[1320a] as shall best compass the results preservative of constitutions, and not think that a measure is democratic or oligarchic which will cause the state to be democratically or oligarchically governed in the greatest degree, but which will cause it to be so governed for the longest time. [loeb_subsection_2] But the demagogues of today to court the favor of the peoples often use the law-courts to bring about confiscations of property. Hence those who are caring for the safety of the constitution must counteract this by enacting that nothing belonging to persons condemned at law shall be confiscated and liable to be carried to the public treasury, but that their property shall be consecrated to the service of religion; for male-factors will be no less on their guard, as they will be punished just the same, while the mob will less often vote guilty against men on trial when it is not going to get anything out of it. Also they must always make the public trials that occur as few as possible, checking those who bring indictments at random by big penalties; for they do not usually indict men of the people but notables, whereas even with this form of constitution it is desirable for all the citizens if possible to be friendly to the state, or failing that, at all events not to think of their rulers as enemies. [loeb_subsection_3] And inasmuch as the ultimate forms of democracy tend to have large populations and it is difficult for their citizens to sit in the assembly without pay, and this in a state where there do not happen to be revenues is inimical to the notables (for pay has to be obtained from a property-tax and confiscation, and from corruption of the law-courts, which has caused the overthrow of many democracies before now),—where therefore there happen to be no revenues, few meetings of the assembly must be held, and the law-courts must consist of many members but only sit a few days (for this not only contributes to the rich not being in fear of the cost of the system even if the well-off do not take the pay and only the poor do, but also leads to far greater efficiency in the trial of law-suits, for the well-to-do, though not wishing to be away from their private affairs for many days, are willing to leave them for a short time), [loeb_subsection_4] while where there are revenues men must not do what the popular leaders do now (for they usethe surplus for doles, and people no sooner get them than they want the same doles again, because this way of helping the poor is the legendary jar with a hole in itThe fifty daughters of Danaus were married to their cousins, and all but one murdered their husbands on the bridal night, and were punished in Hades by having to pour water into the jar described.), but the truly democratic statesman must study how the multitude may be saved from extreme poverty; for this is what causes democracy to be corrupt. Measures must therefore be contrived that may bring about lasting prosperity. And since this is advantageous also for the well-to-do, the proper course is to collect all the proceeds of the revenues into a fund and distribute this in lump sums to the needy, best of all, if one can, in sums large enough for acquiring a small estate, or, failing this, to serve as capital for trade or husbandry,
[1320b] and if this is not possible for all, at all events to distribute the money by tribes or some other division of the population in turn, while in the meantime the well-to-do must contribute pay for attendance at the necessary assemblies, beingthemselves excused from useless public services. [loeb_subsection_5] By following some such policy as this the Carthaginians have won the friendship of the common people; for they constantly send out some of the people to the surrounding territories and so make them well-off. And if the notables are men of good feeling and sense they may also divide the needy among them in groups and supply them with capital to start them in businesses. It is also a good plan to imitate the policyCf. 1263a 35. of the Tarentines. They get the goodwill of the multitude by making property communal for the purpose of use by the needyThis seems to mean that the land was in private ownership, but that there was some system of poor-relief, to provide for the destitute out of the produce.; also they have divided the whole number of their magistracies into two classes, one elected by vote and the other filled by lot,—the latter to ensure that the people may have a share in them, and the former to improve the conduct of public affairs. And it is also possible to effect this by dividing the holders of the same magistracy into two groups, one appointed by lot and the other by vote.
We have then said how democracies should be organized.
[loeb_section_4] [loeb_subsection_1] It is also fairly clear from these considerations how oligarchies ought to be organized. We must infer them from their opposites, reasoning out each form of oligarchywith reference to the form of democracy opposite to it, starting with the most well-blended and first form of oligarchyIn contrast with the first and best form of democracy, 2 init.—and this is the one near to what is called a constitutional government, and for it the property-qualifications must be divided into one group of smaller properties and another of larger ones, smaller properties qualifying their owners for the indispensable offices and larger ones for the more important; and a person owning the qualifying property must be allowed to take a share in the government,—introducing by the assessment a large enough number of the common people to secure that with them the governing class will have a majority over those excluded; and persons to share in the government must constantly be brought in from the better class of the common people. [loeb_subsection_2] And the next form of oligarchy also must be constructed in a similar way with a slight tightening up of the qualification. But the form of oligarchy that stands opposite to the last form of democracy, the most autocratic and tyrannical of the oligarchies, in as far as it is the worst requires a correspondingly great amount of safe-guarding. For just as human bodies in a good state of health and ships well equipped with their crews for a voyage admit of more mistakes without being destroyed thereby, but bodies of a morbid habit and vessels strained in their timbers and manned with bad crews cannot endure even the smallest mistakes, so also the worst constitutions need the most safe-guarding.