[1278a] for slaves also are not in one of the classes mentioned, nor are freedmen. [loeb_subsection_2] For it is true that not all the persons indispensable for the existence of a state are to be deemed citizens, since even the sons of citizens are not citizens in the same sense as the adults: the latter are citizens in the full sense, the former only by presumptionOr, with Casaubon’s probable correction of the Greek, only with a qualification.—they are citizens, but incomplete ones. In ancient times in fact the artisan class in some states consisted of slaves or aliens, owing to which the great mass of artisans are so even now; and the best-ordered state will not make an artisan a citizen. While if even the artisan is a citizen, then what we said to be the citizen’s virtue must not be said to belong to every citizen, nor merely be defined as the virtue of a free man, but will only belong to those who are released from menial occupations. [loeb_subsection_3] Among menial occupations those who render such services to an individual are slaves, and those who do so for the community are artisans and hired laborers. The state of the case about them will be manifest from what follows when we consider it a little further[, for what has been said when made known itself makes it clear].The ill-expressed clause for what—clear seems almost certainly to be an interpolation. As there are several forms of constitution, it follows that there are several kinds of citizen, and especially of the citizen in a subject position; hence under one form of constitution citizenship will necessarily extend to the artisan and the hired laborer, while under other forms this is impossible, for instance in any constitution that is of the form entitled aristocratic and in whichthe honors are bestowed according to goodness and to merit, since a person living a life of manual toil or as a hired laborer cannot practise the pursuits in which goodness is exercised. [loeb_subsection_4] In oligarchies on the other hand, though it is impossible for a hired laborer to be a citizen (since admission to office of various grades is based on high property-assessments), it is possible for an artisan; for even the general mass of the craftsmen are rich. At Thebes there was a law that no one who had not kept out of trade for the last ten years might be admitted to office. But under many constitutions the law draws recruits even from foreigners; for in some democracies the son of a citizen-mother is a citizen, [loeb_subsection_5] and the same rule holds good as to base-born sons in many places. Nevertheless, inasmuch as such persons are adopted as citizens owing to a lack of citizens of legitimate birth (for legislation of this kind is resorted to because of under-population), when a state becomes well off for numbers it gradually divests itself first of the sons of a slave father or mother, then of those whose mothers only were citizens, and finally only allows citizenship to the children of citizens on both sides. [loeb_subsection_6] These facts then show that there are various kinds of citizen, and that a citizen in the fullest sense means the man who shares in the honors of the state, as is implied in the verse of Homer Hom. Il. 9.648, Hom. Il. 16.59 : Like to some alien settler without honor,— since a native not admitted to a share in the public honors is like an alien domiciled in the land. But in some places this exclusion is disguised, for the purpose of deceiving those who are a part of the population.The MSS. give But where such exclusion is disguised, it (this concealment) is for the purpose of deceiving etc.
The answer therefore to the question, [1278b] Is the goodness that makes a good man to be deemed the same as that which makes a worthy citizen, or different? is now clear from what has been said in one form of state the good man and the good citizen are the same, but in another they are different, and also in the former case it is not every citizen but only the statesman, the man who controls or is competent to control, singly or with colleagues, the administration of the commonwealth, that is essentially also a good man.
[loeb_section_4] [loeb_subsection_1] And since these points have been determined, the next question to be considered is whether we are to lay it down that there is only one form of constitution or several, and if several, what they are and how many and what are the differences between them. Now a constitution is the ordering of a state in respect of its various magistracies, and especially the magistracy that is supreme over all matters. For the government is everywhere supreme over the state and the constitution is the government. I mean that in democratic states for example the people are supreme, but in oligarchies on the contrary the few are; and we say that they have a different constitution. And we shall use the same language about the other forms of government also.
[loeb_subsection_2] We have therefore to determine first the fundamental points, what is the object for which a state exists and how many different kinds of system there are for governing mankind and for controlling the common life.
Now it has been said in our first discourses,1253a 1 ff. in which we determined the principles concerning household management and the control of slaves, that man is by nature a political animal;and so even when men have no need of assistance from each other they none the less desire to live together. [loeb_subsection_3] At the same time they are also brought together by common interest, so far as each achieves a share of the good life. The good life then is the chief aim of society, both collectively for all its members and individually; but they also come together and maintain the political partnership for the sake of life merely, for doubtless there is some element of value contained even in the mere state of being alive, provided that there is not too great an excess on the side of the hardships of life, and it is clear that the mass of mankind cling to life at the cost of enduring much suffering, which shows that life contains some measure of well-being and of sweetness in its essential nature.
[loeb_subsection_4] And again, the several recognized varieties of government can easily be defined; in fact we frequently discuss them in our external discourses.Mentioned at 1323a 22 (and also six times in other books); they are there appealed to for the tripartite classification of foods which in Aristot. Nic. Eth.1098b 12 is ascribed to current opinion of long standing and generally accepted by students of philosophy. The term may there predenote doctrines not peculiar to the Peripatetic school. The authority of a master over a slave, although in truth when both master and slave are designed by nature for their positions their interests are the same, nevertheless governs in the greater degree with a view to the interest of the master, but incidentally with a view to that of the slave, for if the slave deteriorates the position of the master cannot be saved from injury. [loeb_subsection_5] Authority over children and wife [and over the whole household, which we call the art of household managementAristotle can hardly have written this clause, as it includes mastership over slaves.] is exercised either in the interest of those ruled or for some common interest of both parties,—essentially, in the interest of the ruled, as we see that the other arts also,