[1310a] so that when men destroy these classes by laws carried to excess they destroy the constitutions. [loeb_subsection_19] And a mistake is made both in democracies and in oligarchies—in democracies by the demagogues, where the multitude is supreme over the laws; for they always divide the state into two by fighting with the well-to-do, but they ought on the contrary always to pretend to be speaking on behalf of men that are well-to-do, while in democracies the oligarchical statesmen ought to pretend to be speaking on behalf of the people, and the oligarchics ought to take oath in terms exactly opposite to those which they use now, for at present in some oligarchies they swear, And I will be hostile to the people and will plan whatever evil I can against them,The scoffing anapaestic cadence of this oath has been noted. In 411 B.C. the democratic reaction at Athens swore to be enemies of the Four Hundred and to hold no parley with them. but they ought to hold, and to act the part of holding, the opposite notion, declaring in their oaths, I will not wrong the people. [loeb_subsection_20] But the greatest of all the means spoken of to secure the stability of constitutions is one that at present all people despise: it is a system of education suited to the constitutions. For there is no use in the most valuable laws, ratified by the unanimous judgement of the whole body of citizens, if these are not trained and educated in the constitution, popularly if the laws are popular, oligarchically if they are oligarchical; for there is such a thing as want of self-discipline in a state, as well as in an individual. [loeb_subsection_21] But to have been educated to suit the constitution does not mean to do the things that give pleasure to the adherents of oligarchy or to the supportersof democracy, but the things that will enable the former to govern oligarchically and the latter to govern themselves democratically. But at present in the oligarchies the sons of the rulers are luxurious, and the sons of the badly-off become trained by exercise and labor, so that they are both more desirous of reform and more able to bring it about; [loeb_subsection_22] while in the democracies thought to be the most democratic the opposite of what is expedient has come about. And the cause of this is that they define liberty wrongly (for there are two things that are thought to be defining features of democracy, the sovereignty of the majority and liberty); for justice is supposed to be equality, and equality the sovereignty of what ever may have been decided by the multitude, and liberty doing just what one likes. Hence in democracies of this sort everybody lives as he likes, and unto what end he listeth, as EuripidesFragment 883, from an unknown play. says. But this is bad; for to live in conformity with the constitution ought not to be considered slavery but safety.
This therefore, speaking broadly, is a list of the things that cause the alteration and the destruction of constitutions, and of those that cause their security and continuance.
[loeb_section_8] [loeb_subsection_1] It remains to speak of monarchy, the causes that destroy it and the natural means of its preservation.
[1310b] And the things that happen about royal governments and tyrannies are almost similar to those that have been narrated about constitutional governments. For royal government corresponds with aristocracy, while tyranny is a combination of the last form of oligarchyCf. 1296a 3, 1312b 35. and of democracy; and for that very reason it is most harmful to its subjects, inasmuch as it is a combination of two bad things, and is liable to the deviations and errors that spring from both forms of constitution. [loeb_subsection_2] And these two different sorts of monarchy have their origins from directly opposite sources; royalty has come into existence for the assistance of the distinguished against the people, and a king is appointed from those distinguished by superiority in virtue or the actions that spring from virtue, or by superiority in coming from a family of that character, while a tyrant is set up from among the people and the multitude to oppose the notables, in order that the people may suffer no injustice from them. [loeb_subsection_3] And this is manifest from the facts of history. For almost the greatest number of tyrants have risen, it may be said, from being demagogues, having won the people’s confidence by slandering the notables. For some tyrannies were set up in this manner when the states had already grown great, but others that came before them arose from kings departing from the ancestral customs and aiming at a more despotic rule,and others from the men elected to fill the supreme magistracies (for in old times the peoples used to appoint the popular officialsHere δημιουργία means magistracy generally; δημιουργός was the title of a special officer in some Peloponnesian states. and the sacred embassiesOfficial missions to religious games and to oracles. for long terms of office), and others from oligarchies electing some one supreme official for the greatest magistracies. [loeb_subsection_4] For in all these methods they had it in their powerto effect their purpose easily, if only they wished, because they already possessed the power of royal rule in the one set of cases and of their honorable office in the other, for example Phidon in Argos Perhaps circa 750 B.C. and others became tyrants when they possessed royal power already, while the Ionian tyrantse.g. Thrasybulus, tyrant of Miletus, 612 B.C. and PhalarisTyrant of Agrigentum 572 B.C. arose from offices of honor, and Panaetius at Leontini and Cypselus at Corinth and PisistratusSee 1305a 23 n. at Athens and DionysiusSee 1259a 28 n. at Syracuse and others in the same manner from the position of demagogue. [loeb_subsection_5] Therefore, as we said, royalty is ranged in correspondence with aristocracy, for it goes by merit, either by private virtue or by family or by services or by a combination of these things and ability. For in every instance this honor fell to men after they had conferred benefit or because they had the ability to confer benefit on their cities or their nations, some having prevented their enslavement in war, for instance Codrus,The usual tradition was that Codrus was already king when he saved Athens by sacrificing his life. others having set them free, for instance Cyrus,Cyrus liberated Persia from the Median empire 559 B.C. or having settled or acquired territory, for instance the kings of Sparta and Macedon and the Molossians.Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, conquered the Molossi and became their king. [loeb_subsection_6] And a king wishes to be a guardian,