[1318a] and if any life-office has been left after an ancient revolution, at all events to deprive it of its power and to substitute election by lot for election by vote.
[loeb_subsection_10] TheseThe rest of the chapter is most obscure, and its authenticity is questioned. then are the features common to democracies. But what is thought to be the extreme form of democracy and of popular government comes about as a result of the principle of justice that is admitted to be democratic, and this is for all to have equality according to number. For it is equality for the poor to have no larger share of power than the rich, and not for the poor alone to be supreme but for all to govern equally; for in this way they would feel that the constitution possessed both equality and liberty. [loeb_subsection_11] But the question follows, how will they have equality? are the property-assessments of five hundred citizens to be divided among a thousand and the thousand to have equal power to the five hundredi.e. two groups of voters, with equal total wealth and total voting-power, but one group twice as numerous as the other, so that a man in the rich group has two votes and one in the poor group one, the former being on the average twice as rich as the latter.? or is equality on this principlei.e. equality in proportion to number. not to be arranged in this manner, but the division into classes to be on this system, but then an equal number to be taken from the five hundred and from the thousand and these to control the elections and the law-courts? Is this then the justest form of constitution in accordance with popular justice, or is it rather one that goes by counting heads?i.e. one man one vote. For democrats say that justice is whatever seems good to the larger number,but advocates of oligarchy think that it is whatever seems good to the owners of the larger amount of property, for they say that the decision ought to go by amount of property. [loeb_subsection_12] But both views involve inequality and injustice; for if the will of the few is to prevail, this means a tyranny, since if one man owns more than the other rich men,i.e. apparently, more than the property of all the others put together. according to the oligarchic principle of justice it is just for him to rule alone; whereas if the will of the numerical majority is to prevail, they will do injustice by confiscating the property of the rich minority, as has been said before.1281a 14. What form of equality therefore would be one on which both parties will agree must be considered in the light of the principles of justice as defined by both sets. For they say that whatever seems good to the majority of the citizens ought to be sovereign. [loeb_subsection_13] Let us then accept this principle, yet not wholly without qualification, but inasmuch as fortune has brought into existence two component parts of the state, rich and poor, let any resolution passed by both classes, or by a majority of each, be sovereign, but if the two classes carry opposite resolutions, let the decision of the majority, in the sense of the group whose total property assessment is the larger, prevail: for instance, if there are ten rich citizens and twenty poor ones, and opposite votes have been cast by six of the rich on one side and by fifteen of the less wealthy on the other, four of the rich have sided with the poor and five of the poor with the rich; then the side that has the larger total property when the assessments of both classes on either side are added together carries the voting.If the rich citizens are on the average twice as wealthy as the poor (1.11), and therefore a rich man has two votes to a poor man’s one, when 6 rich and 5 poor vote one way, and 15 poor and 4 rich the other, the division is 17 to 23, and the view of the latter party, which is carried, represents a larger total of wealth but a larger proportion of poor men. [loeb_subsection_14] But if the totals fall out exactly equal, this is to be deemed an impasse common to both sides, as it is at present if the assembly or law-court is exactly divided;
[1318b] either a decision must be made by casting lots or some other such device must be adopted. But on questions of equality and justice, even though it is very difficult to discover the truth about them, nevertheless it is easier to hit upon it than to persuade people that have the power to get an advantage to agree to it; equality and justice are always sought by the weaker party, but those that have the upper hand pay no attention to them.
[loeb_section_2] [loeb_subsection_1] There being four kinds of democracy, the best is the one that stands first in structure, as was said in the discourses preceding theseCf. 4, 1291b 30-41, 1292b 25-33.; it is also the oldest of them all, but by first I mean first as it were in a classification of the kinds of common people. The best common people are the agricultural population, so that it is possible to introduce democracy as well as other forms of constitution where the multitude lives by agriculture or by pasturing cattle. For owing to their not having much property they are busy, so that they cannot often meet in the assembly, while owing to their havingThe MSS. give not having, but editors do not explain how in that case people would avoid starvation. the necessaries of life they pass their time attending to their farm work and do not covet their neighbors’ goods, but find more pleasure in working than in taking part in politics and holding office, where the profits to be made from the offices are not large; for the mass of mankind are more covetous of gain than of honor. [loeb_subsection_2] And this is indicated by the fact that men endured the tyrannies of former times, and endure oligarchies, if a ruler does not preventthem from working orrob them; for then some of them soon get rich and the others free from want. And also, if they have any ambition, to have control over electing magistrates and calling them to account makes up for the lack of office, since in some democracies even if the people have no part in electing the magistrates but these are elected by a special committee selected in turn out of the whole number, as at Mantinea, yet if they have the power of deliberating on policy, the multitude are satisfied. (And this too must be counted as one form of democracy, on the lines on which it once existed at Mantinea.) [loeb_subsection_3] Indeed it is for this reason that it is advantageous for the form of democracy spoken of before, and is a customary institution in it, for all the citizens to elect the magistrates and call them to account, and to try law-suits, but for the holders of the greatest magistracies to be elected and to have property-qualifications, the higher offices being elected from the higher property-grades, or else for no office to be elected on a property-qualification, but for officials to be chosen on the ground of capacity. And a state governed in this way is bound to be governed well (for the offices will always be administered by the best men with the consent of the people and without their being jealous of the upper classes), and this arrangement is certain to be satisfactory for the upper classes and notables, for they will not be under the government of others inferior to themselves, and they will govern justly because a different class will be in control of the audits— [loeb_subsection_4] since it is expedient to be in a state of suspense and not to be able to do everything exactly as seems good to one, for liberty to do whatever one likes cannot guard against the evil that is in every man’s character.