[268]: Mrs. Carter has a note here. See 1 Cor. vi. 19, 2 Cor. vi. 16, 2 Tim. i. 14, 1 John iii. 24, iv. 12, 13. But though the simple expression of carrying God about with us may seem to have some nearly parallel to it in the New Testament, yet those represent the Almighty in a more venerable manner, as taking the hearts of good men for a temple to dwell in. But the other expressions here of feeding and exercising God, and the whole of the paragraph, and indeed of the Stoic system, show the real sense of even its more decent phrases to be vastly different from that of Scripture.The passage in 1 Cor. vi. 19 is, What? know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God and ye are not your own? This follows v. 18, which is an exhortation to flee fornication. The passage in 2 Cor. vi. 16 is And what agreement hath the temple of God with idols? for ye are the temple of the living God; as God hath said, I will dwell in them and walk in them, etc. Mrs. Carter has not correctly stated the sense of these two passages. It is certain that Epictetus knew nothing of the writers of the Epistles in the New Testament; but whence did these writers learn such forms of expression as we find in the passages cited by Mrs. Carter? I believe that they drew them from the Stoic philosophers who wrote before Epictetus and that they applied them to the new religion which they were teaching. The teaching of Paul and of Epictetus does not differ: the spirit of God is in man. Swedenborg says, In these two faculties (rationality and liberty) the Lord resides with every man, whether he be good or evil, they being the Lord’s mansions in the human race. But the mansion of the Lord is nearer with a man, in proportion as the man opens the superior degrees by these faculties; for by the opening thereof he comes into superior degrees of love and wisdom, and consequently nearer to the Lord. Hence it may appear that as these degrees are opened, so a man is in the Lord and the Lord in him. Swedeuborg, Angelic Wisdom, 240. Again, the faculty of thinking rationally, viewed in itself, is not man’s, but God’s in man. I am not quite sure in what sense the administration of the Eucharist ought to be understood in the church of England service. Some English divines formerly understood, and perhaps some now understand, the ceremony as a commemoration of the blood of Christ shed for us and of his body which was broken; as we see in T. Burnet’s Posthumous work (de Fide et Officiis Christianorum, p. 80). It was a commemoration of the last supper of Jesus and the Apostles. But this does not appear to be the sense in which the ceremony is now understood by some priests and by some members of the church of England, whose notions approach near to the doctrine of the Catholic mass. Nor does it appear to be the sense of the prayer made before delivering the bread and wine to the Communicants, for the prayer is Grant us, gracious Lord, so to eat the flesh of thy dear son Jesus Christ and to drink his blood that our sinful bodies may be made clean by his body and our souls washed through his most precious blood and that we may evermore dwell in him and he in us. This is a different thing from Epictetus’ notion of God being in man, and also different, as I understand it, from the notion contained in the two passages of Paul; for it is there said generally that the Holy Ghost is in man or God in man, not that God is in man by virtue of a particular ceremony. It should not be omitted that there is after the end of the Communion service an admonition that the sacramental bread and wine remain what they were, and that the natural body and blood of our Saviour Christ are in heaven and not here; it being against the truth of Christ’s natural body to be at one time in more places than one. It was affirmed by the Reformers and the best writers of the English church that the presence of Christ in the Eucharist is a spiritual presence, and in this opinion they followed Calvin and the Swiss divines: and yet in the Prayer book we have the language that I have quoted; and even Calvin, who only maintained a spiritual presence, said, that the verity is nevertheless joined to the signs, and that in the sacrament we have true Communion in Christ’s body and blood (Contemporary Review, p. 464, August 1874). What would Epictetus have thought of the subtleties of our days?
[269]: The Athena of Phidias was in the Parthenon on the Athenian Acropolis, a colossal chryselephantine statue, that is, a frame work of wood, covered with ivory and gold (Pausanias, i. 24). The figure of Victory stood on the hand of the goddess, as we frequently see in coins. See. i. 6, 23, and the note in Schweig.’s edition. Cicero, de Natura Deorum, iii. 34.
[270]: The great statue at Olympia was the work of Phidias (Pausanias, v. 11). It was a seated colossal chryselephantine statue, and held a Victory in the right Land.
[271]: —Iliad, i. 526.
[272]: An allusion to the combatants in the public exercises, who used to show their shoulders, muscles and sinews as a proof of their strength. See i. 4, ii. 18, iii. 22 (Mrs. Carter).
[273]: ἔκκλισιν. See Book iii. c. 2.
[274]: The abuse of the faculties, which are proper to man, called rationality and liberty, is the origin of evil. By rationality is meant the faculty of understanding truths and thence falses, and goods and then evils; and by liberty is meant the faculty of thinking, willing and acting freely—and these faculties distinguish man from beasts. Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom, 264 and also 240. See Epictetus, ii. c. 8
[275]: This seems to be a proverb. If I am eaten, let me be eaten by the nobler animal.
[276]: A conjunctive or complex (συμπεπλεγμένον) axiom or lemma. Gellius (xvi. 8) gives an example: P. Scipio, the son of Paulus, was both twice consul and triumphed, and exercised the censorship and was the colleague of L. Mummius in his censorship. Gellius adds, in every conjunctive if there is one falsehood, though the other parts are true, the whole is said to be false, For the whole is proposed as true: therefore if one part is false, the whole is not true. The disjunctive (διεζευγμένον) is of this kind: pleasure is either bad or good, or neither good nor bad.
[277]: We often say a man learns a particular thing: and there are men who profess to teach certain things, such as a language, or an art; and they mean by teaching that the taught shall learn; and learning means that they shall be able to do what they learn. He who teaches an art professes that the scholar shall be able to practise the art, the art of making shoes for example, or other useful things. There are men who profess to teach religion, and morality, and virtue generally. These men may tell us what they conceive to be religion, and morality, and virtue; and those who are said to be taught may know what their teachers have told them. But the learning of religion, and of morality and of virtue, mean that the learner will do the acts of religion and of morality and of virtue; which is a very different thing from knowing what the acts of religion, of morality, and of virtue are. The teacher’s teaching is in fact only made efficient by his example, by his doing that which he teaches
[278]: He is not a Stoic philosopher, who can only explain in a subtle and proper manner the Stoic principles: for the same person can explain the principles of Epicurus, of course for the purpose of refuting them, and perhaps he can explain them better than Epicurus himself. Consequently he might be at the same time a Stoic and an Epicurean; which is absurd.—Schweig. He means that the mere knowledge of Stoic opinions does not make a man a Stoic, or any other philosopher. A man must according to Stoic principles practise them in order to be a Stoic philosopher. So if we say that a man is a religious man, he must do the acts which his religion teaches; for it is by his acts only that we can know him to be a religious man. What he says and professes may be false; and no man knows except himself whether his words and professions are true. The uniformity, regularity, and consistency of his acts are evidence which cannot be mistaken.
[279]: It has been suggested that Epictetus confounded under the name of Jews those who were Jews and those who were Christians. We know that some Jews became Christians. But see Schweig.’s note 1 and note 7.
[280]: It is possible, as I have said, that by Jews Epictetus means Christians, for Christians and Jews are evidently confounded by some writers, as the first Christians were of the Jewish nation. In book iv. c. 7, Epictetus gives the name of Galilaeans to the Jews. The term Galilaeans points to the country of the great teacher. Paul says (Romans, ii. 28), For he is not a Jew, which is one outwardly—but he is a Jew which is one inwardly, etc. His remarks (ii. 17–29) on the man who is called a Jew, and rests in the law and makes his boast of God may be compared with what Epictetus says of a man who is called a philosopher, and does not practise that which he professes.
[281]: See ii. 24, 26; Iliad, vii. 264, etc.; Juvenal, xv. 65, Nec hunc lapidem, quales et Turnus et Ajax Vel quo Tydides percussit pondere coxam Aeneae. —Upton.
[282]: Cicero (de Fin. iv. 10); Seneca, Ep. 95.
[283]: See i. 9. M. Antoninus, vi. 44: But my nature is rational and social; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world. I have here translated προβάτων by domestic animals. I suppose that the bovine species, and sheep and goats are meant.
[284]: This may appear extravagant; but it is possible to explain it, and even to assent to it. If a man believes that all is wisely arranged in the course of human events, he would not even try to resist that which he knows it is appointed for him to suffer: he would submit and he would endure. If Epictetus means that the man would actively pro— mote the end or purpose which he foreknew, in order that his acts may be consistent with what he foreknows and with his duty, perhaps the philosopher’s saying is too hard to deal with; and as it rests on an impossible assumption of foreknowledge, we may be here wiser than the philosophers, if we say no more about it. Compare Seneca, de Provid. c. 5.
[285]: Antoninus, vi. 42: We are all working together to one end, some with knowledge and design, and others without knowing what they do.
[286]: A lettuce is an example of the most trifling thing. A seat probably means a seat of superiority, a magistrate’s seat, a Roman sella curulis.
[287]: οὗτος ᾖ ἀβλαβής. See Schweig.’s note.
[288]: Socrates. We must by no means then do an act of injustice. Crito. Certainly not. Socrates. Nor yet when you are wronged must you do wrong in return, as most people think, since you must in no way do an unjust act. Plato, Crito, c. 10.
