[1296a] since where some own a very great deal of property and others none there comes about either an extreme democracy or an unmixed oligarchy, or a tyranny may result from both of the two extremes, for tyranny springs from both democracy and oligarchy of the most unbridled kind, but much less often from the middle forms of constitution and those near to them. The cause of this we will speak of later in our treatment of political revolutions. [loeb_subsection_9] That the middle form of constitution is the best is evident; for it alone is free from faction, since where the middle class is numerous, factions and party divisions among the citizens are least likely to occur. And the great states are more free from faction for the same reason, because the middle class is numerous, whereas in the small states it is easy to divide the whole people into two parties leaving nothing in between, and also almost everybody is needy or wealthy. Also democracies are more secure and more long-lived than oligarchies owing to the citizens of the middle class (for they are more numerous and have a larger share of the honors in democracies than in oligarchies), since when the poor are in a majority without the middle class, adversity sets in and they are soon ruined. [loeb_subsection_10] And it must be deemed a significant fact that the best lawgivers are from among the middle citizens; for Solon was of that class,as appears from his poetry, and so was Lycurgus (for he was not a king) and Charondas and almost the greatest number of the other lawgivers.
And these considerations also show the reason why the constitutions of most states are either democratic or oligarchical; owing to the middle class in these states being often a small one, the classes diverging from the middle status—whichever of the two, the owners of the estates or the people, from time to time has the upper hand—conduct the government on their own lines, so that it becomes either a democracy or an oligarchy. [loeb_subsection_11] And in addition to this, because factions occur and fights between the people and the wealthy, whichever party happens to gain the upper hand over its opponents does not establish a common or equal government, but takes the superior share in the government as a prize of victory, and makes it a democracy in the one case and an oligarchy in the other. Moreover each of the two states that in the past held the leadership of Greece took as a pattern the form of government that existed among themselves and set up in the one case democracies and in the other oligarchies in the cities, not considering the interest of the cities but their own advantage. [loeb_subsection_12] Hence owing to these causes the middle form of constitution either never comes into existence or seldom and in few places; for one manIt is quite uncertain who is meant, possibly Solon or Theramenes. only among the states that have formerly held the leadership was induced to grant this form of organization, and by this time it has become a fixed habit with the people of the separate cities also not even to desire equality,
[1296b] but either to seek to rule or to endure being under a master.
These considerations therefore make it clear which is the best constitution, and why it is the best; [loeb_subsection_13] and now that the best has been defined, it is not difficult to see, among the other forms of constitution (inasmuch as we pronounce that there are various forms of democracy and various oligarchies), what kind is to be placed first, what second, and what next in this order, by reason of one being better and another worse. For at each stage the form nearest to the best one must necessarily be superior, and the form that is more remote from the middle must be inferior—unless one is judging relatively to given conditions: I make this reservation because it is quite possible that although one form of constitution is preferable it may often be more advantageous for certain people to have another form.
[loeb_section_10] [loeb_subsection_1] The next thing after what has been said is to discuss which constitution is advantageous for which people, and what sort of constitution for what sort of people. Now we must first grasp a general principle that applies equally to all sorts of constitution: it is essential that the part of the state that wishes the constitution to remain should be stronger than the part that does not wish it. But every state consists of both quality and quantity: by quality I mean freedom, wealth, education, good birth, and by quantity the superior numbers of the multitude. [loeb_subsection_2] And it is possible that,while the quality of the state belongs to one among the parts of which the state consists and its quantity to another part—for example the low-born may be more numerous than the noble or the poor than the rich, yet the more numerous class may not exceed in quantity as much as they fall behind in quality. Hence these two factors have to be judged in comparison with one another.
Where therefore the multitude of the poor exceeds in the proportion stated,i.e. so as to outbalance their inferiority in quality. here it is natural for there to be democracy, and each kind of democracy in accordance with the superior number of the common people of each sort, for example if the number of the farming class exceeds, the first sort of democracy, but if that of the common laborers and wage-earners, the last sort, and similarly also with the other sorts that lie between these two; [loeb_subsection_3] but where the class of the well-to-do and notable exceeds in quality more than it falls behind in quantity, here it is natural for there to be an oligarchy, and likewise the various kinds of oligarchy according to the degree of superiorityi.e. superiority in quality. of the oligarchical multitude.The word is loosely used of this small class. But the lawgiver in his constitution must always take in the middle class; if he is making the laws of anoligarchical character he must keep the middle class in view, and if democratic, he must legislate so as to bring them in. [loeb_subsection_4] And where the number of the middle class exceeds both the extreme classes together, or even one of them only, here it is possible for a constitutional government to be lasting;