[1307a] for some men being in distress because of the war put forward a claim to carry out a re-division of the land of the country). Also if a man is great and capable of being yet greater, he stirs up faction in order that he may be sole ruler (as Pausanias who commanded the army through the Persian war seems to have done at Sparta, and HannoPerhaps Hanno who fought in Sicily against the elder Dionysius circa 4OO B.C. at Carthage).
[loeb_subsection_3] But the actual overthrow of both constitutional governments and aristocracies is mostly due to a departure from justice in the actual framework of the constitution. For what starts it in the case of a constitutional government is that it does not contain a good blend of democracy and oligarchy; and in the case of an aristocracy it is the lack of a good blend of those two elements and of virtue, but chiefly of the two elements (I mean popular government and oligarchy), for both constitutional governments and most of the constitutions that are called aristocracies aim at blending these. [loeb_subsection_4] For thisi.e. their mode of blending oligarchy and democracy. is the point of distinction between aristocracies and what are called constitutional governments, and it is owing to this that some of themThe writer loosely speaks of aristocracies and polities as a single class, differing only in degree of concentration of power in the hands of the upper classes. are less and others more stable; for the constitutions inclining more towards oligarchy men call aristocracies and those inclining more to the side of the multitude constitutional governments, owing to which those of the latter sort are more secure than the others, for the greater number is the stronger, and also men are more content when they have an equal amount, whereas the owners of wealthy properties, if the constitution gives them the superior position,seek to behave insolently and to gain money. [loeb_subsection_5] And speaking broadly, to whichever side the constitution leans, that is the side to which it shifts as either of the two parties increases its own side—a constitutional government shifts to democracy and an aristocracy to oligarchy, or to the opposite extremes, that is, aristocracy to democracy (for the poorer people feeling they are unjustly treated pull it round to the opposite) and constitutional governments to oligarchy (for the only lasting thing is equality in accordance with desert and the possession of what is their own). [loeb_subsection_6] And the change mentionedi.e. from aristocracy to democracy. Possibly these events occurred after the defeat of Athens at Syracuse in 413 B.C., when the Athenian party at Thurii was banished (Lysias 835 D). The events in 8 were perhaps in the fourth century. came about at Thurii, for because the property-qualification for honors was too high, the constitution was altered to a lower property-qualification and to a larger number of official posts, but because the notables illegally bought up the whole of the land (for the constitution was too oligarchical, so that they were able to grasp at wealth) . . .Probably a clause meaning civil strife ensued has been lost. And the people having been trained in the war overpowered the guards, until those who were in the position of having too much land relinquished it.
[loeb_subsection_7] Besides, as all aristocratic constitutions are inclined towards oligarchy, the notables grasp at wealth (for example at Sparta the estates are coming into a few hands); and the notables have more power to do what they like, and to form marriage connections with whom they like (which was the cause of the fall of the state of Locri, as a result of the marriage with Dionysius,See 1259a 28 n. He married in 397 B.C. the daughter of a Locrian citizen, who bore him the younger Dionysius. which would not have taken place in a democracy; nor in a well-blended aristocracy).
[1307b] And aristocracies are most liable to undergo revolution unobserved, through gradual relaxation, just as it has been said in what has gone before about all forms of constitution in general, that even a small change may cause a revolution. For when they give up one of the details of the constitution, afterwards they also make another slightly bigger change more readily, until they alter the whole system. [loeb_subsection_8] This occurred for instance with the constitution of Thurii. There was a law that the office of general could be held at intervals of four years, but some of the younger men, becoming warlike and winning high repute with the mass of the guards, came to despise the men engaged in affairs, and thought that they would easily get control; so first they tried to repeal the law referred to, so as to enable the same persons to serve as generals continuously, as they saw that the people would vote for themselves with enthusiasm. And though the magistrates in charge of this matter, called the Councillors, at first made a movement to oppose them, they were won over, believing that after repealing this law they would allow the rest of the constitution to stand; but later, though they wished to prevent them when other laws were being repealed, they could no longer do anything more, but the whole system of the constitution was converted into a dynasty of the men who had initiated the innovations.
[loeb_subsection_9] And constitutions of all formsare broken up some times from movements initiating from within themselves, but sometimes from outside, when there is an opposite form of constitution either near by or a long way off yet possessed of power. This used to happen in the days of the Athenians and the Spartans; the Athenians used to put down oligarchies everywhere and the Spartans democracies.
We have then approximately stated the causes that give rise to revolutions in the constitutions of states and to party factions.
[loeb_section_7] [loeb_subsection_1] The next thing to speak about is security both in general and for each form of constitution separately. First then it is clear that if we know the causes by which constitutions are destroyed we also know the causes by which they are preserved; for opposites create opposites, and destruction is the opposite of security. In well-blended constitutions therefore, if care must be taken to prevent men from committing any other breach of the law, most of all must a small breach be guarded against, [loeb_subsection_2] for transgression of the law creeps in unnoticed, just as a small expenditure occurring often ruins men’s estates; for the expense is not noticed because it does not come all at once, for the mind is led astray by the repeated small outlays, just like the sophistic puzzle, if each is little, then all are alittle.This is the soritesfallacy; add to one stone another, and another, and another—when do they make a heap ( σωρός)? and take away stone after stone—when do they cease to be a heap? Horace’s ratio ruentis acerui (Hor. Ep. 2.47. This is true in one way but in another it is not; for the whole or total is not little, but made up of little parts. One thing therefore that we must guard against is this beginning; and the next point is that we must not put faith in the arguments strung together for the sake of tricking the multitude,