[289]: See the beginning of ii. 16.
[290]: The same remark will apply to most dissertations spoken or written on moral subjects: they are exercises of skill for him who delivers or writes them, or matter for criticism and perhaps a way of spending an idle hour for him who listens; and that is all. Epictetus blames our indolence and indifference as to acts, and the trifling of the schools of philosophy in disputation.
[291]: See i. e. 2.
[292]: See Cicero’s use of opinatio (Tusc. iv. 11).
[293]: See Schweig.’s note.
[294]: Doing nothing without the rule. This is a Greek proverb, used also by Persius, Sat. v. 119; compare Cicero, de Fin. iii. 17; and Antoninus, ii 16.
[295]: That is, so far shall I consider you from being able to judge rightly of things without a balance that I shall understand that not even with the aid of a balance can you do it, that you cannot even use a balance, and consequently that you are not worth a single word from me. Schweig.
[296]: This is a just conclusion. We must fix the canons or rules by which things are tried; and then the rules may be applied by the wise and good to all cases.
[297]: This is what is said in the Gorgias of Plato, p. 472, 474.
[298]: The word is ἔννοιαι, which Cicero explains to be the name as προλήψεις. Acad. Pr. ii. 10.
[299]: Socrates’ notion of envy is stated by Xenophon (Mem. iii. 9, 8), to be this: it is the pain or vexation which men have at the prosperity of their friends, and that such are the only envious persons. Bishop Butler gives a better definition; at least a more complete description of the thing. Emulation is merely the desire and hope of equality with or superiority over others, with whom we may compare ourselves. There does not appear to be any other grief in the natural passion, but only that want which is implied in desire. However this may be so strong as to be the occasion of great grief. To desire the attainment of this equality or superiority, by the particular means of others being brought down to our level, or below it, is, I think, the distinct notion of envy. From whence it is easy to see, that the real end which the natural passion, emulation, and which the unlawful one, envy, aims at is the same; namely, that equality or superiority: and consequently that to do mischief is not the end of envy, but merely the means it makes use of to attain its end. —Sermons upon Human Nature, I.
[300]: I have omitted the words ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἐκίνησε τὸν πλησιον I see no sense in them; and the text is plain without them.
[301]: I am not sure that I have understood rightly it ἐξ ὧν δὲ αὐτός at the beginning of this sentence.
[302]: The Symposium or Banquet of Xenophon is extant. Compare Epietetus, iii. 16, 5, and iv. o. 5, the beginning.
[303]: Hesiod, Theogony, v. 87.
[304]: The aliptic art is the art of anointing and rubbing, one of the best means of maintaining a body in health. The iatric or healing art is the art of restoring to health a diseased body. The aliptic art is also equivalent to the gymnastic art, or the art of preparing for gymnastic exercises, which are also a means of preserving the body’s health, when the exercises are good and moderate.
[305]: Epictetus in speaking of himself and of his experience at Rome.
[306]: See i. 29, note 20.
[307]: —Iliad, xiii. 281.
[308]: In Diogenes Laertius (Zeno, vii.) there is a letter from Antigonus to Zeno and Zeno’s answer. Simplicius (note on the Encheiridion. c. 51) supposes this Antigonus to be the King of Syria; but Upton remarks that it is Antigonus Gonatas, king of Macedonia.
[309]: See i. c. 7.
[310]: The original is but that person (ἐκεῖνος) has power to kill me. That person must be the person already mentioned, and Mrs. Carter has done right in adding this explanation.
[311]: The Thirty tyrants of Athens, as they were named (Xenophon, Hellenica, ii.). The talk of Socrates with Critias and Charicles two of the Thirty is reported in Xenophon’s Memorabilia (i. 2, 33). The defence of Socrates before those who tried him and his conversation in prison are reported in Plato’s Apology, and in the Phaedon and Crito. Diogenes was captured by some pirates and sold (iv. 1, 115).
[312]: There is some corruption here.
[313]: Encheiridion, c. 8: Do not seek (wish) that things which take place shall take place as you desire, but desire that things which take place shall take place as they do, and you will live a tranquil life.
[314]: Compare iii. 2. 4, iv. 8. 20. Antoninus (viii. 27) writes: There are three relations [between thee and other things]: the one to the body which surrounds thee; the second to the divine cause from which all things come to all; and the third to those who live with thee. This is precise, true and practical. Those who object to the divine cause, may write in place of it the nature and constitution of things. for there is a constitution of things, which the philosopher attempts to. discover; and for most practical purposes, it is immaterial whether we say that it is of divine origin or has some other origin, or no origin can be discovered. The fact remains that a constitution of things exists; or, if that expression be not accepted, we may say that we conceive that it exists and we cannot help thinking so.
[315]: See i. 14. 13, ii. 8. 14. Socrates (Xen. Mem. i. 1. 19) said the same. That man should make himself like the Gods is said also by Antoninus, x. 8.—See Plato, De Legg. i. 4. (Upton.) When God is said to provide for all things, this is what the Greeks called πρόνοια, providence. (Epictetus, i. 16, iii. 17.) In the second of these passages there is a short answer to some objections made to Providence. Epictetus could only know or believe what God is by the observation of phaenomena; and he could only know what he supposed to be God’s providence by observing his administration of the world and all that happens in it. Among other works of God is man, who possesses certain intellectual powers which enable him to form a judgment of God’s works, and a judgment of man himself. Man has or is supposed to have certain moral sentiments, or a capacity of acquiring them in some way. On the supposition that all man’s powers are the gift of God, man’s power of judging what happens in the world under God’s providence is the gift of God: and if he should not be satisfied with God’s administration, we have the conclusion that man, whose powers are from God, condemns that administration which is also from God. Thus God and man, who is God’s work, are in opposition to one another. If a man rejects the belief in a deity and in a providence, because of the contradictions and difficulties involved in this belief or supposed to be involved in it, and if he finds the contradictions and difficulties such as he cannot reconcile with his moral sentiments and judgments, he will be consistent in rejecting the notion of a deity and of providence. But he must also consistently admit that his moral sentiments and judgments are his own, and that he cannot say how he acquired them, or how he has any of the corporeal or intellectual powers which he is daily using. By the hypothesis they are not from God. All then that a man can say is that he has such powers.
[316]: See ii. 10, i. 17. 12, ii. 11. 4, etc. M. Antoninus, x. 8.
[317]: The original is to add the colophon, which is a proverbial expresssion and signifies to give the last touch to a thing.
[318]: See the fragments of Menander quoted by Upton.
[319]: Sunt In Fortunae qui casibus omnnia ponunt, Et mundum credunt nullo rectore moveri. Juvenal, xiii. 86.
[320]: From the fact that man has some intelligence Voltaire concludes that we must admit that there is a greater intelligence. (Letter to Mde. Necker. Vol. 67, ed. Kehl. p. 278.)
[321]: The word is ἀποκαρτερεῖν, which Cicero (Tusc. i. 34) renders perinediam vita discedere. The words I have resolved are in Epictetus, κέκρικα. Pliny (Epp. i. 12) says that Corellius Rufus, when he determined to end his great sufferings by starvation made the same answer, κέκρικα, to the physician who offered him food.
[322]: The great city is the world.
[323]: The meaning is that you cannot lead a fool from his purpose either by words or force. A wise fool must mean a fool who thinks himself wise; and such we sometimes see. Though thou shouldst bray a fool in the mortar among wheat with a pestle, yet will not his foolishness depart from him. Proverbs, xxvii. 22.
[324]: Ellebore was a medicine used in madness. Horace says, Sat. ii. 3. 82— Danda est ellebori multo pars maxima avaris.
[325]: Epictetus seems in this discussion to be referring to some professor, who had declared that he would not take money from his hearers, and then, indirectly at least had blamed our philosopher for receiving some fee from his hearers. Schweig.
[326]: See ii. 10. 25.
[327]: To answer to things means to act in a way suitable to circum— stances, to be a match for them. So Horace says (Sat. ii. 7. 85)— Responsare cupidinibus, contemnere honores Fortis.
[328]: Perhaps this was a common puzzle. The man answers right; he cannot say.
[329]: That is which follows praise or blame. He seems to mean making the proper use of praise or of blame.
[330]: By the words sit down Epictetus indicates the man’s baseness and indolence, who wishes God to do for him that which he can do himself and ought to do. Schweig.
[331]: So Schweighaeuser explains this difficult passage. Perhaps he is right. This part of the chapter is obscure.
[332]: It is observable, that this most practical of all the philosophers owns his endeavours met with little or no success among his scholars. The Apostles speak a very different language in their epistles to the first converts of Christianity: and the Acts of the Apostles, and all the monuments of the primitive ages bear testimony to the reformation of manners produced by the Gospel. This difference of success might indeed justly be expected from the difference of the two systems. Mrs. Carter.—I have not quoted this note of Mrs. Carter, because I think that it is true. We do not know what was the effect of the teaching of Epictetus, unless this passage informs us, if Mrs. Carter has drawn a right inference from it. The language of Paul to the Corinthians is not very different from that of Epictetus, and he speaks very unfavourably of some of his Corinthian converts. We may allow that a reformation of manners was produced by the Gospel in many of the converts to Christianity, but there is no evidence that this reformation was produced in all; and there is evidence that it was not. The corruptions in the early Christian church and in subsequent ages are a proof that the reforms made by the Gospel were neither universal nor permanent; and this is the result which our knowledge of human nature would lead us to expect.
