[1266a] [loeb_subsection_11] In Plato’s Laws on the other hand it is stated that the best constitution must consist of a combination of democracy and tyranny,Plato wrote monarchy, Plat. Laws 693d (cf. here 3.13). which one might refuse to count as constitutional governments at all, or else rank as the worst of all constitutions. A better theory therefore is put forward by those who intermingle a larger number of forms, for the constitution composed of a combination of a larger number of forms is better. In the next place, the constitution in the Laws proves as a matter of fact not to contain any element of monarchy at all, but its factors are taken from oligarchy and democracy, and for the most part it tends to incline towards oligarchy. This appears from the regulations for the appointment of the magistrates; for their selection by lot from a list previously elected by vote is a feature common to both oligarchy and democracy, but the compulsion put upon the richer citizens to attend the assembly and vote for magistrates or perform any other political function, while the others are allowed to do as they like, is oligarchical, as is the endeavor to secure that a majority of the magistrates shall be drawn from the wealthy and that the highest offices shall be filled from the highest of the classes assessed by wealth. [loeb_subsection_12] But the writer also makes the election of the council oligarchical for everybody is compelled to elect, but from the first property-class, and then again an equal number from the second class, and then from the members of the third class, except that it was not to be compulsory for all to vote for those to be elected from the members of the third or the fourth class, and to elect from the fourth class was only compulsory for the members of the first and second classes; and afterwards from those thus selected he says that they are to appointan equal number from each class. Thus those who elect the members from the highest property classes will be more numerous and better,i.e. a better ellective body because representative of all classes. because some of the lower orders will abstain from votingi.e. from voting for the preliminary list from the third and fourth classes. as it is not compulsory. [loeb_subsection_13] Accordingly that it is not proper to establish a constitution of this character from a blend of democracy and monarchy appears clearly from these considerations, and from what will be said later when our inquiry comes to deal with this class of constitution; also the provision for the election of the rulers from among candidates chosen at a preliminary election is dangerous, for if even a moderate number of people choose to combine into a party, the elections will always go according to their wish.
Such are the points as to the constitution in the Laws.
[loeb_section_4] [loeb_subsection_1] There are also certain other constitutional schemes, some drawn up by amateurs and others by philosophers and statesmen, but all of them are nearer to those which have been actually established and by which states are governed at present than are both of those which have been considered; for nobody else has introduced the innovation of community of children and women, nor that of public meals for the women, but they start rather with the necessary reforms. For some persons think that the right regulation of property is the most important; for the question of property, they say, is universally the cause of party strife. Therefore the Chalcedonian PhaleasOtherwise unknown. was the first who introduced this expedient;
[loeb_subsection_2] for he says that the citizens’ estates ought to be equal [1266b] and he thought that this would not be difficult to secure at the outset for cities in process of foundation, while in those already settled, although it would be a more irksome task, nevertheless a levelling would most easily be effected by the rich giving dowries but not receiving them and the poor receiving but not giving them. Plato when writing the Laws thought that up to a certain point inequality ought to be allowed, but that no citizen should be permitted to acquire more land than would make his estate five times the size of the smallest, as has also been said before.
[loeb_subsection_3] But those who bring in legislation of this sort must also not overlook this point, which is overlooked at present, that when regulating the amount of property legislators ought also to regulate the size of the family; for if the number of children becomes too large for the property, the law is quite sure to be broken, and apart from the breach of the law it is a bad thing that many citizens who were rich should become poor, for it is difficult for such men not to be advocates of a new order. [loeb_subsection_4] That a level standard of property affects the community of the citizens in an important manner some men even in old times clearly have recognized; for example there is the legislation of Solon, and other states have a law prohibiting the acquisition of land to any amount that the individual may desire; and similarly there is legislation to prevent the sale of estates, as at Locri there is a lawthat a man shall not sell unless he can prove that manifest misfortune has befallen him and also there is legislation to preserve the old allotments, and the repeal of this restriction at Leucas made the Leucadian constitution excessively democratic, for it came about that the offices were no longer filled from the established property-qualifications. [loeb_subsection_5] But it is possible that equality of estates may be maintained, but their size may be either too large and promote luxury, or too small, causing a penurious standard of living; it is clear therefore that it is not enough for the lawgiver to make the estates equal, but he must aim at securing a medium size. And again, even if one prescribed a moderate property for all, it would be of no avail, since it is more needful to level men’s desires than their properties, and this can only be done by an adequate system of education enforced by law. [loeb_subsection_6] But perhaps Phaleas would say that he himself actually prescribes this, as he considers it fundamentally necessary for states to have equality in these two things, property and education. But the nature of the education needs to be defined: it is no use merely for it to be one and the same for all, for it is possible for all to have one and the same education but for this to be of such a nature as to make them desirous of getting more than their share of money or honor or both; [loeb_subsection_7] moreoverProbably the Greek should be altered to give because instead of moreover. civil strife is caused not only by inequality of property but also by inequality of honors, though the two motives operate in opposite ways—the masses are discontented if possessions are unequally distributed,