Capítulo 27. Chapter XXVII.—Of The Phrase ‟To Every Argument An Equal Argument Is Opposed”
[1.27.202] When we say ‟To every argument an equal argument is opposed,” we mean ‟to every argument” that has been investigated by us, and the word ‟argument” we use not in its simple sense, but of that which establishes a point dogmatically (that is to say with reference to what is non-evident) and establishes it by any method, and not necessarily by means of premisses and a conclusion.[103] We say ‟equal” with reference to credibility or incredibility, and we employ the word ‟opposed” in the general sense of ‟conflicting;” and we supply therewith in thought the phrase ‟as appears to me.”
[1.27.203] So whenever I say ‟To every argument an equal argument is opposed,” what I am virtually saying is ‟To every argument investigated by me which establishes a point dogmatically, it seems to me there is opposed another argument, establishing a point dogmatically, which is equal to the first in respect of credibility and incredibility;” so that the utterance of the phrase is not a piece of dogmatism,[104] but the announcement of a human state of mind which is apparent to the person experiencing it.
[1.27.204] But some also utter the expression in the form ‟To every argument an equal argument is to be opposed,”[105] intending to give the injunction ‟To every argument which establishes a point dogmatically let us oppose an argument which investigates dogmatically, equal to the former in respect of credibility and incredibility, and conflicting therewith;” for they mean their words to be addressed to the Sceptic, although they use the infinitive form ‟to be opposed” instead of the imperative ‟let us oppose.”
[1.27.205] And they address this injunction to the Sceptic lest haply, through being misled by the Dogmatist, he may give up the Sceptic search, and through precipitancy miss the ‟quietude”[106] approved by the Sceptics, which they—as we said above[107]—believe to be dependent on universal suspension of judgement.