[333]: See ii. 1. 13.
[334]: Dirce a pure stream in Boeotia, which flows into the Ismenus. The Marcian water is the Marcian aqueduct at Rome, which was constructed B. C. 144, and was the best water that Rome had. Some or me arches of this aqueduct exist. The bright stream of Dirce is spoken of in the Hercules Furens of Euripides (v. 573). The verse in the text which we may suppose that Epictetus made, has a spondee in the fourth place, which is contrary to the rule.
[335]: The small stones are supposed to be the marbles which decorated Athens, and the rock to be the Acropolis.
[336]: In the original it is Εἰσαγωγαί. It was a name used for short commentaries on the principles of any art; such as we now call Introductions, Compendiums, Elements. Gellius, xvi. 8.
[337]: 12 See Schweig.’s note.
[338]: The MSS. have ἴσος εἰμί: but the emendation of Salmasius, σός εἰμι, is certain.
[339]: There are innumerable passages in St. Paul, which, in reality, bear that noble testimony which Epictetus here requires in his imaginary character. Such are those in which he glories in tribulation; speaks with an heroic contempt of life, when set in competition with the performance of his duty; rejoices in bonds and imprisonments, and the view of his approaching martyrdom; and represents afflictions as a proof of God’s love. See Acts xx. 23, 24; Rom. v. 3, viii. 38—39; 2 Tim. iv. 6.—Mrs. Carter.
[340]: The meaning is uncertain. See Schweighaeuser’s note.
[341]: Procrustes and Sciron, two robbers who infested Attica and were destroyed by Theseus, as Plutarch tells in his life of Theseus.
[342]: Antoninus x. 28, only to the rational animal is it given to follow voluntarily what happens; but simply to follow is a necessity imposed on all. Compare Seneca, Quaest. Nat. ii. 59.
[343]: See ii. 11. 1, and iii. 14. 8.
[344]: Theorems are defined by Cicero, de Fato, c. 6, Percepta appelle quae dicuntur Graece θεωρήματα.
[345]: This rhetorician or orator, as Epictetus names him, appears to be the same person as Theopompus of Chios, the historian.
[346]: That Epictetus does not quite correctly compare the notion of what is wholesome to the human body with the preconceived notion (anticipata notione) of moral good and bad, will be apparent to those who have carefully inquired into the various origin and principles of oar notions. Schweigh. Also see his note on ἀνάτεινον.
[347]: The topic of the desires and aversions. Sec. iii. c. 2.
[348]: Compare i. c. 27, 10.
[349]: This is the meaning of what Medea says in the Medea of Euripides Epictetus does not give the words of the poet.
[350]: Compare iv. 7. 20.
[351]: If you would subject all things to yourself, subject yourself to reason. Seneca, Ep. 37.
[352]: See i. 7. 1.
[353]: The Pseudomenos was a treatise by Chrysippus (Diog. Laert. vii. Chrysippus). The Pseudomenos was a famous problem among the Stoics, and it is this. When a person says, I lie; doth he lie, or doth he not? If he lies, he speaks truth: if he speaks truth, he lies. The philosophers composed many books on this difficulty. Chrysippus wrote six. Philetas wasted himself in studying to answer it. Mrs. Carter.
[354]: Epictetus is ridiculing the men who compliment one another on their writings. Upton compares Horace, Epp. ii. 2. 87. ut alter Alterius sermone meros audiret honores— Discedo Alcaeus puncto lllius? ille meo quis? Quis nisi Callimachus?
[355]: Compare i. 19. 4.
[356]: Schweighaeuser has no doubt that we ought instead of συναγωγάς, collections, to read εἰσαγωγάς, introductions.
[357]: As to Archedemus, see ii. 4, 11; and Antipater, ii. 19, 2.
[358]: See iv. c. 12.
[359]: ἀῤῥωστήματα. Aegrotationes quae appellantur a Stoicis ἀῤῥωστήματα. Cicero, Tusc. iv. 10.
[360]: κομψῶς σοί ἐστι. Compare the Gospel of St. John iv. 52, ἐπύθετο οὖν παρ’ αὐτῶν τὴν ὥραν ἐν ᾗ κομψότερον ἔσχε.
[361]: Placet enim Chrysippo cum gradatim interrogetur, verbi causa, tria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat quiescere; id est quod ab iis dicitur ἡσυχάζειν. Cicero, Acad. ii. Pr. 29. Compare Persius, Sat. vi. 80: Depinge ubi sistam, Inventus, Chrysippe, tui finitor acervi.
[362]: The passage is in Plato, Laws, ix. p. 854, ὅταν σοι προσπίπτῃ τι τῶν τοιούτων δογμάτων, etc. The conclusion is, if you cannot be cured of your (mental) disease, seek death which is better and depart from life. This bears some resemblance to the precept in Matthew vi. 29 And if thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out and cast it from thee, etc.
[363]: Hercules is said to have established gymnastic contests and to have been the first victor. Those who gained the victory both in wrestling and in the pancratium were reckoned in the list of victors as coming in the second or third place after him, and so on.
[364]: I have followed Wolff’s conjecture πύκτας instead of the old reading παίκτας.
[365]: Compare iii. 12. 15.
[366]: Castor and Pollux. Horace, Carm. i. 12:— Quorum simul alba nautis Stella refulsit, etc.
[367]: Gellius, xix. c. 1, 4 visa quae vi quadam sua sese inferunt noscitanda hominibus.
[368]: Consider that every thing is opinion, and opinion is in thy power. Take away then, when thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner, who has doubled the promontory, thou wilt find calm, every thing stable, and a waveless pay. Antoninus, xii. 22.
[369]: Hesiod, Works and Days, v. 411.
[370]: Compare Gellius xvii. c. 19.
[371]: See the long note communicated to Upton by James Harris; and Schweighaeuser’s note.
[372]: Diodorus, surnamed Cronus, lived at Alexandria in the time of Ptolemaeus Soter. He was of the school named the Megaric, and distinguished in dialectic.
[373]: If you assume any two of these three, they must be in contradiction to the third and destroy it.
[374]: speak to me, etc. may be supposed to be said to Epictetus, who has been ridiculing logical subtleties and the grammarians’ learning. When he is told to speak of good and evil, he takes a verse of the Odyssey, the first which occurs to him, and says, Listen. There is nothing to listen to, but it is as good for the hearer as any thing else. Then he utters some philosophical principles, and being asked where he learned them, he says, from Hellanicus, who was an historian, not a philosopher. He is bantering the hearer: it makes no matter from what author I learned them; it is all the same. The real question is, have you examined what Good and Evil are, and have you formed an opinion yourself?
[375]: —Odyssey, ix. 39.
[376]: The Peripatetics allowed many things to be good which contributed to a happy life; but still they contended that the smallest mental excellence was superior to all other things. Cicero, De Fin. v. 5. 31.
[377]: See ii. c. 8. 20.
[378]: to blame God means to blame the constitution and order of things, for to do this appeared to Epictetus to be absurd and wicked; as absurd as for the potter’s vessel to blame the potter, if that can be imagined, for making it liable to wear out and to break.
[379]: Our fellowship is with the Father and with his son Jesus Christ, 1 John i. 3. The attentive reader will observe several passages besides those which have been noticed, in which there is a striking conformity between Epictetus and the Scriptures: and will perceive from them, either that the Stoics had learnt a good deal of the Christian language or that treating a subject practically and in earnest leads men to such strong expressions as we often find in Scripture and sometimes in the philosophers, especially Epictetus. Mrs. Carter. The word fellowship in the passage of John and of Epictetus is κοινωνία. See i. 29. note 19.
[380]: Itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quidquam quod soiri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset. Sic omnia latere censebat in occulto, neque ease quidquam quod oerni aut intelligi possit. Quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare quemquam neque adsensione adprobare. Cicero, Academ. Post. 1. 12, Diog. Laert. ix. 90 of the Pyrrhonists.
[381]: Cicero, de Fin. ii. 30. 31, speaking of the letter, which Epicurus wrote to Hermarchus when he was dying, says that the actions of Epicurus were inconsistent with his sayings, and his writings were confuted by his probity and morality.
[382]: Paul says, Cor. i. 15. 32: If after the manner of men I have fought with beasts at Ephesus, what advantageth it me, if the dead rise not? let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die. The words let us eat and drink, etc. are said to be a quotation from the Thais of Menander. The meaning seems to be, that if I do not believe in the resurrection of the dead, why should I not enjoy the sensual pleasures of life only? This is not the doctrine of Epictetus, as we see in the text.
[383]: It would give security to the Epicureans, that they would enjoy all that they value, if other men should be persuaded that we are all made for fellowship, and that temperance is a good thing.
[384]: See Upton’s note.
