[1294a] And it seems an impossibility for a city governed not by the aristocracy but by the base to have well-ordered government, and similarly also for a city that has not a well-ordered government to be governed aristocratically. But to have good laws enacted but not obey them does not constitute well-ordered government. Hence one form of good government must be understood to consist in the laws enacted being obeyed, and another form in the laws which the citizens keep being well enacted (for it is possible to obey badly enacted laws). And for laws to be well enacted is possible in two ways: they must either be the best laws possible for the given people or the best absolutely. [loeb_subsection_4] But aristocracy in the fullest sense seems to consist in the distribution of the honors according to virtue; for virtue is the defining factor of aristocracy, as wealth is of oligarchy, and freedom of democracy (while the principle that a decision of the majority is supreme is found in them all: for in both oligarchy and aristocracy and democracies whatever the larger part of those who have a share in the government decides is supreme). In most statesi.e. in most states that are considered aristocracies. then the name of aristocracy is given to that form of constitutional government,i.e. the more oligarchical form, 1293b 36. for the combination aims only at the well-off and the poor, wealth and freedom (since in almost the largest number of states the rich seem to occupy the place of the gentry); [loeb_subsection_5] butas there are three things that claim equal participationin the constitution, freedom, wealth and virtue (for the fourth, what is called nobility, accompanies the two latter—nobility means ancient wealth and virtue), it is manifest that the mixture of the two factors, the rich and the poor,Loosely put for wealth and free birth. ought to be termed constitutional government, while the mixture of the three factors deserves the name of aristocracy most of all the various forms of aristocracy beside the true and best form.
It has then been stated that other forms of constitution also exist besides monarchy, democracy and oligarchy, and what their characteristics are, and how the various sorts of aristocracy and of constitutional government differ from one another; and it is manifest that aristocracy and constitutional government are not widely apart from one another.
[loeb_section_7] [loeb_subsection_1] Next to what has been said let us state the way in which what is called constitutional government comes into existence by the side of democracy and oligarchy, and how it is proper to establish it. At the same time the defining characteristics of democracy and oligarchy will also be clear; for we must grasp the distinction between these and then make a combination out of them, taking, so to say, a contribution from each. And there are three principles determining this combination or mixture. [loeb_subsection_2] Under one plan we must adopt both features from the legislative schemes of the two different constitutions: for example, in regard to the administration of justice, in oligarchies they institute a fine for the rich if they do not serve on juries but no pay for the poor for serving, while in democracies they assign pay for the poor but no fine for the rich, but a common and intermediate principle is to have both payment and fine, and therefore this is a mark of a constitutional government, since it is a mixture of elements from both oligarchy and democracy.
[1294b] [loeb_subsection_3] This then is one mode of combining the two. Another is to take the middle course between the regulations of each: for example, democracies permit membership of the assembly on no property-qualification at all or a quite small one, oligarchies on a large property-qualification, but the combination clearly is to have neither principle, but one which lies in the middle between either of these two qualifications. In the third place is a combination of the two systems, taking some features from the oligarchical law and some from the democratic; I mean, for example, that it is thought to be democratic for the offices to be assigned by lot, for them to be elected oligarchic, and democratic for them not to have a property-qualification, oligarchic to have one; therefore it is aristocratic and constitutional to take one feature from one form and the other from the other, from oligarchy that offices are to be elected, and from democracy that this is not to be on a property-qualification. This then is the mode of the mixture; [loeb_subsection_4] and the mark of a good mixture of democracy and oligarchy is when it is possible to speak of the same constitution as a democracy and as an oligarchy; for manifestly this is so when it is said because they have been mixed well, and this is the case with the form that lies in the middle, for each of the two extreme forms can be seen in it. [loeb_subsection_5] This is the case with the constitution of Sparta. For many peopleendeavor to describe it as being a democracy, because its system has many democratic features, for instance first of all its regulation for the rearing of boys, since the sons of the rich are brought up in the same way as those of the poor, and are educated in a manner in which the sons of the poor also could be educated, and they are also treated similarly at the next age, and in the same manner when they are grown up, for there is nothing that distinguishes the rich man from the poor man—thus the arrangements for food are the same for all at the common messes, and the rich wear clothes such as even any poor man could procure, and also because of the two greatest offices the common people elect to one and share in the other (they elect the Elders and share in the Ephorate); but others call it an oligarchy, because it has many oligarchical features, for instance that all the offices are elective and none appointed by lot and few persons have the power to sentence to death and exile, and a number of other such matters. [loeb_subsection_6] But in a well-constructed mixed constitution both of the two factors, and neither of them,A conjectural emendation removes this mysterious epigram, giving and not one of the two (only). should seem to be present, and it should be kept safe by its own means and not by outside aid, and by its own means not because those who desire its security are more numerous outside itOr, if ἔξωθεν is an interpolation, not merely because those (citizens) who wish it to survive are more numerous (than those who do not). (for even a bad constitution might possess this quality), but because no section of the state whatever would even wish for another constitution.
The proper way therefore to establish a constitutional government, and similarly also the governments named aristocracies, has now been stated.