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Outlines of Pyrrhonism

Sextus Empiricus · Capítulo 20. Chapter XX.—Of ‟Aphasia” or Non-Assertion

Capítulo 20. Chapter XX.—Of ‟Aphasia” or Non-Assertion

[1.20.192] Concerning non-assertion what we say is this. The term ‟assertion” has two senses, general and special; used in the general sense it indicates affirmation or negation, as for example ‟It is day,” ‟It is not day;” in its special sense it indicates affirmation only, and in this sense negations are not termed assertions. Non-assertion, then, is avoidance of assertion in the general sense in which it is said to include both affirmation and negation, so that non-assertion is a mental condition of ours because of which we refuse either to affirm or to deny anything.

[1.20.193] Hence it is plain that we adopt non-assertion also not as though things are in reality of such a kind as wholly to induce non-assertion, but as indicating that we now, at the time of uttering it, are in this condition regarding the problems now before us. It must also be borne in mind that what, as we say, we neither posit nor deny, is some one of the dogmatic statements made about what is non-apparent; for we yield to those things which move us emotionally and drive us compulsorily to assent.