[385]: I have followed Schweighaeuser who suggests προσεξεργάσασθαι in place of the MSS. προσεργάσασθαι.
[386]: Polybius (vi. 56), when he is speaking of the Roman state, commends the men of old time, who established in the minds of the multitude the opinions about the gods and Hades, wherein, he says, they acted more wisely than those in his time who would destroy suck opinions.
[387]: Epictetus alludes to the Spartans who fought at Thermopylae B. C. 480 against Xerxes and his army. Herodotus (vii. 228) has recorded the inscription placed over the Spartans:— Stranger, go tell the Spartans, Here we lie Obedient to those who bade us die. The inscription is translated by Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. 42.
[388]: When Xerxes was advancing on Athens, the Athenians left the city and embarked on their vessels before the battle of Salamis, B. C. 480. See Cicero, De Officiis, iii. 11.
[389]: He is now attacking the Academics, who asserted that we can know nothing.
[390]: Epictetus is speaking according to the popular notions. To deny Demeter and to eat the bread which she gives is the same thing in the common notions of the Greeks, as it would be for Epictetus to deny the existence of God and to eat the bread which he gives.
[391]: The MSS. have παράσχωμεν. Παράσχωσι would be in conformity with the rest of the passage. But this change of persons is common in Epictetus.
[392]: This resembles what our Saviour said to the Jewish rulers: Verily I say unto you, that the publicans and the harlots go into the kingdom of God before you. Matthew, xxi. 31. Mrs. Carter. To an Academic who said he comprehended nothing, the Stoic Ariston replied, Do you not see even the person who is sitting near you? When the Academic denied it, Ariston said, Who made you blind? who stole your power of sight. (Diog. Laert. vii. 163. Upton.)
[393]: Schweig. has some remarks on the title of this chapter. He says that this discourse does not keep to the same subject, but proceeds from that with which it began to other things.
[394]: καταστολὰς ποιήσας. I have omitted these words because I don’t understand them; nor do the commentators. The word καταστολή occurs in ii. 10. 15, where it is intelligible.
[395]: Literally, because to you or for you nothing is brought from home. Perhaps the meaning is explained by what follows. The man has no comfort at home; he brings nothing by the thought of which he is comforted.
[396]: See i. 7.
[397]: See ii. 17. 34.
[398]: τί με ταῦτα ὠφελήσει; Schweig. in his note says that he has written the text thus; but he has not. He has written τί μετὰ ταῦτα ὠφελήσει; The με appears to be necessary, and he has rendered the passage accordingly; and rightly, I think.
[399]: See i. 4, note 5 on Halteres.
[400]: See ii. 25.
[401]: In this dissertation is expounded the Stoic principle that friendship is only possible between the good. Schweig. He also says that there was another discourse by Epictetus on this subject, in which he expressed some of the opinions of Musonius Rufus (i. 1. note 12). Schweig draws this conclusion from certain words of Stobaeus; and he supposes that this dissertation of Epictetus was in one of the last four books of Epictetus’ discourses by Arrian, which have been lost. Cicero (de Amicit. c. 5) says nisi in bonis amicitiam ease non posse, and c. 18.
[402]: The first verse is from the Alcestis of Euripides, v. 691. The second in Epictetus is not in Euripides. Schweighaeuser thinks that it has been intruded into the text from a trivial scholium.
[403]: From the Phoenissae of Euripides, v. 723, etc.
[404]: Compare Euripides, Hecuba, v. 846, etc.:— δεινόν γε θνητοῖς ὡς ἅπαντα συμπίτνει καὶ τὰς ἀνάγκας ὡς νόμοι διώρισαν, φίλους τιφέντες τούς γε πολεμιωτάτους ἐχθρούς τε τοὺς πρὶν εὐμενεῖς ποιούμενοι.
[405]: Alexander did this when Hephaestion died. Arrian. Expedition of Alexander, vii. 14.
[406]: Matthew vi. 21, for where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.
[407]: By self is here meant the proper Good, or, as Solomon expresses it, Eccl. xii. 13, the whole of man. The Stoic proves excellently the inconvenience of placing this in any thing but a right choice (a right disposition and behaviour): but how it is the interest of each individual in every case to make that choice in preference to present pleasure and in defiance of present sufferings, appears only from the doctrine of a future recompense. Mrs. Carter. Compare Cicero, De Fin. ii. 15, where he is speaking of Epicurus, and translates the words ἀποφαίνειν ἢ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ καλὸν ἢ ἄρα τὸ ἔνδοξον, ut enim consuetudo loquitur, id solum dicitur Honestum quod est populari fama gloriosum (ἔνδοξον). See Schweig.’s note.
[408]: The quarrels of the Athenians with the Lacedaemonians appear chiefly in the history of the Peloponnesian war. (Thucydides, i. 1). The quarrel of the great king, the king of Persia, is the subject of the history of Herodotus (i. 1). The great quarrel of the Macedonians with the Persians is the subject of Arrian’s expedition of Alexander. The Romans were at war with the Getae or Daci in the time of Trajan, and we may assume that Epictetus was still living then.
[409]: Aristotle, Eth. viii. c. 8. Mrs. Carter.
[410]: Schweig. thinks that this is the plain meaning: as wild beasts in the mountains lie in wait for men, so men lie in wait for men, not only in deserted places, but even in the forum.
[411]: ὅπου δόσις τοῦ καλοῦ. Lord Shaftesbury suggested δόσις καὶ λῆψις τοῦ καλοῦ: which Upton approved, and he refers to ii. 9. 12, αἱ ἀκατάλληλοι λήψεις καὶ δόσεις. Schweighaeuser suggests διαδόσις which I have followed in the version. Schweig. refers to i. 12. 6 i. 14. 9. The MSS. give no help.
[412]: The old story about Eriphyle who betrayed her husband for a necklace.
[413]: See Schweig.’s note
[414]: The word for spirit is πνεῦμα, a vital spirit, an animal spirit, a nervous fluid, as Schweighaeuser explains it, or as Plutarch says (De Placit. Philosoph. iv. 15). the spirit which has the power of vision, which permeates from the chief faculty of the mind to the pupil of the eye. and in another passage of the same treatise (iv. 8), the instruments of perception are said to be intelligent spirits (πνεύματα νοερά) which have a motion from the chief faculty of the mind to the organs.
[415]: See Schweig.’s note.
[416]: See i. 1.
[417]: Schweighaeuser has this note: That which Epictetus names the προαιρετικὴ δυναμίς and afterwards frequently προαίρεσις, is generally translated by voluntas (will); but it has a wider meaning than is generally given to the Latin word, and it comprehends the intellect with the will, and all the active power of the mind which we sometimes designate by the general name Reason.
[418]: On the Greek text Upton remarks that, there are many passages in these dissertations which are ambiguous or rather confused on account of the small questions, and because the matter is not expanded by oratorical copiousness, not to mention other causes.
[419]: The general reading is καὶ προαιρετά. Salmasius proposes καὶ ἀπροαίρετα, which Schweig. says in a note that he accepts, and so he translates it in the Latin; but in his text he has καὶ προαιρετά.
[420]: This appears to be the book which Cicero (Tuscul. iii. 18) entitles on the supreme good (de summo bono), which, as Cicero, says, contains all the doctrine of Epicurus. The book on the Canon or Rule is mentioned by Velleius in Cicero de Nat. Deorum i. c. 16. as that celestial volume of Epicurus on the Rule and Judgment. See also De Fin. i. 19.
[421]: This is said in a letter written by Epicurus, when he was dying in great pain (Diog. Laert. x. 22); Cicen) (De Fin. ii. c. 30) quotes this letter.
[422]: The MSS. have προαιρετικῆς δυνάμεως. Lord Shaftesbury suggested φραστικῆς and Salmasius also. Schweig. has put φραστικῆς in the text, and he has done right.
[423]: The Stoics taught that a man should lead an active life. Horace (Ep. i. 1. 16) represents himself as sometimes following the Stoic principles: Nune agilis fio et mersor civilibus undis. but this was only talk. The Stoic should discharge all the duties of a citizen, says Epictetus; he should even marry and beget children. But the marrying may be done without any sense of duty; and the continuance of the human race is secured by the natural love of the male and of the female for conjunction. Still it is good advice, which the Roman censor Metellus gave to his fellow citizens, that, as they could not live without women, they should make the beat of this business of marriage. (Gellius, i. 6.)
[424]: The rest of the verses are quoted in the Encheiridion, s. 52.
[425]: Chrysippus wrote a book on the resolution of Syllogisms. Diogenes Laertius (vii.) says of Chrysippus that he was so famous among Dialecticians that most persons thought, if there was Dialectic among the Gods, it would not be any other than that of Chrysippus.
[426]: See Schweig.’s note on ἀκαταληκτικῶς.
[427]: That is, let us not now consider whether I am perfect in the art of speaking, and you have a mind well prepared to derive real advantage from philosophical talk. Let us consider this only, whether your ears are sufficiently prepared for listening, whether you can understand a philosophical discussion. Schweig.
[428]: See Schweig.’s note.
[429]: In the ninth book of the Iliad, where Achilles answers the messengers sent to him by Agamemnon. The reply of Achilles is a wonderful example of eloquence.
