but the qualifications specifiedThat is, numbers and wealth. in more: [1302a] nowhere are there a hundred men nobly born and good, but there are rich menPerhaps the text should be emended to give there are many rich men and poor men in many places. in many places. But for the constitution to be framed absolutely and entirely according to either kind of equality is bad. And this is proved by experience, for not one of the constitutions formed on such lines is permanent. And the cause of this is that it is impossible for some evil not to occur ultimately from the first and initial error that has been made. Hence the proper course is to employ numerical equality in some things and equality according to worth in others. [loeb_subsection_9] But nevertheless democracy is safer and more free from civil strife than oligarchy; for in oligarchies two kinds of strife spring up, faction between different members of the oligarchy and also faction between the oligarchs and the people, whereas in democracies only strife between the people and the oligarchical party occurs, but party strife between different sections of the people itself does not occur to any degree worth mentioning. And again the government formed of the middle classes is nearer to the people than to the few, and it is the safest of the kinds of constitution mentioned.
[loeb_section_2] [loeb_subsection_1] And since we are considering what circumstances give rise to party factions and revolutions in constitutions, we must first ascertain their origins and causes generally. They are, speaking roughly, three in number,Viz. the material, final and efficient causes of revolutions (Jowett). which we must first define in outline separately.For we must ascertain what state of affairs gives rise to party strife, and for what objects it is waged, and thirdly what are the origins of political disorders and internal party struggles.
Now the principal cause, speaking generally, of the citizens being themselves disposed in a certain manner towards revolution is the one about which we happen to have spoken already. Those that desire equality enter on party strife if they think that they have too little although they are the equals of those who have more, while those that desire inequality or superiority do so if they suppose that although they are unequal they have not got more but an equal amount or less [loeb_subsection_2] (and these desires may be felt justly, and they may also be felt unjustly); for when inferior, people enter on strife in order that they may be equal, and when equal, in order that they may be greater. We have therefore said what are the states of feeling in which men engage in party strife.
The objects about which it is waged are gain and honor, and their opposites, for men carry on party faction in states in order to avoid dishonor and loss, either on their own behalf or on behalf of their friends.
[loeb_subsection_3] And the causes and origins of the disturbances which occasion the actual states of feeling described and their direction to the objects mentioned, according to one account happen to be seven in number, though according to another they are more. Two of them are the same as those spoken of before although not operating in the same way: the motives of gain and honor also stir men up against each other not in order that they may get them for themselves, as has been said before,
[1302b] but because they see other men in some cases justly and in other cases unjustly getting a larger share of them. Other causes are insolence, fear, excessive predominance, contempt, disproportionate growth of power; and also other modes of causeThe four causes now mentioned are those alluded to just above (1302a 38) as an addition to the seven enumerated above, 1302a 38-b 5. are election intrigue, carelessness, pettiness, dissimilarity. [loeb_subsection_4] Among these motives the power possessed by insolence and gain, and their mode of operation, is almost obvious; for when the men in office show insolence and greed, people rise in revolt against one another and against the constitutions that afford the opportunity for such conduct; and greed sometimes preys on private property and sometimes on common funds. It is clear also what is the power of honor and how it can cause party faction; for men form factions both when they are themselves dishonored and when they see others honored; and the distribution of honors is unjust when persons are either honored or dishonored against their deserts, just when it is according to desert. Excessive predominance causes faction, when some individual or body of men is greater and more powerful than is suitable to the state and the power of the government; for such are the conditions that usually result in the rise of a monarchy or dynasty. [loeb_subsection_5] Owing to this in some places they have the custom of temporary banishment,Cf. 1284a 18. as at Argos and Athens; yet it would be better to provide from the outset that there may be no persons in the stateso greatly predominant, than first to allow them to come into existence and afterwards to apply a remedy. Fear is the motive of faction with those who have inflicted wrong and are afraid of being punished, and also with those who are in danger of suffering a wrong and wish to act in time before the wrong is inflicted, as the notables at Rhodes banded togetherPerhaps in 390 B.C., cf. 1302b 32 f. and 1304b 27 ff. against the people because of the law-suits that were being brought against them. [loeb_subsection_6] Contempt is a cause of faction and of actual attacks, upon the government, for instance in oligarchies when those who have no share in the government are more numerous (for they think themselves the stronger party), and in democracies when the rich have begun to feel contempt for the disorder and anarchy that prevails, as for example at Thebes the democracy was destroyed owing to bad government after the battle of Oenophyta,Against Athens, 456 B.C. and that of the Megarians was destroyed when they had been defeated owing to disorder and anarchy,See 1300a 18 n. and at Syracuse before the tyranny 485 B.C. of Gelo, and at Rhodes See 1302b 23 n. the common people had fallen into contempt before the rising against them. [loeb_subsection_7] Revolutions in the constitutions also take place on account of disproportionate growth; for just as the bodyIt is not clear whether what follows refers to a work of art (cf. 1284b 8) or is an exaggerated account of a disease; Galen describes one called σατυρίασις, in which the bones of the temple swell out like satyrs’ horns. is composed of parts, and needs to grow proportionately in order that its symmetry may remain, and if it does not it is spoiled, when the foot is four cubits long and the rest of the body two spans, and sometimes it might even change into the shape of another animal if it increased disproportionately not only in size but also in quality,i.e. if, for example, the foot became as hard as a hoof. so also a state is composed of parts,