprehended; and so it is impossible to conceive of an object which is both relative and also really serves to reveal the thing in relation to which it is thought. But the sign is, as they affirm, both relative and serving to reveal the thing signified; wherefore it is impossible to conceive of the sign.
[2.11.121] Furthermore, there is this also to be said. Amongst our predecessors there existed a controversy, some declaring that an indicative sign exists, others maintaining that no indicative sign exists.[229] He, then, who asserts the existence of an indicative sign will assert it either simply and without proof, making a bald assertion, or by the aid of proof. But if he shall employ mere assertion he will not gain credence; while if he shall propose to prove it he will be assuming the matter in question.
[2.11.122] For since proof is stated to come under the genus sign,[230] seeing that it is disputed whether or not a sign exists, there will also be a dispute as to whether proof does or does not at all exist—just as, when we make, let us suppose, the inquiry ‟Does animal exist?” we are inquiring also ‟Does man exist?” But it is absurd to try to prove the matter in question either by means of what is equally in question or by means of itself. So that neither will one be able by means of proof to affirm positively that sign exists.
[2.11.123] And if it is not possible either simply or with the aid of proof to make a positive declaration about the sign, it is impossible to make an apprehensive affirmation[231] concerning it; and if the sign is not apprehended with exactness, neither will it be said to be significant of anything, inasmuch as there is no agreement even about itself; and because of this it will not even be a sign. Hence, according to this line of reasoning also, the sign will be unreal and inconceivable.
[2.11.124] But there is this further to be said. Either the signs are apparent only or non-evident only, or some are apparent and some non-evident.[232] But none of these alternatives is valid; therefore sign does not exist.
Now that all the signs are not non-evident is shown by the following argument. The non-evident does not become apparent of itself, as the Dogmatists assert, but is perceived by means of something else. The sign, therefore, if it were non-evident, would require another non-evident sign—since, according to the hypothesis assumed, there is no apparent sign —and this again a third, and so on ad infinitum. But it is impossible to grasp an infinite series of signs; and so it is impossible for the sign to be apprehended when it is non-evident. And for this reason it will also be unreal, as it is unable to signify anything and to be a sign owing to its not being apprehended.
[2.11.125] And if all the signs are apparent, then, because the sign is a relative thing and in relation to the thing signified, and relatives are apprehended conjointly,[233] the things said to be signified, being apprehended along with what is apparent, will be apparent. For just as when the right and left are perceived together, the right is not said to appear more than the left nor the left than the right, so when the sign and the thing signified are apprehended together the sign should not be said to appear any more than the thing signified.
[2.11.126] And if the thing signified is apparent, it will not even be signified, as it requires nothing to signify and reveal it. Hence, just as when ‟right” is abolished there exists no ‟left,” so when the thing signified is abolished there can exist no sign, so that the sign is found to be unreal, if one should declare that the signs are apparent only.
[2.11.127] It remains to declare that of the signs some are apparent, others non-evident; but even so the difficulties remain. For the things said to be signified by the apparent signs will, as we said before, be apparent and require nothing to signify them, and will not even be things signified at all, so that neither will the signs be signs, as not signifying anything.
[2.11.128] And as to the non-evident signs which need things to reveal them, if we say that they are signified by things non-evident, the argument will be involved in a regress ad infinitum, rendering them non-apprehensible and therefore unreal, as we said before;[234] whereas, if they are to be signified by things apparent, they will be apparent, because apprehended along with their apparent signs, and therefore also unreal. For it is impossible for any object really to exist which is by nature both non-evident and apparent; but the signs which we are discussing though assumed to be non-evident have been found to be apparent owing to the reversal of the argument.[235]
[2.11.129] If, therefore, the signs are neither all apparent nor all non-evident, nor yet some of the signs apparent and some non-evident, and besides these there is no other alternative, as they themselves affirm, then the so-called signs will be unreal.
[2.11.130] So then these few arguments out of many will be enough for the present to suggest to us the non-existence of an indicative sign. Next, we shall set forth those which go to suggest the existence of a sign, in order that we may exhibit the equipollence of the counter-balancing arguments.
Either, then, the phrases used in criticism of the sign signify something or they signify nothing.[236] But if they are non-significant how could they affect the reality of the sign? While if they signify something, there exists a sign.
[2.11.131] Further, the arguments against the sign are either probative or non-probative; but if they are non-probative they do not prove the non- existence of a sign; while if they are probative, since proof, as serving to reveal the conclusion, belongs to the genus sign, sign will exist. Whence this argument also is propounded: ‟If sign exists, sign exists; and if sign exists not, sign exists; for the non- existence of sign is shown by proof, which is a form of sign. But sign either exists or exists not; therefore sign exists.”
[2.11.132] And this argument is counter- balanced by the following argument: ‟If any sign does not exist, sign does not exist; and if sign is that which the Dogmatists declare sign to be, sign does not exist (for the sign under discussion, accord- ing to the conception of it and as stated to be both relative and serving to reveal the thing signified, is found to be unreal, as we have shown).
[2.11.133] But sign either exists or exists not; therefore sign does not exist.”
Regarding also the phrases used in support of the sign,[237] let the Dogmatists themselves say in reply to our argument whether they signify something or signify nothing. For if they signify nothing, the existence of sign is not confirmed; whereas if they signify something, the thing signified will follow them; and it was ‟the existence of a sign.” And from this follows, as we have shown, the non-existence of sign, because of the reversal of the argument.
In short, then, since such plausible arguments are adduced both for the existence and for the non- existence of sign, we must declare that sign is ‟no more”[238] existent than non-existent.