[430]: See i. 17.
[431]: Compare Xenophon, Mem. iii. 9. 4.
[432]: There is some deficiency in the text. Cicero (Acad. Prior. i. 12), but enim necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus impositis deprimi; sic snimum perspicuis cedere, appears to supply the deficiency.
[433]: M. Antoninus, v. 28; x. 4.
[434]: A Pancratiast is a man who is trained for the Pancratium, that is, both for boxing and wrestling. The Pentathlon comprised five exercises, which are expressed by one Greek line, Leaping, running, the quoit, throwing the Javelin, wrestling. Compare Aristotle, Rhet. i. 5.
[435]: (Comp. Horace, Sat. ii. 3, v. 253. Quacro, faciasne quod olim Mutatus Polemon? etc. The story of Polemon is told by Diogenes Laertius. He was a dissolute youth. As he was passing one day the place where Xenocrates was lecturing, he and his drunken companions burst into the school, but Polemon was so affected by the words of the excellent teacher that he came out quite a different man, and ultimately succeeded Xenocrates in the school of the Academy. See Epict. iv. 11. 30.
[436]: Laius consulted the oracle at Delphi how he should have children. The oracle told him not to beget children, and even to expose them if he did. Laius was so foolish as to disobey the god in both respects, for he begot children and brought them up. He did indeed order his child Oedipus to be exposed, but the boy was saved and became the murderer of Laius.
[437]: Plato, Apology, i. 9, etc. and c. 17.
[438]: i. 2. note 4.
[439]: Cicero, de Fin. ii. 11: Horace, Epp. i. 10, 12. This was the great principle of Zeno, to live according to nature. Bishop Butler in the Preface to his Sermons says of this philosophical principle, that virtue consisted in following nature, that it is a manner of speaking not loose and undeterminate, but clear and distinct, strictly just and true.
[440]: The bare use of objects (appearances) belongs to all animals; a rational use of them is peculiar to man. Mrs. Carter, Introd. § 7.
[441]: ὅλον δι’ ὅλων αὐτὸ ποίησον. Wolf proposed an emendation which Schweighaeuser does not put in his text, but he has expressed it in the Latin version. The Greek is intelligible, if we look to what follows.
[442]: From the Odyssey, i. 37, where Zeus is speaking of Aegisthus.
[443]: καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός is the usual Greek expression to signify a perfect man. The Stoics, according to Stobaeus, absurdly called virtue, καλόν (beautiful), because it naturally calls (καλεῖ) to itself those who desire it. The Stoics also said that every thing good was beautiful (καλός), and that the good and the beautiful were equivalent. The Roman expression is Vir bonus et sapiens. (Hor. Epp., i. 7, 22 and 16, 20). Perhaps the phrase καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός arose from the notion of beauty and goodness being the combination of a perfect human being.
[444]: Antoninus, xi. 37, as to sensual desire he should altogether keep away from it; and as to avoidance [aversion] he should not show it with respect to any of the things which are not in our power.
[445]: To point out a man with the middle finger was a way of showing the greatest contempt for him.
[446]: As to Archedemus, see ii. 4, 11. Απέχεις ἅπαντα: this expression is compared by Upton with Matthew vi. 2, ἀπέχουσι μισθὸν.
[447]: Wolf suggests οἷος. Crinis was a Stoic philosopher mentioned by Diogenes Laertius. We may suppose that he was no real philosopher, and that he died of fright.
[448]: See this chapter above.
[449]: τοὺς σιφάρους. On this reading the student may consult the note in Schweighaeuser’s edition. The word σιφάρους, if it is the right reading, is not clear; nor the meaning of this conclusion.The philosopher is represented as being full of anxiety about things which do not concern him, and which are proper subjects for those only who are free from disturbing passions and are quite happy, which i not the philosopher’s condition. He is compared to a sinking ship, and at this very time he is supposed to be employed in the useless labour of hoisting the sails.
[450]: Comp. i. 19, 11.
[451]: Mrs. Carter compares the Epistle to the Romans, vii. 21–23. Schweighaeuser says, the man either sees that the thing which he is doing is bad or unjust, or for any other reason he does not do the thing willingly; but he is compelled, and allows himself to be carried away by the passion which rules him. The another who compels is God, Schweig. says, who has made the nature of man such, that he must postpone every thing else to that thing in which he places his Good: and he adds, that it is man’s fault if he places his good in that thing, in which God has not placed it. Some persons will not consider this to be satisfactory. The man is compelled and allows himself to be carried away, etc. The notion of compulsion is inconsistent with the exercise of the will. The man is unlucky. He is like him who sees, as the Latin poet says, the better things and approves of them, but follows the worse.
[452]: See Schweig.’s note on this obscure passage.
[453]: On preconceptions, see i. 2.
[454]: Xenophon (Memorab. i. 6, 14); but Epictetus does not quote the words, he only gives the meaning. Antoninus (viii. 43) says, Different things delight different people. But it is my delight to keep the ruling faculty sound without turning away either from any man or from any of the things which happen to men, but looking at and receiving all with welcome eyes, and using every thing according to its value.
[455]: Socrates never professed to teach virtue, but by showing himself to be a virtuous man he expected to make his companions virtuous by imitating his example. (Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 3.)
[456]: Upton explains this passage thus: He who loves knows what it is to endure all things for love. If any man then being captivated with love for a girl would for her sake endure dangers and even death, what would he not endure if he possessed the love of God, the Universal, the chief of beautiful things?
[457]: The Greek is κοίνος νοῦς, the Communis sensus of the Romans, and our Common sense. Horace (Sat. i. 3, 65) speaks of a man who communi sensu plane caret, one who has not the sense or understanding which is the common property of men.
[458]: This was a proverb used by Bion, as Diogenes Laertius says. The cheese was new and soft, as the antients used it.
[459]: Rufus is mentioned i. 1, note 12.
[460]: The Greek is διορθωτής. The Latin word is Corrector, which occurs in inscriptions, and elsewhere.
[461]: The Epicureans are ironically named Philosophers, for most of them were arrogant men. See what is said of them in Cicero’s De Natura Deorum, i. 8. Schweig.
[462]: Maximus was appointed by Trajan to conduct a campaign against the Parthians, in which he lost his life. Dion Cassius, ii. 1108, 1126, Beimarus. Cassiope or Cassope is a city in Epirus, near the sea, and between Pandosia and Nicopolis, where Epictetus lived.
[463]: ψυχικοῖς is Lord Shaftesbury’s emendation in place of ἀγαθοῖς, and it is accepted by Schweighaeuser.
[464]: Diogenes Laertius (x. 151), quoted by Upton. Injustice, says Epicurus, is not an evil in itself, but the evil is in the fear which there is on account of suspicion.
[465]: The MSS., with one exception, have δογματίζων τὰ καλὰ, ποιῶν τὰ αἴσχρα, but it was properly corrected by Wolf, as Upton remarks, who shows from Cicero, de Fin., ii. 25 and 31, that the MSS. are wrong. In the second passage Cicero says, nihil in hae praeclara epistola so, iptum ab Epicuro congruens et conveniens decretis ejus reperietis. Ita redarguitur ipse a sese, vincunturque scripta ejus probitate ipsius ac moribus. See Epictetus, ii. 18.
[466]: Upton compares the passage (v. 333) in the Cyclops of Euripides, who speaks like an Epicurean. Not to marry and not to engage public affairs were Epicurean doctrines. See Epictetus, i. 23, 3 and 6
[467]: The toreutic art is the art of working in metal, stone, or wood, and of making figures on them in relief or by cutting into the material.
[468]: See Schweig.’s note.
[469]: See Schweig.’s note.
[470]: A codicillus is a small codex and the original sense of codex is a strong stem or stump. Lastly it was used for a book, and even for a will. Codicilli were small writing-tablets, covered with wax, on which men wrote with a stylus or pointed metal. Lastly, codicillus is a book or writing generally; and a writing or letter by which the emperor conferred any office. Our word codicil has only one sense, which is a small writing added or subjoined to a will or testament; but this sense is also derived from the Roman use of the word. (Dig. 29, tit. 7, de jure codicillorum.)
[471]: Upton supposes this to mean, whose bedchamber man are you? and he compares i. 19. But Schweig. says that this is not the meaning here, and that the meaning is this: He who before daybreak is waiting at the door of a rich man, whose favour he seeks, is said in a derisive way to be passing the night before a man’s chamber.
[472]: See i. 9. 20.
[473]: See ii. 6. 22, ἄν σοι ποιῆ. Upton.
[474]: Schweighaeuser says that he does not clearly see what Epictetus means; nor do I.
[475]: See Schweig.’s note.
[476]: The Roman word patronus, which at that time had the sense of a protector.
[477]: On the syllogism named lying (ψευδόμενος) see Epict. ii. 17. 34.
[478]: Murrhina vasa were reckoned very precious by the Romans, and they gave great prices for them. It is not certain of what material they were made. Pliny (xxxvii. c. 2) has something about them.
[479]: M. Antoninus, iii. 13. As physicians have always their instruments and knives ready for cases which suddenly require their skill, so do thou have principles (δόγματα) ready for the understanding of things divine and human, and for doing every thing, even the smallest, with a recollection of the bond which unites the divine and human to one another. For neither wilt thou do anything well which pertains to man without at the same time having a reference to things divine; nor the contrary.
[480]: These verses are from the Golden verses attributed to Pythagoras. See iv. 6. 32.
[481]: The beginning of a form of prayer, as in Macrobius, Sat. i 17: namque Vestales Virgines ita indigitant; Apollo Maedice, Apollo Paean.
[482]: This passage is obscure. See Schweig.’s note here, and also his note on a. 6.
[483]: εἰ νομίμως ἤθλησας. St. Paul hath made use of this very expression ἐὰν μὴ νομίμως ἀθλήσῃ, 2 Tim. ii. 3. Mrs. Carter.
[484]: The Greek is οὐ φιλολογῶ. See Schweighaeuser’s note.
[485]: See ii 18, 14.
[486]: Et quid opus Cratero magnos promittere montes? Persius, iii. 65. Craterus was a physician.
[487]: Upton compares Matthew, viii. 2. Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean.
[488]: Compare M. Antoninus, iv. 48. τᾶς ὀφρῦς ... συσπάσαντες.
[489]: To this Stoic precept Horace (Epist. i. 1. 19) opposes that of Aristippus. Et mihi res, non me rebus, subjungere conor. Both wisely said, if they are rightly taken. Schweig., who refers to i. 12. 17.
[490]: Lord Shaftesbury proposed to read τὸν ἰατρόν for τὸν ἀδελφόν. But see Schweig.’s note.
[491]: As to the divine law, see iii. 24. 32, and Xenophon’s Memorabilia, iv. 4. 21, etc. Upton.
[492]: The poet is Homer. The complete passage is in the Odyssey, xiv. V. 55, etc. Stranger, I must not, e’en if a worse man come, Ill treat a stranger, for all come from Zeus, Strangers and poor.
[493]: To set up a palm tree. He does not mean a real palm tree, but something high and upright. The climbers of palm trees are mentioned by Lucian, de Dea Syria (c. 29). Schweigh. has given the true interpretation when he says that on certain feast days in the country a high piece of wood is fixed in the earth and climbed by the most active youths by using only their hands and feet. In England we know what this is. It is said that Diogenes used to embrace statues when they were covered with snow for the purpose of exercising himself. I suppose bronze statues, not marble which might be easily broken. The man would not remain long in the embrace of a metal statue in winter. But perhaps the story is not true. I have heard of a general, not an English general, setting a soldier on a cold cannon; but it was as a punishment.
[494]: ἀνατοιχήσω. See the note of Schweighaeuser.
[495]: This was done for the sake of exercise says Upton; but I don’t understand the passage.
[496]: There is a like fable in Aesop of the earthen pitcher and the brazen. Upton.
[497]: The text has ἀσυμμετρίαν. It would be easier to understand the passage, if we read συμμετριάν, as in iv. 1, 84 we have παρὰ τὰ μέτρα. See Schweig.’s note.
[498]: See i. 26, 18, and iii. 2, 5.
[499]: Polybius vi. 36.
[500]: Schweighaeuser refers to Arrian’s Expedition of Alexander (vi. 26) for such an instance of Alexander’s abstinence. There was an Apollonius of Tyana, whose life was written by Philostratus: but it may be that this is not the man who is mentioned here.
[501]: This was the doctrine of Heraclitus that all things were composed from (had their origin in) fire, and were resolved into it, an opinion afterwards adopted by the Stoics. It is not so extravagant, as it may appear to some persons, to suppose that the earth had a beginning, is in a state of continual change, and will finally be destroyed in some way, and have a new beginning. See Seneca, Ep. 9 cum resolute mundo, diis in unum confusis, paulisper oessante natura, adquiescit sibi Jupiter, cogitationibus suis traditus.
[502]: The Latin translation is: hoc etiam nonnulli facturum eum in conflagratione mundi . . . . aiunt. But the word is ποιεῖ; and this may mean that the conflagration has happened, and will happen again. The Greek philosophers in their speculations were not troubled with the consideration of time. Even Herodotus (ii. 11), in his speculations on the gulf, which he supposes that the Nile valley was once, speaks of the possibility of it being filled up in 20,000 years, or less. Modern speculators have only recently become bold enough to throw aside the notion of the earth and the other bodies in space being limited by time, as the ignorant have conceived it.
[503]: See iii. 1, 43.
[504]: What a melancholy description of death and how gloomy the ideas in this consolatory chapter! All beings reduced to mere elements in successive conflagrations! A noble contrast to the Stoic notions on this subject may be produced from several passages in the Scripture—Then shall the dust return to the earth, as it was; and the spirit shall return to God who gave it, Eccles. xii. 7. Mrs. Carter; who also refers to 1 Thess. iv. 14; John vi. 39, 40; xi. 25, 26; I Cor. vi. 14; xv. 53; 2 Cor. v. 14 etc. Mrs. Carter quotes Ecclesiastes, but the author says nearly what Epicharmus said, quoted by Plutarch, παραμυθ. πρὸς Ἀπολλώνιον, vol. i. p. 435 ed. Wytt. συνεκρίθη καὶ διεκρίθη καὶ ἀπῆλθεν ὅθεν ἦλθε πάλιν, γᾶ μὲν ἐς γᾶν, πνεῦμα δ’ ἄνω τί τῶνδε χαλεπόν; οὐδὲ ἕν. Euripides in a fragment of the Chrysippus, fr. 836, ed. Nauck, says τὰ μὲν ἐκ γαίας φύντ’ εἰς γαῖαν, τὰ δ’ ἀπ’ αἰθερίου βλαστόντα γονῆς εἰς οὐράνιον πάλιν ἦλθε πόλον. I have translated the words of Epictetus ὅσον πνευματίου, εἰς πνευμάτιον by of air (spirit), to air: but the πνευμάτιον of Epictetus may mean the same as the πνεῦμα of Epicharmus, and the same as the spirit of Ecclesiastes. An English commentator says that the doctrine of a future retribution forms the great basis and the leading truth of this book (Ecclesiastes), and that the royal Preacher (Ecclesiastes) brings forward the prospect of a future life and retribution. I cannot discover any evidence of this assertion in the book. The conclusion is the best part of this ill-connected, obscure and confused book, as it appears in our translation. The conclusion is (xii. 13, 14): Fear God and keep his commandments: for this is the whole duty of man, for God shall bring every work into judgment with every secret thing, whether it be good or whether it be evil. This is all that I can discover in the book which can support the commentator’s statement; and even this may not mean what he affirms. Schweighaeuser observes that here was the opportunity for Epictetus to say something of the immortality of the soul, if he had any thing to say. But he says nothing unless he means to say that the soul, the spirit, returns to God who gave it as the Preacher says. There is a passage (iii. 24, 94) which appears to mean that the soul of man after death will be changed into something else, which the universe will require for some use or purpose. It is strange, observes Schweig., that Epictetus, who studied the philosophy of Socrates, and speaks so eloquently of man’s capacity and his duty to God, should say no more: but the explanation may be that he had no doctrine of man’s immortality, in the sense in which that word is now used.
[505]: The text has ἀρχομένων, but it probably ought to be ἀρχομένῳ. Compare i. 1, 8, πᾶσα δύναμις ἐπισφαλής. The text from φέρειν οὖν δεῖ to τῷ φθισικῷ is unintelligible. Lord Shaftesbury says that the passage is not corrupt, and he gives an explanation; but Schweig. says that the learned Englishman’s exposition does not make the text plainer to him; nor does it to me. Schweig. observes that the passage which begins πᾶσα μεγάλη and what follows seem to belong to the next chapter xiv.
[506]: See Schweig.’s note, and the Latin version
[507]: All the MSS. have good (καλοί), which the Critics have properly corrected. As to σκόπει see Schweig.’s note.
[508]: This section is not easy to translate.
[509]: Compare Encheiridion 29. This chapter has a great conformity to Luke xiv. 28 etc. But it is to be observed that Epictetus, both here and elsewhere, supposes some persons incapable of being philosophers; that is, virtuous and pious men: but Christianity requires and enables all to be such. Mrs. Carter. The passage in Luke contains a practical lesson, and so far is the same as the teaching of Epictetus: but the conclusion in v. 33 does not appear to be helped by what immediately precedes v. 28–32. The remark that Christianity enables all to be such is not true, unless Mrs. Carter gives to the word enables a meaning which I do not see.
[510]: The commentators refer us to Paul, 1 Cor. c. 9, 25. Compare Horace, Ars Poetica, 39: Versate diu quid ferre recusent, Quid valeant humeri.
[511]: Wolf thought that the word παρορύσσεσθαι might mean the loss of an eye; but other commentators give the word a different meaning. See Schweigh.’s note.
[512]: In place of Euphrates the Encheiridion 29 had in the text Socrates, which name the recent editors of the Encheiridion altered to Euphrates, and correctly. The younger Pliny (i. Ep. 10) speaks in high terms of the merits and attractive eloquence of this Syrian philosopher Euphrates, who is mentioned by M. Antoninus (x. 31) and by others.
[513]: Rufus was a philosopher. See i. 1, i. 9. Galba is the emperor Galba, who was murdered. The meaning of the passage is rather obscure, and it is evident that it does not belong to this chapter. Lord Shaftesbury remarks that this passage perhaps belongs to chapter 11 or 14, or perhaps to the end of chapter 17.
[514]: The word is σικχᾶναι. See Antoninus v. 9.
[515]: Upton suggests that Sura may be Palfurius (Juvenal, iv. 53), or Palfurius Sura (Suetonius, Domitian, c. 13).
[516]: See Schweig.’s note.
[517]: Compare iii. 5. 4.
[518]: I have not followed Schweighaeuser’s text here. See his note.
[519]: The original is θεωρητικῶν φαντασιῶν, which is translated in the Latin version visa theoretica, but this does not help us. Perhaps the author means any appearances which are presented to us either by the eyes or by the understanding; but I am not sure what he means. It is said in the Index Graecitatis (Schweig.’s ed.): φαντασίαι θεωρητικαί, notiones theoretical, iii. 20. 1, quibus opponuntur Practicae ad vitam regendam spectantes.
[520]: Menoeceus, the son of Creon, gave up his life by which he would save his country, as it was declared by an oracle. (Cicero, Tuscul. i. e. 48.) Juvenal (Sat. xiv. 238) says Quarum Amor in te Quantus erat patriae Declorum in pectore; quantum Dilexit Thebas, si Graecia vera, Menoeceus. Euripides, Phoenissae, v. 913.
[521]: See Schweig.’s note.
[522]: The father of Admetus was Phe es (Euripides, Alcestis)
[523]: The meaning is not clear, if we follow the original text. Schweig. cannot see the sense with both hands in the Greek, nor can I. He also says that in the words ἆρον ὑπὲρ ἀμφοτέρας unless some masculine noun is understood which is not expressed, ἐκεῖνος must be referred to the aliptes; and he translates βαρύτερος by severior.
[524]: Mrs. Carter quotes the epistle to the Romans (viii. 28): and we snow that all things work together for good to them that love God; but she quotes only the first part of the verse and omits the conclusion, to them who are the called according to his purpose.
[525]: See Schweig.’s note.
[526]: ἀναρχίας; see iv. 4, 2 and 23.
[527]: Some abusive fellow, known to some of the hearers of Epictetus. We ought perhaps to understand the words as if it were said, each of you ought to say to himself, Good luck to Lesbius etc. Schweig.’s note.
[528]: The practical teaching of the Stoics is contained in iii. c. 7, and it is good and wise. A modern writer says of modern practice: If we open our eyes and if we will honestly acknowledge to ourselves what we discover, we shall be compelled to confess that all the life and efforts of the civilized people of our times is founded on a view of the world, which is directly opposed to the view of the world which Jesus had (Strauss, Der alte und der neue Glaube, p. 74).
[529]: Cicero (Academ. Prior. ii. 47) names Antipater and Archedemus (Archedemus) the chief of dialecticians, and also opiniosissimi homines.
[530]: This passage is one of those which show the great good sense of Epictetus in the matter of education; and some other remarks to the same effect follow in this chapter. A man might justly say that we have no clear notion of the purpose of education. A modern writer, who seems to belong to the school of Epictetus says: it cannot be denied that in all schools of all kinds it ought to be the first and the chief object to make children healthy, good, honest, and, if possible, sensible men and women; and if this is not done in a reasonable degree, I maintain that the education of these schools is good for nothing—I do not propose to make children good and honest and wise by precepts and dogmas and preaching, as you will see. They must be made good and wise by a cultivation of the understanding, by the practice of the discipline necessary for that purpose, and by the example of him who governs, directs and instructs. Further, my men and women teachers have something which the others have not: they have a purpose, an end in their system of education; and what is education? What is human life without some purpose or end which may be attained by industry, order and the exercise of moderate abilities? Great abilities are rare, and they are often accompanied by qualities which make the abilities useless to him who has them, and even injurious to society.
[531]: There was a great temple of Demeter (Ceres) at Eleusis in Attica, and solemn mysteries, and an Hierophant or conductor of the ceremonies.
[532]: See the note of T. Burnet, De Fide et Officiis Christianorum, Ed. Sec. p. 89.
[533]: The reader, who has an inclination to compare religious forms antient and modern, may find something in modern practice to which the words of Epictetus are applicable.
[534]: This is a view of the fitness of a teacher which, as far as I know, is quite new; and it is also true. Perhaps there was some vague notion of this kind in modern Europe at the time when teachers of youths were only priests, and when it was supposed that their fitness for the office of teacher was secured by their fitness for the office of priest. In the present Ordering of Deacons in the Church of England, the person, who is proposed as a fit person to be a deacon, is asked the following question by the bishop: Do you trust that you are inwardly moved by the Holy Ghost to take upon you this office and ministration to serve God for the promotion of his glory and the edifying of his people. In the ordering of Priests this question is omitted, and another question only is put, which is used also in the ordering of Deacons; Do you think in your heart that you be truly called, according to the will of our Lord Jesus Christ etc. The teacher ought to have God to advise him to occupy the office of teacher, as Epictetus says. He does not say how God will advise: perhaps he supposed that this advice might be given in the way in which Socrates said that he received it. Wisdom perhaps is not enough to enable a man to take care of youths. Whatever wisdom may mean, it is true that a teacher should have a fitness and liking for the business. If he has not, he will find it disagreeable, and he will not do it well. He may and ought to gain a reasonable living by his labour: if he seeks only money and wealth, he is on the wrong track, and he is only like a common dealer in buying and selling, a butcher or a shoemaker, or a tailor, all useful members of society and all of them necessary in their several kinds. But the teacher has a priestly office, the making, as far as it is possible, children into good men and women. Should he be ordered like a Deacon or a Priest, for his office is even more useful than that of Priest or Deacon? Some will say that this is ridiculous. Perhaps the wise will not think so.
[535]: See the description of Thersites in the Iliad, ii. 212.
[536]: The office which in our times corresponds to this description of the Cynic, is the office of a teacher of religion.
[537]: See i. 24, note.*
[538]: Quod petis hic est, Eat Ulubris, animus si te non deficit aequus. Horace, Ep. i. 11, 30. Willst du immer weiter schweifen? Sieh, das Gute liegt so nah. Lerne nur das Glück ergreifen, Denn das Glück ist immer da. Goethe, Gedichte.
[539]: These men are supposed to have been strong gladiators. Oroesus is the rich king of Lydia, who was taken prisoner by Cyrus the Persian.
[540]: Iliad, x. 15.
[541]: Iliad x. 91.
[542]: Man then is supposed to consist of a soul and of a body. It may be useful to remember this when we are explaining other passages in Epictetus
[543]: It is observable that Epictetus seems to think it a necessary qualification in a teacher sent from God for the instruction of mankind to be destitute of all external advantages and a suffering character. Thus doth this excellent man, who had carried human reason to so great a height, bear testimony to the propriety of that method which the divine wisdom hath thought fit to follow in the scheme of the Gospel; whose great author had not where to lay his head; and which some in later ages have inconsiderately urged as an argument against the Christian religion. The infinite disparity between the proposal of the example of Diogenes in Epictetus and of our Redeemer in the New Testament is too obvious to need any enlargement. Mrs. Carter.
[544]: Some of the antients, who called themselves philosophers, did blame God and his administration of the world; and there are men who do the same now. If a man is dissatisfied with the condition of the world, he has the power of going out of it, as Epictetus often says; and if he knows, as he must know, that he cannot alter the nature of man and the conditions of human life, he may think it wise to withdraw from a state of things with which he is not satisfied. If he believes that there is no God, he is at liberty to do what he thinks best for himself; and if he does believe that there is a God, he may still think that his power of quitting the world is a power which he may exercise when he chooses. Many persons commit suicide, not because they are dissatisfied with the state of the world, but for other reasons. I have not yet heard of a modern philosopher who found fault with the condition of human things, and voluntarily retired from life. Our philosophers live as long as they can, and some of them take care of themselves and of all that they possess; they even provide well for the comfort of those whom they leave behind them. The conclusion seems to be that they prefer living in this world to leaving it, that their complaints are idle talk; and that being men of weak minds, and great vanity they assume the philosopher’s name, and while they try to make others as dissatisfied as they profess themselves to be, they are really enjoying themselves after their fashion as much as they can. These men, though they may have the means of living with as much comfort as the conditions of human life permit, are dissatisfied, and they would, if they could, make as dissatisfied as themselves those who have less means or making life tolerable. These grumblers are not the men who give their money or their labour or their lives for increasing the happiness of mankind and diminishing the unavoidable sufferings of human life; but they find it easier to blame God, when they believe in him; or to find fault with things as they are, which is more absurd, when they do not believe in God, and when they ought to make the best that they can of the conditions under which we live.
[545]: The text is εἰκῆ ἐξελθόντα. Meibomius suggested εἰσελθόντα in place of ἐξελθόντα: Schweig. appears to prefer εἰσελθόντα, and I have translated this word in the version. I think that there is no doubt about the emendation.
[546]: E caelo descendit γνῶθι σεαυτόν Juvenal xi. 27. The expression Know thyself is attributed to several persons, and to Socrates among them. Self-knowledge is one of the most difficult kinds of knowledge; and no man has it completely. Men either estimate their powers too highly, and this is named vanity, self conceit or arrogance; or they think too meanly of their powers and do not accomplish what they might accomplish, if they had reasonable self confidence.
[547]: Compare this with the Christian precepts of forbearance and love to enemies, Matthew v. 39–44. The reader will observe that Christ specifies higher injuries and provocations than Epictetus doth; and requires of allhis followers, what Epictetus describes only as the duty of one or two extraordinary persons, as such. Mrs. Carter.
[548]: Upton quotes Hieronymus lib. ii. adversus Jovianum, where the thing is told in a different way.
[549]: I have not translated, because I do not understand, the words δτι κατηγορεῖ. See Schweig.’s note.
[550]: This must be the meaning. Meibomius suggested that the true reading is Κυνικοῦ, and not Κυνικόν: and Schweig. seems to be of the same mind. I have repeated the word Cynic several times to remove all ambiguity in this section.
[551]: See Schweig.’s note on ὥστε ἄν σοι δοκῇ.
[552]: The Stoics recommended marriage, the procreation of children, the discharge of magisterial offices, and the duties of social life generally.
[553]: It is remarkable that Epictetus here uses the same word (ἀπερισπάστως) with St. Paul, 1 Cor. vii. 35, and urges the same consideration, of applying wholly to the service of God, to dissuade from marriage. His observation too that the state of things was then (ὡς ἐν παρατάξει) like that of an army prepared for battle, nearly resembles the Apostle’s (ἐνεστῶσα ἀνάγκη) present necessity. St. Paul says 2 Tim. ii. 4 (οὐδεὶς στρατευόμενος ἐμπλέκεται etc.) no man that warreth entangleth himself with the affairs of life. So Epictetus says here that a Cynic must not be (ἐμπεπλεγμένον) in relations etc. From these and many other passages of Epictetus one would be inclined to think that he was not unacquainted with St. Paul’s Epistles or that he had heard something of the Christian doctrine. Mrs. Carter. I do not find any evidence of Epictetus being acquainted with the Epistles of Paul. It is possible that he had heard something of the Christian doctrine, but I have not observed any evidence of the fact. Epictetus and Paul have not the same opinion about marriage, for Paul says that if they cannot contain, let them marry: for it is better to marry than to burn. Accordingly his doctrine is to avoid fornication let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband. He does not directly say what a man should do when he is not able to maintain a wife; but the inference is plain what he will do (I Cor. vii. 2). Paul’s view of marriage differs from that of Epictetus, who recommends marriage. Paul does not: he writes, I say therefore to the unmarried and widows, It is good for them if they abide even as I. He does not acknowledge marriage and the begetting of children as a duty; which Epictetus did. In the present condition of the world Epictetus says that the minister of God should not marry, because the cares of a family would distract him and make him unable to discharge his duties. There is sound sense in this. A minister of God should not be distracted by the cares of a family, especially if he is poor.
[554]: Homer, Iliad ii. 25
[555]: The word is ἀνάτεινον. Compare ii. 17, 9.
[556]: In the text it is γραφεῖα, τιλλάρια. It is probable that there should be only one word. See Schweig.’s note. Horace (Sat. i. 6. 73) speaks of boys going to school Laevo suspensi loculos tabulamque lacerto.
[557]: The wife of Crates was Hipparchia, who persisted against all advice in marrying Crates and lived with him exactly as he lived. Diogenes Laertius, vi. 96. Upton.
[558]: There is some difficulty about ἀπερισπάστων here. Upton proposed to write ἀπεριστάτων, which he explains that which has nothing peculiar in it.
[559]: Schweig. translates κακορυγχα male grunnientes: perhaps it means ugly-faced.
[560]: Diogenes Laertius, vi. 42.
[561]: The Cynic is in Epictetus the minister of religion. He must be pure, for otherwise how can he reprove vice? This is a useful lesson to those whose business it is to correct the vices of mankind.
[562]: See ii. 23, 42, note.
[563]: This is quoted by M. Antoninus, xi. 36.
[564]: II. vi. 490.
[565]: Epictetus in an amusing manner touches on the practice of Sophists, Rhetoricians, and others, who made addresses only to get praise. This practice of reciting prose or verse compositions was common in the time of Epictetus, as we may learn from the letters of the younger Pliny, Juvenal, Martial, and the author of the treatise de Causis corruptae eloqwuntiae. Upton.
[566]: Such were the subjects which the literary men of the day de. lighted in.
[567]: Dion of Prusa in Bithynia was named Chrysostomus (golden-mouthed) because of his eloquence. He was a rhetorician and sophist, as the term was then understood, and was living at the same time as Epictetus. Eighty of his orations written in Greek are still extant, and some fragments of fifteen.
[568]: These words are the beginning of Xenophon’s Memorabilia, i. 1. The small critics disputed whether the text should be τίσι λόγοις, or τίνι λόγῳ.
[569]: From the Crito of Plato, c. 6.
[570]: The rich, says Upton, used to lend their houses for recitations, as we learn from Pliny, Ep. viii. 12 and Juvenal, vii. 40. Si dulcedine famae Succensus recites, maculosas commodat aedes. Quadratus is a Roman name. There appears to be a confusion between Socrates and Quadratus. The man says, No. Socrates would not do so: but he would do, as a man might do now. He would say on the road; I hope you will come to hear me. I don’t find anything in the notes on this passage; but it requires explanation.
[571]: κατηγορία is one of Aristotle’s common terms.
[572]: From Plato’s Apology of Socrates.
[573]: Aulus Gellius v. 1. Seneca, Ep. 52. Upton.
[574]: Cicero, de Officiis i. 18: Quae magno animo et fortiter excellenterque gesta sunt, ea nescio quomodo pleniore ore laudamus. Hino Rhetorum campus de Marathone, Salamine, Plataeis, Thermopylis, Leuctria.
[575]: See Schweig.’s note.
[576]: See ii. 5, 26.
[577]: See iii. 13. 15.
[578]: Homer, Odyssey i. 3.
[579]: Odyssey, xvii. 487.
[580]: ἀπέχειν. See iii. 2, 13. Paul to the Philippians, iv. 18.
[581]: Suetonius (Claudius, 25) says: Peregrinae conditionis homines vetuit usurpare Romana nomina, duntaxat gentilia. Civitatem Romanam usurpantes in campo Esquilino securi percussit. Upton.
[582]: This is a denunciation of the hypocrite.
[583]: Pity perhaps means that he will suffer the perturbation of pity, when he ought not to feel it. I am not sure about the exact meaning.
[584]: What follows hath no connection with what immediately preceded; but belongs to the general subject of the chapter. Mrs. Carter. The person with whom Epictetus chiefly held this discourse, seems to have been instructed by his friends to pay his respects to some great man at Nicopolis (perhaps the procurator, iii. 4. 1) and to visit his house. Schweig.
[585]: The reward of virtue is in the acts of virtue. The Stoics taught that virtue is its own reward. When I was a boy I have written this in copies, but I did not know what it meant. I know now that few people believe it; and like the man here, they inquire what reward they shall have for doing as they ought to do. A man of common sense would give no other answer than what Epictetus gives. But that will not satisfy all. The heathens must give the answer: For what more dost thou want when thou hast done a man a service? Art thou not content that thou hast done something conformable to thy nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for it? just as if the eye demanded a recompense for seeing or the feet for walking. M. Antoninus. ix. 42. Compare Seneca, de Vita Beata, c. 9.
[586]: It was the custom at Athens when the court (the dicasts) had determined to convict an accused person, in some cases at least, to ask him what penalty he proposed to be inflicted on himself; but Socrates refused to do this or to allow his friends to do it, for he said that to name the penalty was the same as admitting his guilt (Xenophon, Apologia, 23). Socrates said that if he did name a proper penalty for himself, it would be that he should daily be allowed to dine in the Prytaneium (Plato, Apology, c. 26; Cicero, De Oratore, i. 54).
[587]: The character of Diogenes is described very differently by Epictetus from that which we read in common books.
[588]: A people in Thessaly between the river Peneius and Mount Olympus. It is the same as if Epictetus had said to any remote country.
[589]: On the word καρπιστήν see the notes in Schweig.’s edition. The word is supposed to be formed from καρπίς, καρφίς, festuca.
[590]: Μεταπίπτοντας. See i. 7.
[591]: This is an old practice, to go about and sell physic to people. Cicero (Pro Cluentio, c. 14) speaks of such a quack (pharmacopola), who would do a poisoning job for a proper sum of money. I have seen. a travelling doctor in France who went about in a cart, and rang a bell, at the sound of which people came round him. Some who were deaf had stuff poured into their ears, paid their money, and made way for others who had other complaints.
[592]: It was the custom in Roman triumphs for a slave to stand behind the triumphant general in his chariot and to remind him that he was still mortal. Juvenal, x. 41.
[593]: Compare Antoninus xi. 33 and 34.